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Introduction 
i 1 Introduction 
"A fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the atomization implicit in the theoretical extremes 
of under- and oversoeialized conceptions. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, 
nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories 
that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations." (Granovetter 1985: 487) 
1.1 Introduction 
The entrepreneur takes a remarkable place in society. For the public, the entrepreneur is 
the hardworking, creative, independent successful businessman
1. He is Bill Gates or 
Donald Trump. In its ultimate form, he is the paperboy, who started with nothing and 
who worked hard, with genius, to build his empire, sometimes relentless, but always 
forward looking, seizing opportunities, and transforming challenges into victories. For the 
government, the entrepreneur is the supercharger of the economy. He is creating jobs and 
boosting economic growth. But for the researcher, the entrepreneur presents mainly a 
problem. How do we define him? What are his functions? Is he the Sayian manager of 
labor and capital, or the Marshallian jack-of-all-trade with general and specific abilities to 
deal with the variety of task of entrepreneurship, or is he the Schumpeterian innovator, 
who disrupts economic equilibrium, or rather the Knightean bearer of uncertainty? 
Although researchers differ in their conceptualizations and definitions of the entrepre-
neur, they acknowledge the entrepreneur's important function of changing the economic 
and social context by innovating new products, filling niches unattractive for multina-
tional enterprises, and increasing competition (see e.g. Parker 2004). 
As the opening quotes suggests, human action, like entrepreneurial action, oper-
ates never without a social context. Entrepreneurs do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social world. For the entrepreneur not only shapes the economic and social 
context with his products and actions, he is in turn dependent on and shaped by his social 
and economic context. For it is not without reason that an entrepreneur often stems from 
an entrepreneurial family, which does not only provide the entrepreneur with a pair of 
genes fit for the variety of entrepreneurial tasks, but also provides him with information, 
advice and support, and maybe even with the possibility to take over a company. And in 
every dialogue with an entrepreneur, he will ascertain you the value of his social network, 
in favoring him orders, assuring him product and service quality, and providing him 
timely and reliable information about suppliers and clients. During the last two decades, 
researchers have acknowledged the value of social structure and social networks and 
coined this phenomenon social capital, in close analogy to physical, financial and human 
capital. 
But the social context can be more subtle. The entrepreneur's history, his past 
choices, all influences his recent course through the entrepreneurial context. His invest-
ments in education, his savings on past earnings, his marriage, and even parental heritage, 
1 In this dissertation 1 will often speak of the entrepreneur as a man. Not because of gender preferences, but 
merely of the fact that still more men than women are entrepreneur today. 
2 can help the entrepreneur to fulfill his dreams to start a business. But at the same time, the 
accumulation of job-specific capital, the feeding and nurturing of children can make an 
entrepreneur anxious or reluctant to become who he really is. Not only is his social 
context in continuing flux, also the effects the social context bear on the individual can 
change over time. For example, parental social and financial support are mainly impor-
tant at the beginning of an individual's career, when he tries to get a foot on the ground, 
but lacks the necessary resources and experience to go on his own. And for the aging 
entrepreneur more time comes available when the demands of children fade away as they 
grow up and leave parental home. 
The entrepreneur is so strongly embedded in his social context, both horizontally 
through space by the social and economic structure and vertically through time by his 
past actions and choices and future aspirations, that entrepreneurial decisions can not be 
researched from a static atomized perspective, but should be studied as a dynamic phe-
nomenon mutually reinforcing social and economic context. Research questions should 
follow this empirical reality. Important research questions in self-employment and 
entrepreneurship literature need revision. The most common research questions "who 
becomes an entrepreneur and who exits entrepreneurship?" must be extended with 
research questions like "when does an individual becomes an entrepreneur and when does 
an individual decide to exit entrepreneurship?". Furthermore, researchers should question 
how these processes behave in a social context. 
1.2 Contributions and relevance of the study 
This dissertation explores the entry, exit, and capital accumulation decisions of entrepre-
neurs in a social context. In this dissertation, we are interested in the individual as a 
decision maker. Why do individuals decide to become an entrepreneur and why do 
individuals decide to exit entrepreneurship? Why do entrepreneurs differ in their timing 
of these decisions? And how can an individual's social environment affect these choices? 
Knowledge on the reasons why individuals enter self-employment is important for policy 
makers that want to promote the level of self-employment and unleash possible financial, 
human, and social capital constraints. However, the empirical evidence of the determi-
nants of self-employment entry provides mixed and contradictory results. Part of the 
confusion is attributable to the different sampling schemes used to study entry. Flow 
samples provide genuine information on the determinants of entrepreneurship. Stock 
samples, however, provide only information about the determinants of entrepreneurship 
under very restrictive assumptions. We believe that much of the controversy can be 
overcome by understanding the process that generates the self-employment entry data. 
Therefore, we derive a duration model of self-employment entry that is consistent with 
the stochastic process that generates the data. By this, we contribute to the dynamic 
analysis of self-employment entry decisions, as envisaged and modeled by Carroll and 
Mosakowski (1987). To our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly model the timing of 
the entry decision. 
There is another reason for the mixed empirical results. Entrepreneurs grow up in 
a social context. Growing up in an unproductive and backward social environment can 
constrain an individual's opportunity to become self-employed because he has no or 
3 limited access to financial or human capital. On the other hand, growing up in a social 
environment can also be the source of the opportunity to become self-employed. Namely, 
a considerable part of self-employment is family self-employment (Carroll and Mosa-
kowski 1987). People who take over a family business can be different from those who 
found an entirely new business. While real founders enter self-employment with the 
burden of financing the sunk nature of start up expenses, continuation of a family busi-
ness is like entering self-employment with a valuable set of assets already existent. 
Therefore, we build a theory of the dynamics of business succession and real founding. 
This model explains how human, financial, and social capital accumulation decisions 
influence the timing of the entry decision for these alternative types of self-employment. 
Differentiating real founding and family business succession can provide insights how the 
different requirements of these types of self-employment influence the speed whereby 
individuals become self-employed. This is to our knowledge the first theoretical model 
that can differentiate between family self-employment and de novo self-employment. 
Thereby, we finally materialize the suggestions for future research by Carroll and Mosa-
kowski (1987), who only addressed this distinction empirically. 
We believe that knowledge of the timing of the entry decision is important for the 
following reasons. If self-employment and its derivative entrepreneurship are important 
for economic growth and innovation (e.g. Cosh et al. 1999; Geroski and Pomroy 1990) 
then it is not only desirable that individuals become self-employed but also that they 
become self-employed early in their careers. Self-employment experience is namely an 
important predictor of future self-employment (Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Evans and 
Leighton 1989) and of self-employment success related to profits (Bosma et al. 2004) and 
related to business survival (Holmes and Schmitz 1996; Quadrini 1999; Taylor 1999). 
But the self-employment process does not stop after entry. An individual entering self-
employment demarcates the end of the entry event; however, an individual entering 
entrepreneurship also marks the start of the self-employment spell. We believe that these 
processes are related. Determinants that influence the timing of the entry decision can 
also influence the timing of the exit decision. We start from the postulate that the timing 
of the entry decision and the timing of the exit decision are not unrelated. We build a 
theoretical framework that acknowledges the option nature of the self-employment 
decision. Pivotal to this theory is that starting up a business involves sunk costs and that 
future earnings from self-employment are uncertain. We follow recent models of invest-
ments under uncertainty that show how the presence of sunk costs introduces an option 
value of waiting for new information and delaying irreversible decisions (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994). These models combine the question of whether to invest (the "q" value) 
with when to invest (the option value). The option value of setting up a self-employed 
business is largely ignored in the theoretical and empirical self-employment models. We 
follow recent work by Pfann (2006) in identifying idiosyncratic option values. 
Finally, we investigate why and how entrepreneurs invest in social relations. We 
believe that knowledge of these social capital accumulation decisions is important to 
understand differences in the composition of social networks among entrepreneurs. 
Inspired by Gleaser, Laibson, and Sacerdote's (2002) analysis of the formation of social 
capital in the form of club membership, we apply Becker's (1964) human capital theory 
to investments in social capital in the form of productive social relations. Social relations 
can add to profitability by economizing on transaction costs, minimizing search costs, 
4 enforcing contracts, stimulating trade, and providing timely access to valuable and 
reliable information. Entrepreneurs who face higher returns on investments in social 
relations may therefore be more successful entrepreneurs. We model the accomplishment 
of social relations as a rational choice. In our model, we analyze the choice of the number 
of productive relations in a profit maximizing framework under uncertainty. The main 
objective of this model is to show that profitability of productive social relations depends 
on the productivity of social relations within an industry and idiosyncratic accomplish-
ment costs. 
1.3 Research questions 
In order to better understand entry, exit, and capital accumulation behavior of entrepre-
neurs in a social context, the empirical part of this dissertation scrutinizes individual 
decisions related to self-employment. A first subset of research questions relates to the 
determinants of the timing of the entry decision. 
• How can the probability of entry into entrepreneurship be studied in a dynamic 
context? 
• What impact do individual characteristics have on the timing of the entry deci-
sion? 
• How does the social environment influence the self-employment decision? 
• How do the dynamics of the entry decision differ between different types of self-
employment? 
Empirical research relies on the participation of respondents. A common problem 
in surveys is non-response. Since part of our research is based on a newly created dataset, 
the so-called Limburg dataset; we ask ourselves the following research questions. 
• What are the sources of non-response in the Limburg survey? 
• Is there a structural relationship between the outcome of the self-employment en-
try decision and non-response? 
A second set of research questions focuses on the relationship between entry and exit 
decisions of individuals. 
• How can the theory of real options be applied to self-employment decisions? 
• What are the causes and consequences of sunk set up costs for self-employment 
entry and exit decisions? 
• How are the entry and exit decisions related to each other? 
• How do individual exit thresholds relate to the timing of the exit decision? 
Finally, we shift our attention from the entry and exit decisions of individuals to the 
accumulation decisions of entrepreneurs. More specific, we investigate the following 
research questions: 
5 • Why do social networks differ among entrepreneurs? 
• How can the accomplishment of entrepreneurial social networks be researched? 
1.4 Outline of the study 
The dissertation is organized as follows. To clarify the scientific context in which the 
research questions are embedded, chapter 2 surveys the literature on entrepreneurship, 
self-employment, and social capital. Because of the rather broad scope of this disserta-
tion, we only discuss parts of the literature, which are either canonical or which we deem 
important for answering our research questions. This literature survey is therefore neces-
sary inconclusive and is certainly not questioning the worth of other researchers who 
approach these topics from other perspectives not included in this survey. 
The empirical part of the dissertation starts in chapter 3 with the econometric 
modeling of the dynamic self-employment entry decision. We explicitly model the timing 
of the entry decision into entrepreneurship. We investigate the predictive power and 
parameter accuracy of different dynamic duration models versus static single period 
classification models and determine the bias of time aggregation implicit in static models 
applied to multi-period data. 
Chapter 4 extends chapter 3 by investigating the different routes into self-
employment. We build a theory of the dynamics of business succession and de novo self-
employment taking into account the capital accumulation decisions of individuals. 
Hypotheses are developed on how human and social capital influences the timing of the 
two self-employment options. A multiple risks model is estimated to test the hypotheses. 
In chapter 5, we introduce the Limburg dataset. We will use this dataset in chapters 6, 7, 
and 8. The Limburg dataset consists of detailed information on labor market history, 
social background, and social networks of 1223 individuals that seriously considered 
becoming self-employed around 1998 and 1999. In 2004, this dataset was matched with a 
dataset of the Chamber of Commerce that provide information about the status of the 
self-employment decision. In this chapter, we provide some initial results of both datasets 
related to our research questions. 
Chapter 6 assesses empirically the sources of non-response at various stages of 
development of the Limburg dataset. A structural model is estimated to reveal some 
important population characteristics, like the probability of attrition (e.g. death), the 
probability of non-response, and the entrepreneurial ability of the prospective self-
employed. Adverse events, like discontinuing a business idea, can make individuals 
reluctant to cooperate with the survey. A structural link between business continuance 
rate and non-response can lead to biased results in self-employment choice probabilities. 
We derive a sequential decision model to investigate the link between non-response and 
business continuance. The model's empirical contents are investigated with a multinomial 
logit analysis. 
Chapter 7 investigates the individual exit decisions of entrepreneurs. We present a 
theoretical framework that shows the real options nature of self-employment decisions. 
We scrutinize on the causes and consequences of the fact that part of the set up costs are 
sunk. We show how idiosyncratic sunk costs, idiosyncratic productivity, and idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty affect idiosyncratic profit thresholds and the length of the self-
6 employment spell when business conditions are uncertain. The predictions of the model 
are tested with a duration analysis. 
In chapter 8, we design a model to explain the accomplishment of entrepreneurs
1 
productive social networks in concentrated markets. We analyze the choice of the number 
of productive social relations in a profit maximizing framework. A discrete choice 
formulation is used to draw inferences about the unobserved profitability of entrepre-
neurs' social networks under uncertainty. The predictions are tested with an ordered logit 
model. 
Finally, chapter 9 concludes. It reviews the empirical results of the dissertation 
and provides answers to the research questions. At the end of the summary, suggestions 
for future research are given. 
7 Chapter 2 
Literature review 
8 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is the act of starting up and exploiting a business idea. Entrepreneurship 
often involves the creation of new business ventures. Entrepreneurship is characterised by 
risk taking and risk creation, creativity and innovation, drive and ambition, and need for 
independence and self-actualization. Entrepreneurship is often equated with self-
employment and small business ownership. However, not all self-employed are entrepre-
neurs (Garland et al. 1984; Webster 1977). Self-employment mainly refers to an income-
generating mechanism that is different from paid labour. Furthermore, not ail entrepre-
neurs are self-employed. Entrepreneurship can also take place within an organization. 
This is often referred as intrapreneurship. In this literature review, we will apply the 
broad definition of entrepreneurship as self-employment and use the terms interchangea-
bly
2. 
Historically, the definition, characteristics, and function of an entrepreneur is de-
fined in a plethora of ways
3. Cantillon (1755) coined the term entrepreneur. He argued 
that the distinguishing feature of an entrepreneur is risk bearing. The entrepreneur buys 
certain factors of production at certain prices in order to create a product and sell it at an 
uncertain price in the future. The entrepreneur bears the risk of the uncertain future price 
of the product. With Jean-Baptiste Say (1803), the entrepreneur obtained its modern 
definition of an entrepreneur as a manager of a business. In his definition, an entrepreneur 
is the coordinator of production and the distributor of wage and interest among the 
productive inputs of labor and capital. John Stuart Mill (1848) brought the term entrepre-
neur into general use among economists. Like Cantillon, he argued that the distinguishing 
characteristic of an entrepreneur is risk bearing. Marshall (1890) provided a neoclassical 
point of view of the entrepreneur. He presented the entrepreneur as the supplier of com-
modities. The entrepreneur exercises control and bears all responsibilities of the firm. In 
order to fulfill the variety of tasks of an entrepreneur, the entrepreneur should possess 
some general abilities and intelligence. Marshall pointed towards family background, 
education, and innate abilities as important determinants of these general abilities. 
Furthermore, in order to become successful, the entrepreneur should also possess some 
specific abilities, like forecasting, spotting and exploiting opportunities, and knowledge 
of the trade. With Schumpeter (1934), the entrepreneur transformed from a manager to an 
innovator. Whereas for Marshall, innovation was merely a by-product of the production 
process, for Schumpeter, the innovative creative ability of the entrepreneur becomes 
pivotal and is seen as the driving force of change in the economic system. He acknowl-
edged that the ability to innovate required psychological motives and thereby opened 
2 Simon Parker, one of the authorities on entrepreneurship and self-employment, explains this issue as 
follows; "at the conceptual level, the term 'entrepreneur' and 'entrepreneurship' will be used; at the 
practical level, where issues of measurement, estimation and policy are involved, we will use the closest 
approximation to the manifestation of entrepreneurship that appears to be suitable. That will usually be 
'self-employment', though occasionally the term 'small firm' will be more relevant." (Parker 2004: 5). 
3 See e.g. Garland et al. (1984) or Van Praag (1999) for more elaborate historical perspectives on entrepre-
neurship and Brockhaus (1982) for some excellent definitions. 
9 entrepreneurship for psychological inquiry. We owe the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty to the dissertation of Frank Knight (1921). He argued that the true economic 
function of the entrepreneur is the bearing of uncertainty. Uncertainty differs from risk, in 
that for risk one can calculate the ex-ante probabilities of an outcome of an event while 
with uncertainty the outcome of an event cannot be known. Therefore, risk can be in-
sured. With Knight, good judgement becomes an important characteristic of the entrepre-
neur as well as his ability to deal with this uncertainty. More able entrepreneurs can 
therefore reap above average profits. 
During the last thirty years there has been a shift from theoretical descriptive 
research to more empirically oriented research of entrepreneurship and self-employment. 
Within psychology and organizational research, researchers investigated the (psychologi-
cal) traits and motives of the entrepreneur (see e.g. Brockhaus 1982; McClelland 1961). 
At the same time within economics and business, more structural empirical research 
started. This research evolved around two research questions: (1) Who becomes an 
entrepreneur? and (2) What determines the success of an entrepreneur? The difference 
between these two disciplines, psychology and economics, is that psychological research 
searched for individual traits and motives related to entrepreneurship, while economic 
research focused on the choice for entrepreneurship. The economic approach assumes 
maximizing behaviour of the entrepreneur. The choice for entrepreneurship is therefore 
simultaneously determined by the preference of the entrepreneur, its relative productivity 
in self-employment versus paid labour, and the availability of liquidity constraints. The 
empirical determinants of this choice will be surveyed in this literature review. 
Not all entrepreneurs are successful. Besides a set of determinants of self-
employment selection, the empirical research investigated a set of factors that influenced 
the probability that an entrepreneur would exit self-employment. One of the possible 
factors for successful entrepreneurship that has gained much popularity in formal re-
search and popular literature is the social network of the entrepreneur. The research on 
social networks is embedded in the larger research program on social capital that has 
gained much popularity throughout the nineties. The term social capital can be traced 
back in sociology to Bourdieu (1986) and Loury (1977) in economics, but the concept 
was picked up and formalized by Coleman (Coleman 1988; 1990) and finally popularized 
by Putnam (2000) in his book Bowling Alone. According to Putnam, social capital is 
"...features of social life - networks, norms, and trust - that enable participants to act together more effec-
tively to pursue shared objectives... Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant 
norms and trust". (Putnam 1995: 665) 
This broad definition is reflected in the broad research on this topic. It is instructive to 
separate collective social capital from individual social capital. From a collective level, 
social capital is often perceived as the norms and trust embedded in groups, cities, 
societies and nations, which lead to shared objectives, like community programs and 
safety. From an individual perspective, social capital is often seen as individual's pur-
poseful investments in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace. The 
investment is often disbursed in increased access to information, gained trust to reduce 
uncertainty, and control of behavior and resources. In this literature review, we will 
investigate mainly how individual social capital, in the form of social relationships, can 
10 influence self-employment entry and exit and how the research on social capital, in the 
form of social networks, can be incorporated in the research on entrepreneurship. 
In the last few years, we have witnessed a surge in survey literature in the field of entre-
preneurship (see e.g. Le 1999; Parker 2004; Van Praag 2005). Surveying these books and 
research papers, we have tried to identify the remaining gaps and lack of clarities in the 
literature of entrepreneurship. 
This literature review is written with the following objectives in mind. First, we 
try to shed light on the contradictory results of the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of entry into self-employment. Second, we provide a basis for theory development 
on individual social capital, specifically related to self-employment. Third, we summarize 
the empirical literature of the relationship between social capital and entrepreneurship. 
This literature review is organized as follows. Section 2.2 deals with self-employment 
entry and exit. First, we will discuss and explain the canonical theoretical models on self-
employment entry and exit in section 2.3. Then, we will investigate the empirical deter-
minants of self-employment entry and exit. We will do so by critically examining the 
different sampling schemes used by researchers. Section 2.4 deals with social capital. 
First, we will discuss the main theoretical and empirical contributions to the concept of 
social capital. We present social capital as a process, following its formation, access, 
mobilization, and the consequences of social capital. Then, we will discuss the main 
empirical papers that have explicitly incorporated social capital as a determinant for 
explaining self-employment success. Section 2.5 summarizes the main arguments and 
provides recommendations for research. 
2.2 Entry and exit 
The literature offers several frameworks to study entry and exit behavior of firms, de-
pending on the unit of analysis. At the industry level, entry and exit is often studied in an 
integrated equilibrium framework, where firm entry and exit is determined simultane-
ously depending on the industry distribution of entrepreneurial abilities (Jovanovic 1982), 
active reinvestments and learning (Pakes and Ericson 1998), the changes in industry 
prices, demand, or some other characteristics of the process for firm shocks (Hopenhayn 
1992). At the individual level, entry and exit decisions are seldom researched simultane-
ously because entry approaches differ from exit approaches. Entry is mainly modeled as a 
choice in an occupational choice framework, The individual decides to work for a boss or 
pursues the more risky alternative of making earnings for himself. Whereas entry is a 
choice, exit is often perceived as a function of natural selection (Friedman 1953; Wil-
liamson 1991). Well-performing firms survive while poorly performing firms disappear. 
However, Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) argue that the survival of a firm is not 
exclusively a function of economic performance, but also depends on a business owner's 
own threshold of performance. Business owners may disentangle economic viable firms 
if income from self-employment is below the alternative wage paid in the labor market. 
In the next section, we are mainly interested in the behavior of individuals when they 
choose to enter or exit from markets. 
11 2.2.1 Theoretical models of entry and exit 
2.2.2 Entry 
In order to explain who becomes an entrepreneur, and so who enters the market of 
entrepreneurs, researchers often use some form of an occupational choice model. The 
mechanism of the occupational choice model is straightforward. Self-employment refers 
to an income generating mechanism that is different from employment in the labor 
market. Since the occupational choice model is key to understanding self-employment 
selection, we will discuss an adapted version of Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) entrepre-
neurial choice model. 
The income of an individual working in the labor market consists of his wage and 
the returns on his assets. Let his wage be a function of its earning ability in a wage job w(, 
assets Aj, and the net rate of return r. Then the individuals income as a wage earner is 
HV + rA.. 
The income of the self-employed is more complex. The main difference between 
a wage earner and a self-employed person is that the self-employed person needs to 
invest capital in order to earn income. For a self-employed entrepreneur, the income is a 
function of his gross entrepreneurial earnings and the returns on remaining assets after 
capital is invested in the firm. Let the individual's gross earnings as an entrepreneur be a 
function of his entrepreneurial ability 0., the amount of capital invested ki, and some 
random components, summarizing the good fortune of the entrepreneur. Then, the 
individual's income as an entrepreneur is 0if{kl)s + r{Ai -£,.). 
If ki > Ai, then the entrepreneur must borrow the remaining assets in the capital 
market. However, due to uninsurable risk and possible uncertain entrepreneurial abilities, 
capital markets are imperfect and therefore the amount of borrowing is constrained. The 
size of the constraint depends on the individual assets. The size of the constraint is 
defined by ki </A.(v4(), with and where lk{A;) is the amount that can be 
For an entrepreneur, the optimal amount of capital ki maximizes his entrepreneu-
rial income subject to this liquidity constraint. The solution to this constrained maximiza-
analysis by allowing capital asset transfer between parents and offspring. In this case, 
own capital is extended with family capital A . Allowing intergenerational capital 
transfer does not alter the results below. If the entrepreneur is liquidity constrained, then 
Until now, we have discussed the differences in the income generating mecha-
nism. However, both incomes are uncertain. Generally among researchers, it is assumed 
that entrepreneurial income is more volatile because (1) the uncertain evolution of 
business conditions, and (2) the uncertainty of the entrepreneurs ability or business idea. 
Most researchers summarize this information in the formulation of expected income 
borrowed. 
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) extend this 
=/; (4 ) > o. 
12 streams. So that the standard entrepreneurial choice models predict that an individual will 
opt for entrepreneurship if the expected utility is higher in the self-employment option, 
that is, if, 
(2.1)
 + £{t/[w, +rAl\Zi) 
Where Z, is a vector of personal characteristics (e.g. marital status, children, 
education, and social background). 
Naturally, these models assume that individuals switch back and forth if the value 
for the options changes over time. According to this model, switching can be rather 
frequent and this is mainly due to the fact that almost all entrepreneurial choice models 
assume costless switching. 
The literature on entrepreneurial choice offers several extensions and variations to 
this model. The main difference between researchers is the treatment, specification, and 
interpretation of entrepreneurial ability ^. In Lucas' (1978) general equilibrium model 
and in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 8i is assumed to be known and stable over time. The 
most able entrepreneurs become self-employed and the least able become wage earner. 
Moreover, different entrepreneurs manage firms with different sizes. The most able 
entrepreneurs start large firms, and the marginal entrepreneur starts the smallest firm in 
this model. 
At the other extreme, Jovanovic (1982) assumes that entrepreneurial ability is ini-
tially unknown. Only the population distribution of entrepreneurial abilities is known. 
True entrepreneurial ability can only be learned after entry in the market in a Bayesian 
way by comparing expected productivity by true productivity revealed through company 
performance. Calvo and Wellisz (1980) and Van Praag and Cramer (2001) take a differ-
ent approach and assume that entrepreneurial ability can be learned over time. Caivo and 
Wellisz (1980) argue that an individual's entrepreneurial ability is a function of his age 
and his ability to learn from the growth in common technological knowledge. Van Praag 
and Cramer (2001) argue that entrepreneurial ability is determined by individual charac-
teristics like educational attainment, gender and social background. Finally, Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin (2000) argue that entrepreneurial ability can be transmitted from the self-
employed parents to their offspring. 
Besides the different interpretations and specifications of entrepreneurial ability, 
there are several extensions of the standard entrepreneurial choice model. Holmes and 
Schmitz (1990) offer a model that incorporate the Schumpeterian idea of the entrepreneur 
as someone who recognizes and exploits new business opportunities. These opportunities 
arise continually in an economy which is in a permanent state of disequilibrium. In their 
model, individuals can choose to continue managing a firm or to set up a new firm, and 
transfer the control of the firm to a less able entrepreneur. Their analysis shows that the 
least able entrepreneurs will manage existing firms, and the most able entrepreneurs will 
focus on starting up new ventures. Whereas Holmes and Schmitz exploit the ideas of 
Schumpeter on entrepreneurship, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) build their model on the 
ideas of Knight on trading off risk and returns. Their model is built on the general 
perception of the entrepreneur as a risk taker. In their model, there is a population distri-
13 bution of risk aversion. The least risk averse individuals become entrepreneurs and 
manage the largest firms. 
Almost as often as individuals decide to start up and manage a business, entrepre-
neurs decide to sell the firm or go bankrupt and exit from the market. 
2.2.3 Exit 
Our understanding why firms or individuals exit from the market is mainly driven by the 
seminal learning model of Jovanovic (1982). His elegant model explains firm exit from 
an industry through learning about initially unknown abilities. Entrepreneurs learn about 
their true entrepreneurial abilities only after they have entered the industry. Entrepreneurs 
learn about their entrepreneurial abilities by observing their firms' performance, which is 
based on stochastic draws from the market. Based on this constant flow of information, 
entrepreneurs adjust their belief in a Bayesian way, and adjust their strategies based on 
their updated beliefs. In Jovanovic' model, entrepreneurial ability is reflected in the cost 
function and is therefore a parameter for efficiency. Only the most able and most efficient 
entrepreneurs survive, while the less able or unlucky exit the market. Many of the predic-
tions from Jovanovic model are supported by empirical evidence (see Parker 2004 
Chapter 4 four an extensive treatment). 
For understanding why individuals exit, Jovanovic' model is mainly used to 
determine the shape of the exit hazard. According to this model, exit rates are initially 
low, because entrepreneurs have to learn about their true ability and adjust only slowly. 
However, if the entrepreneur is faced with more evidence of low entrepreneurial ability, 
then the exit rate increases. Once the low ability entrepreneurs are driven from the 
market, the exit rate will decrease. There is ample evidence for this hump-shaped hazard 
rates for new firms (see e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood 1995; Mata and Portugal 1994). 
Another implication of Jovanovic model is that all entrepreneurs should enter at 
the same scale. The fact that entrants should have the same scale is the result of the 
assumption that entrepreneurs have unknown prior entry entrepreneurial ability. Frank's 
(1988) model of intertemporal exit starts from the assumption that firms enter at a differ-
ent scale. Furthermore, unlike Jovanovic, Frank assumes that (part) of the entry costs are 
sunk. Before investing these sunk costs, the firm must expect that these expenditures are 
justified. Frank argues that entrants who enter at a large scale have more optimistic 
beliefs about their entrepreneurial ability, And because these entrepreneurs have more 
optimistic beliefs it takes a longer time period to convince them of their true and revealed 
entrepreneurial ability and to change their beliefs and behavior. A disputable point in 
Frank's model is that he assumes that optimism and not entrepreneurial ability dictates 
firm entry size [in contrast to Lucas model, where entrepreneurial ability determines firm 
size]. The entrepreneur in Frank's model is still uncertain about its true entrepreneurial 
ability and learns it only ex post. Therefore, Frank's theory is based on the assumption 
that the entrepreneur knows that he can not know his entrepreneurial ability before entry, 
however, he still perceives his chances subjectively, and bases his entry strategy on this 
subjective belief. 
Jovanovic (1982) and Frank (1988) entry and exit model provide two options 
concerning entry. Either firms enter at the same scale, or firms differ in scale because 
14 larger firms are more optimistic. At the aggregate level these models seem to produce 
satisfying results, however, at a disaggregate level they seem less convincing. The main 
dissatisfaction stems from the fact that these exit models do not match with reasoning 
from occupational choice models that were introduced to explain entry, 
In Jovanovic' model, the outside option is the entrepreneurial ability employed in 
a different activity. Jovanovic implicitly assumes that the value of this outside option is 
always significantly lower than the value of the chosen option. Given the fact that all 
entrepreneurs enter at the same scale, there are no marginal entrepreneurs. This is in 
sharp contrast with the occupational choice models. These models assume that entrepre-
neurs are marginal
4. If entrepreneurs in Jovanovic' model would be marginal, then 
theorizing along Jovanovic' model should not lead to a hump-shaped exit hazard, but to a 
strictly decreasing hazard. The hazard would be strictly decreasing because directly after 
entry, firms with a negative draw can earn more in the outside option and should there-
fore exit. 
Further dissatisfaction with aggregate entry and exit models arises from the as-
sumption that entry and exit thresholds are set by the industry. As a consequence, firms 
exit if their performance is below industry standards. While this result may hold at 
aggregate levels, at disaggregated levels, this is quite unsatisfactory. If we refer back to 
equation (2.1), we see that thresholds are individual. Gimeno et al. (1997) develop a 
model of exit on this observation. They argue that firms differ in their thresholds of 
performance, and exit is determined by whether firm performance fall below these 
individual thresholds. The question then is: where do these thresholds come from? 
Gimeno et al. find that exit thresholds are mainly determined by the value of the outside 
option, in most cases for entrepreneurship this value is determined by income as a wage 
earner and sunk costs. In their analysis, these sunk costs arise from switching occupa-
tions. In order to induce exit, returns from entrepreneurship must fall below the value of 
the outside option minus the switching costs. Although their model does not account for 
uncertain entrepreneurial abilities, introducing uncertain entrepreneurial abilities will lead 
to a hump-shaped exit hazard. In that case it takes time to learn that entrepreneurial 
abilities fall below individual thresholds. Therefore, the key to understanding the hump-
shaped exit hazard resides not only in uncertain entrepreneurial abilities, but also in sunk 
costs. The presence of sunk costs in self-employment decisions is not a far-fetched 
assumption. Asplund (2000) shows that 50-80 percent of the investments in metal work-
ing machinery used in Swedish manufacturing industries are sunk. The consequences of 
sunk costs within the occupational choice models have not been put in a proper perspec-
tive. Next, we will discuss the empirical evidence on the empirical determinants of entry 
and exit. 
2.3 Empirical Studies on Self-employment Selection 
The decision to become self-employed has been investigated by various researchers from 
different academic disciplines. Two types of quantitative empirical studies can be distin-
4 Not all entrepreneurs are marginal. An exception are entrepreneurs that become self-employed immedi-
ately after graduating. However, Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) find that only 5% of dc novo entrepre-
neurs start immediately after graduating. 
15 guished. One type of studies use explicative models based on a set of hypotheses derived 
from theoretical considerations about factors influencing the self-employment decisions. 
Other studies develop structural models explaining self-employment. These models rely 
on the rational that self-employment occurs if the expected rewards of self-employment 
exceed those of paid work. Hence, after estimating earnings functions for self-employed 
and employees, for each individual the earning difference is calculated and used in the 
structural equation. An additional property of structural modeling is that the earnings 
functions contain a selectivity term that is constant through time. Thus, possible biases 
from time independent self-selection are corrected for. 
2.3.1 The statistical relationship between inflow, stock and duration 
The decision to become self-employed is researched under different sampling frames: 
stock and flow sampling. However, the consequences of applying different sampling 
schemes are not properly understood
5. When sampling the flow into self-employment we 
are interested in the sorts of people who become self-employed, and when sampling the 
stock of the self-employed we are interested in the sorts of people likely to be found self-
employed (Chesher and Lancaster 1983). Our research interest is in finding determinants 
of the selection process into self-employment, so the relevant population is the flow of 
individuals. Many social scientists have interpreted inferences based on stock samples as 
if they were taken from flow samples. That is, they have perceived equally the factors 
that influence the probability of being found self-employed with the probability of 
becoming self-employed. Inferences based on stock samples provide no information 011 
the probability of becoming self-employed, unless the economy is in a steady state and 
one has estimates of the effects of covariates that influence the length of stay as a self-
employed. As none of the empirical studies we reviewed have simultaneously researched 
the probability of being found self-employed and the probability of leaving self-
employment, we can only use results on stock samples cautiously with related evidence 
of duration studies from different samples. 
Still, if the economy is in a steady state, with inflow rate constant and survival not 
dependent on calendar time, then the inflow, stock and duration of self-employed are 
related through the following expression (Ridder 1982: 21): 
(2.2) Pr(S£) = Pr(/F) * 
where, Pr(IF) is the probability of becoming self-employed in a certain period, Pr(SE) is 
the probability of being part of the stock of self-employed at a certain moment, and E(T) 
is the mean (completed) self-employment duration. 
If we assume that: 
(2.3a) Pv(SE) = ƒ(x,fiSE) 
c 
For instance, a recent survey paper on the empirical evidence of self-employment selection by Le (1999) 
does not even mention the sampling schemes and the consequences of the different sampling schemes on 
interpretation of the results. 
16 and 
(2.3b) Pr(IF) = g{x90fF) 
If we assume furthermore the following conditions: (1) ƒ = g, (2) linear, and (3) additive 
and let (j) = ƒ = g then equation (2.2) can be written in log-form and rearranged as (van 
Praag 1996: 64): 
(2.3c) log[£(7-)] - log[Pr(/F)]- log[Pr(SE)] 
Assume that equation (2.3a) and (2.3b) are explained by the same set of regressors. 
Represent the j-th element of the set of regressors x by Xj. Then, the partial derivatives 
of the predicted probabilities with respect to x are: 
(2.4) ^Pr {SE) = tfx'fiss)*fiL  ox. 
J 
and 
(2.5) ^-Pr {1F) = ^X'P,f)*P{f 
OX j 
» I 




}F represent the j-
th elements of the parameter vectors and are consistent with the effect of x} on the 
respective probabilities. 
Define: 
(2.6a) r. ^-?-\oZ[E{T)} 
or, from equation (2.3) 
(2.6b) r, = [log[Pr(^)] - log[Pr(/F)]] 
axi  J 
(2.6c) Yj = ~ log[Pr(5£)] - JL log[Pr(/F)] 
L/A i C/A > 
w 
By partial differencing, we have (see 2.6 Appendix for the complete derivation): 
17 (2.7) r,=- I J A* 
1 
?T(SE) 
Equation (2.7) reduces to a numerical expression for the predicted effect of each 
covariate on log[E(T)], the mean duration of self-employment. 
2.3.2 The bias in the determinants of the probability of becoming 
self-employed 
The relevant empirical research on the determinants of the probability of entry suffers 
from three biases: (1) interpreting J3SE as j3/r, (2) left-truncation, and (3) time aggrega-
tion. The effect and direction of the first two biases are both a function of the length of 
stay as entrepreneur, so yr If we know yr we can make inferences about the nature of 
the bias and its effect on the true fljF. 
In case of bias (1), we can make use of established empirical evidence about the 
probability of being self-employed and the mean duration, to give indirect evidence about 
the effect of the regressor on the probability of becoming self-employed. Imputing the 
empirical evidence about the coefficients fi
J
SE and y
J into equation (2.7) provides the 
expected effect of x. on the probability of becoming self-employed (see Table 2.1). 
Since empirical evidence on ft
j
SE and y
j comes from different studies, we can not always 
determine f5L precisely. 
Table 2.1: Predicted sign of 0]F given the signs of jiSE and y 
r 
+  0  -
+ 
•>  *  +  + 
PSE 
0  0  + 
« 
In case of bias (2), the effect of the bias is not so clear as bias (1). The magnitude of the 
* 
bias depends on the direction of y
J and the length of the interval in which left-truncation 
takes place. Table 2.2 provides the direction of the bias on given knowledge on y
J. 
It encircles the cases for which the bias may be problematic for qualitative inferences 
about PjF. 




+  +  0 
PlF  0  +  0 
- +  0 
The third bias, time aggregation, is unrelated to mean duration. Time aggregation 
bias occurs if a static methodology, e.g. pooling observations into a single period logit or 
probit, is applied to dynamic, multiperiod data. The parameter estimates are always 
biased and inconsistent (Shumway 2001). We do discuss the bias in detail in chapter 3 in 
this dissertation but the coefficients should always be interpreted with care. 
2.3.3 Empirical studies on self-employment entry 
A 
Table 2.3 gives an overview of empirical studies on self-employment. The factors that 
influence the chance of becoming self-employed are divided into significant negative or 
positive impact or no significant effect. Table 2.3 provides direct and indirect evidence on 
the factors that influence the self-employment decision. Direct evidence comes from 
studies that draw inferences on flow samples, while indirect evidence follows from stock 
samples combined with evidence on duration studies according to the scheme of Table 
2.1
7. According to the empirical result each study is put in one of the three categories. A 
coefficient is considered significant if p<0.05. More important, Table 2.3 indicates the 
biases in the empirical studies. 
The overall picture taken from the existing research on self-employment is very ambigu-
ous. Most surprisingly, the standard economic argument that 'people will choose the 
activity with the highest (lifetime) income' is not straightforward. Most studies find no 
significant effect on income differences (De Wit and Van Winden 1989; Dolton and 
Makepeace 1990; Rees and Shah 1986). Moreover, studies that find significant effects are 
based on stock samples. 
The effects of human capital are not straightforward either. The results of general 
human capital are contradictory. Evans and Leighton (1989), Blanchflower and Meyer 
(1994), and Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) find a positive effect of general education on 
the probability to become self-employed. Lazear (2004) finds that general education, in 
terms of educational program content, also increases the probability of entry. Conversely, 
Evans and Leighton (1989) find a negative impact of education on the probability of 
becoming self-employed using another sample. 
6 This overview does not claim completeness. We attempt to include the main references. The literature 
review differs from other overviews (e.g. Parker 2004; van Praag 2001), by addressing biases. 
7 The outflow and duration studies are related. If a regressor increases the probability of exit, then it reduces 
the duration of being self-employed. 
19 Table 2-3: Overview of Empirical Studies Investigating the Self-Employment Decisions 
Human Capital 

























m  mt  (20 rt 
do t {2m 



























































(27) Table 2.3 (continued) 
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References: (1) Dolton and Makepeace, 1990 (UK), (2) Taylor, 1996 (UK), (3) Alba-Ramirez, 1994 (Spain), (4) Evans andLeighton, 1939 (US), (5) 
Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994 (a=AustraHa; b=US), (6) De Wit and Van Winden, 1989 (Netherlands), (7; Blau, 1985, (S) Biuderl et al. 1992, (9) Van Praag and 
VanOphem 1995, (10) Evans and Jovanovic, 1989 (US), (11) Gill, 1988, (12) Borjars andBronars, 1989 (US), (13) Dunn andHoltz-Eakin, 2000 (US), (14) 
Kidd, 1993 (Australia), (15) Rees andShah, 1986 (UK), (16) Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987 (West Germany), (17) Van Praag, 2003 (US), (18) Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1998 (UK), (19) Lindh andOhlsson, 1996 ^Sweden), (20) Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen., 1994a (US), (21) Holts-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 
1994b, (22) Bates, 1990, (23) Lazear, 2004 (US), (24) Bruderl andPieisendorfer, 1996 (West German}^ (25) Taylor, 1999 (UK), (26) Gimeno et al. 1997 (US), 
(27) Bosnia, VanPraag, Thurik, and de Wit, (2004), 
Note: f = * = JpmiS 
Effects are counted as negative orpositive if the respective coefficients is different from 0 at a significance level of p<.05. Alba-Ramirez (1994) for Spain, and Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) for West-
Germany confirm the negative impact of education on the probability of self-
employment. No effect was found by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Carroll and 
Mosakowski (1987) in different model specifications. The results from the stock and 
duration studies in Table 2.3 confirm this ambiguous picture of education as a determi-
nant of self-employment selection. The results about more specific human capital are also 
not convincing. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find a positive effect, but Carroll and 
Mosakowski (1987), Evans and Leighton (1989), and Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995) 
find no significant direct effect. The effects are even more contaminated by the biases 
inherent in most studies. 
No study rejects hypotheses on the positive relationship between financial capital 
and becoming self-employed (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989; 
Holtz Eakin et al. 1994). But some studies do not find significant effects of financial 
capital (Lindh and Ohlsson 1996), One of the most consistent and prominent factors to 
explain self-employment is whether the father has been self-employed (see e.g. Blanch-
flower and Meyer 1994; Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Lindh and Ohlsson 1996; Taylor 
1999). While the influence of the father's economic activity is manifest, these studies do 
not provide a clear vision about other forms of social capital, such as partnerships and 
children. Marriage is found to have a negative (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and 
Leighton 1989; Van Praag and Van Ophem 1995), positive (Blanchflower and Meyer 
1994; Evans and Leighton 1989) or insignificant effect on the probability of becoming 
self-employed (Alba-Ramirez 1994; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Evans and Leighton 
1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994). The stock and duration studies in Table 2.3 find usually 
an insignificant effect. 
We can conclude two things from the empirical literature: (1) the effects of the 
covariates are unstable across samples, and (2) data limitations and utilizations may cause 
significant biases. These ambiguities and biases can be overcome in the following ways. 
Utilize a flow sample, thereby directly measuring the probability of becoming self-
employed. Apply a dynamic methodology to dynamic data, so that the estimates do not 
suffer from severe time aggregation. Besides these sampling issues, make variables time-
varying where possible. In this way, the variables influence the hazard only when the 
effect should take place, and not allow it to be constant over life. 
2.3.4 Empirical studies on self-employment exit and duration 
The decision to exit self-employment has been investigated from several angles. These 
studies investigated the propensity to exit from an individual perspective or from a firm 
perspective. Both types of studies share their focus on finding determinants of survival in 
self-employment. The exit studies that take an individual perspective focus mainly on the 
individual's human capital, in terms of education, training, and experience, and the 
individual's financial capital, in terms of previous income or assets. Exit studies that take 
a firm perspective focus primarily on the size of the enterprise, the business strategy of 
the firm, and macro-economic conditions. As we are interested in individual determinants 
22 of exit from self-employment, we will focus mainly on studies with a focus on the 
individual entrepreneur. 
In contrast with the models on self-employment selection, empirical studies on 
self-employment exit do not suffer so much from the methodological flaws that plagued 
entry studies. There are several reasons. First of all, most studies use a flow sample. They 
follow a cohort of firms or individuals that enter at the same time for a certain time 
period. Of course, not all firms will exit within the observed time period. These firms are 
censored. Therefore, the natural econometric candidate is a duration model. Although 
some early studies use a binary discrete choice model to study who exit within a certain 
time frame
8 (e.g. Bates 1990), most recent studies that focus on the determinants of the 
probability of exit and small business longevity use duration models (see e.g. Bosma et 
al. 2004). 
The results concerning the relationship between human capital and the probability 
of exit are mixed. We see the same pattern as with the relationship between human 
capital and the probability of entry. Some find a positive relationship, some no relation-
ship, while others find a negative relationship. Taylor (1999) argues for example that 
academic success is a poor indicator for entrepreneurial ability. He claims that, consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis, individuals who plan a career in self-employment have no 
need to acquire formal qualifications. However, more self-employment specific experi-
ence increases the probability of survival in self-employment (Bosma et al. 2004; Taylor 
1999). 
There is some evidence that individuals who have more access to financial capital 
have better survival chances. Bates (1990), for example, finds that individuals who have 
started up a business with above average levels of capital have a lower probability of exit. 
More evidence comes from the studies that find a positive relationship between firm size 
and survival (e.g. Bruderl and PreisendQrfer 1998; Gimeno et al. 1997). If larger firms 
have had better access to financial capital, then a positive relationship between firm size 
and survival provides indirect evidence for a positive relationship between financial 
capital and success. 
2.4 Social capital 
In this literature review we will try to gain some understanding of the concept of social 
capital both from a structural and a rational choice (agency) perspective. The structural 
perspective distinguishes itself from agency by making macro assumptions of social 
structure, which provide context for analyzing human behavior. Gaining understanding of 
the concept of social capital allows us to understand why and how social capital works 
(or not) in general, and in specific for self-employment. Therefore, we have to understand 
the genealogy of social capital: its causes, its nature, and its consequences. In this review 
on social capital, we will render social capital as a process, starting with its formation and 
ending with its consequences. 
Social capital was defined in section 2.1 as these features of social life, like net-
works, norms, and trust that enables individuals to reap benefits from interacting with 
81 will discuss the implications of time aggregation in chapter 3. 
23 each other. Most of the research on social capital deals with the consequences of social 
capital. A review of the literature leams that social capital affects people, states, cities, 
and even nations. 
For some, social capital is considered as the mix of sociology and economics 
(Frank 1992). As social capital is the bridge between these two distinct disciplines, they 
bring different assumptions and methodologies of defining, measuring an interpreting 
social capital
9. Historically, economists have advocated methodological individualism. 
This principle implies that all collective activity can be traced back to the behavior of 
individuals. This view is prevalent in the utilitarian tradition of classical and neo-classical 
economics, in which economic actors behave as self-interested utility maximizers who 
are only minimally affected by social relations (Granovetter 1985). 
In contrast, early sociologists rejected this individualism and advocated methodo-
logical collectivism or holism, inspired by sociologist as Durkheim and Weber. This 
principle implies that groups often have traits, behaviors and outcomes that cannot be 
understood by reducing them to their individual parts and that the relationships among 
individuals affect their behavior. These diverging assumptions about action within a 
social context bear a strong influence on theoretical and empirical work in both sciences. 
Theoretical work in the field of sociology emphasizes the social structure and how the 
social structure constraints individual choice and behavior. In contrast, economists have 
put more interest in the freedom of the individual and its subsequent purposeful and 
rational actions. The last two decades have witnessed a shift away from these pure views 
on individual behavior and action within a social context, as is reflected for example in 
the works of Becker (1996) Accounting for Tastes and Becker and Murphy (2000) Social 
Economics
10. These works preach cautiousness in analyzing individual choices within a 
social framework. 
2.4.1 Theory: The social capital process 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the social capital process. The first phase deals with the determi-
nants of social capital. How is social capital formed? The second phase shows how the 
formation of social capital brings into place opportunity structures for deriving social 
capital benefits. However, a beneficent opportunity structure is no guarantee for network 
benefits. In the third phase, the mobilization and use of social capital determines the 
productivity of the opportunity structure. Finally, we arrive at the individual effects 
(these can be positive or negative - see Portes (1998) and Portes and Landolt (1996) for 
downside effects of social capital). Figure 2.1 also schematically reveals the different 
methodologies used in social capital research. The figure presents the pure form of 
agency and structure and how they form different paths to social capital outcomes. We 
differentiate three paths: the structural path, the agency path, and the instrumental path. 
The structural perspective distinguishes itself from agency by making macro as-
sumptions of social structure, which provide context for analyzing human behavior (Lin 
1990). The first assumption states that most societies are structured hierarchically at the 
9 These problems are nicely illustrated by a famous quote of Duessenberry that "economics is all about how 
people make choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any choices at all" (1960: 233). 
10 The fact that Gary Becker has contributed significantly in mixing sociology with economics can be 
attributed to the fact that he originally had a chair in sociology before he moved to economics. 






to macro level. Every level of the hierarchy reflects different demands for valued goods like 
status, wealth, and power. The second assumption states that these hierarchies of valued 
goods have the tendency towards congruence and transferability. Individuals who value 
wealth also value status and power. Valued goods are traded within hierarchies to repro-
duce class. The last assumption states that most hierarchies tend to be pyramidal shaped 
in the sense that there are more people with less valued goods and less people with more 
valued goods. These assumptions are guided by the micro-assumption of homophilous 
interaction. This principle states that social interactions takes place among people at 
similar hierarchical levels, also known as the like-me hypothesis (Homans 1950; 
Laumann 1966). 
These assumptions define the structural path of social capital. The structural path 
is reflected in one of the first definitions of social capital by the French sociologist 
Bourdieu: 
"Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to a possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition...a 
'credential
1, which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word,'
1 (1986: 249). 
The network of relationships is perceived as an asset that can be used to the advantage of 
individuals, groups, and families. Access is defined by origin, which is reflected in the 
correlation between the resources of parents and resources available for the child. Indi-
vidual outcomes from a structural view are contingent on their structural position. The 
social resources available come from people of equal structural positions. 
The agency path starts with the individual. The individual is a rational actor, 
which purposefully creates social organization (Coleman 1990). The individual has only 
one goal, promoting its own interests. This perspective allows the individual to make its 
own choices, based on its idiosyncratic preferences. Like investments in human capital, 
individuals invest in social capital by maximizing the utility of today's costs of invest-
ments with its discounted future benefits. 
This agency path into social capital is probably best reflected by Glaeser and his 
colleagues' economic approach to social capital based on rational choice (Glaeser 2001; 
Glaeser et al. 2002). From their view point, social capital is defined as: 
"A person's social characteristics - including social skills, charisma, and the size of his Rolodex - which 
enables him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with others." (Glaeser et al. 2002: 
438) 
They assume that an individual's social capital comprises both the intrinsic abilities (e.g. 
being extroverted and charismatic) and the results of social capital investments (e.g. a 
large social network). This view on social capital put aside all structural constraints and 
focuses solely on the rational choices of individuals. The individualistic focus in this 
definition of social capital reveals the rational choice approach. Besides the structural 
path and agency path, there is a third path of social capital. 
The instrumental path of social capital combines elements from the structural and 
the agency perspective (Lin 1990; Lin 1999). It takes as starting point the structural 
perspective, however adds the micro-assumption of social action. In contrast to expres-
sive actions initiated to maintenance and perseverance of valued resources, there are 
26 instrumental actions. Instrumental actions are undertaken by individuals in order to obtain 
valued resources that are not at the disposal of the individual. Those actions are initiated 
towards individuals higher up in the hierarchy who possess valuable resources. It is often 
assumed that the ties that bridge different levels of hierarchies are weak ties (Granovetter 
1973). These weak bridging ties are in conflict with structural assumptions and the 
principle of homophilous interactions and are sometimes assumed subordinate to struc-
ture (Lin 1990). Nonetheless, these weak bridging ties loosen the individual from its 
stringent structural constraints and allow him upward mobility in social structure beyond 
its position. 
To summarize, we see that there are different paths in the social capital process 
that lead to different outcomes. The structural path is merely focused on the reproduction 
of class and its resources. The instrumental path deals with upward mobility within a 
structural framework, while the agency path shows how individual outcomes are the 
result of rational self-interested choices. These paths through the stages of the social 
capital process give rise to different empirical contributions to the concept of social 
capital. 
2.4.2 Social capital formation 
What drives the formation of social capital? Let us claim for simplicity that an individ-
ual's social capital comprises his social network and the resources available in the 
relationships of his network. From a structural perspective, the drivers of an individuals 
network and the resources available in this network stem from an individual's original 
socio-economic position. Blau and Duncan (1967) pioneered the research on social 
origin. They claim that individual attainment does not only depend on education, but also 
on the socio-economic background of the parents. Lin (1990) adapts this claim into his 
strength-of-position hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the level of original position is 
positively associated with access and use of social resources. Given the principle of 
homophilous interactions, the better the original position of an individual, the better are 
the resources he can access and mobilize through its social network. An individual's 
initial position is often indicated by parental resources or attained resources. Evidence for 
this claim comes from a random job search survey of 399 individuals conducted in 1975 
in the New York erea (Lai, Ling, & Leung, 1998). Parental resources, measured by the 
respondent's father's occupational status and educational level, show a positive associa-
tion with an individual's attained resources. 
These structural parameters are clearly out of an individual's control. Even though 
its origins stem from sociological research, the claim that original position affects indi-
vidual outcomes is widely recognized in economic research (Loury 1977; Mulligan 
1999). Mulligan investigates the determinants of earnings differentials between parents 
and offspring comparing the income of 3,247 individuals in 1991 with parental income 
generated from the 1970 Census Public Use Microsample. He finds that parental perma-
nent income accounts for 40% of the association between parental success and offspring 
success, even after controlling for a rich set of control variables, including cognitive test 
results. Bowles et al. (2001) suggest that the transfer of non-cognitive skills not captured 
by conventional cognitive tests might account for the intergenerational transfer of sue-
27 cess. These skills include attitude towards risk, ability to adapt to new economic condi-
tions, hard work, and the rate of time preference. 
The agency perspective has a different approach in establishing the determinants 
of social capital. In this perspective, not the structure determines the formation of social 
capital, but the rational actions of an individual. Coleman's pioneering works (1986; 
1988; 1990) claim that rational actors create their own social networks for achieving 
certain ends. Glaeser (2001) and Glaeser et al. (2002) provide a pure economic approach 
to the formation of social capital. In their view social capital is the result of optimal 
individual investment decisions. They extend the definition of social capital as social 
networks with their determinants, namely a person's social characteristics that allow him 
to develop a social network and reap market and non-market returns. 
The main empirical evidence comes from the study of Glaeser et al. (2002). They 
used cross sectional data from 1972 to 1998 of the General Social Survey in the United 
States. To measure the stock of social capital the number of memberships in types of 
organizations is used. Age shows an inverted u-shape relation with organization member-
ship. This supports the claim that investments in social capital decline when the number 
of periods to recoup investment costs decreases. Mobility shows a negative relation with 
membership, supporting the claim that people invest more if their benefits from investing 
in social capital rise. Mobility decreases the returns on investments in social capital, 
because mobility reduces also the number of periods to recoup investment costs. The 
benefits for investing in social capital are assumed to be positively related with the 
sociability of and individual's occupation. The data confirms this prediction. Individuals 
with benefits from social interaction invest more in social relations, The data fails to 
support the model's prediction that membership falls with the opportunity cost of time. 
The opportunity cost of time is indicated by income or educational level
1 . Both income 
and educational level have a positive impact on membership. The relation between 
education and social capital can result from the possibility that social skills are learned at 
school. The positive relation between human and social capital is supported in a cross-
sectional study of 1402 Dutch top managers (Boxman et al. 1991). This study shows that 
human capital, measured by formal education, work experience, and number of formal 
jobs, is positively associated with social capital, measured by work contacts and member-
ships of clubs. 
From a theoretical stance, there is one theory that attempts to integrate structural 
determinism with an agency perspective of rational choice. Becker's (1996) economic 
theory on social capital accounts for tastes of related individuals on a person's utility 
through the stock of social capital He defines social capital as: 
"The influences of past actions by peers and others in an individual's social network and control system." 
(Becker 1996:4). 
11 Although the opportunity cost of time increases, higher educated individuals might also use time more 
efficiently, reflected in the ability of high educated individuals to generate a greater variety of non-routine 
activities (Gronau and Hamermesh 2001). it should be noted for completion that these economic explana-
tions focus more on the cost of civic engagement, while the argument by Glaeser et al, (2002) stress more 
the importance of high returns e.g. the self-employed pharmacist membership in all clubs to have contact 
with its customer. 
28 In Becker's opinion, the social network does not determine directly the behavior 
and decisions of individuals, rather indirectly through the influence on the relative utility 
of goods (Becker and Murphy 2000). An individual's social network determines his 
preferences and these in turn determine his choices. Once the social network has formed 
the actual formation of social capital is mostly outside the control of the individual. 
Therefore, the real moment of choosing is choosing the social network. Rational indi-
viduals will choose the networks that support their way of life. However, structure comes 
in ones more, when Becker explains: 
"Still, the choices available may be limited by market prices and other circumstances. A teenager enrolled 
in a particular school may have little choice over the peer pressure she feels. The equilibrium degree of 
segregation between blacks and whites, rich and poor, and other groups is determined by market and other 
forces that are partly beyond the control of the individual" (Becker 1996: 13). 
This quote makes us agnostic in judging the value of social structure and agency. 
The tension between structure and agency seems to be more the combination of an 
individual's freedom to make rational decisions with whom to enter into social networks, 
given the opportunities and constraints provided by social structure. Evidence for the 
structural formation and consequences of social capital in terms of social networks and 
resources is well developed. However, the rational choice approach to the formation of 
social capital in terms of an individual's investment decisions, based on his social charac-
teristics, is still in its infancy. 
2.4.3 Social capital access 
In this section we shift attention from the formation to the form and functions of network 
structures. From an outward perspective, networks can be closed or open, based on the 
embeddedness of the ties. However, a thorough network analysis should not only focus 
on the forest, the network, but should also take an inward perspective on the trees, its ties. 
Different perspectives on the form of networks are best understood by their function. 
Open networks with weak bridging ties strive for structural autonomy and opportunity 
(Burt 1992), while closed networks with strong bonding ties strive for social closure and 
support (Coleman 1990). These perspectives enclose different theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the concept of social capital. 
2.4.3.1 Closed networks and social capital 
Understanding the differences between open and closed networks is best understood by 
looking at its contributors and their methodological assumptions. The work on closed 
networks and its functions can be traced back to Coleman's (1988; 1990) seminal works 
on social theory and social capital. Coleman applies methodological individualism in the 
form of rational choice to social organization. Individuals purposefully promote their 
interests by forming social relations. Without these purposeful interactions of individuals 
no social organization would exist (the core argument of methodological individualism). 
These assumptions lead to the most well known definition of social capital: 
29 "I will conceive of ... social-structural resources as a capital asset for the individual, that is, as social 
capital. Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities 
having two characteristics in common: they all consists of some aspects of social structure, and they 
facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure." (Coleman 1990: 302) 
Although Coleman conceives social capital as an individual asset, it is a property 
of the social structure and inheres in relations. This relational property of social capital is 
reflected in the forms of social capital (Coleman 1990). The first form of social capital is 
obligations and expectations. This form of reciprocity allows extending the time horizon 
for exchange. Favors done today might be repaid in the future. Social capital in this form 
reduces transaction cost and makes social exchange more efficient, as financial capital 
made economic exchange more efficient (Frank 1992). The second form of social capital 
is information. This form of social capital is important for timely access to new knowl-
edge. Membership in a social structure may provide information about finding jobs 
(Granovetter 1974). The third form of social capital that emerges out of social structure is 
norms and legitimate authority. Norms are an effective way to regulate behavior. These 
norms come close to Becker's (1996) definition of social capital. Norms can be inter-
preted as the influences of past actions of individuals in an individual's social network 
and control system. The last form of social capital is the appropriability of social organi-
zation. Social relations and social organization serve often-other purposes for which they 
are originally created The appropriability of social capital reduces the set-up cost for 
forming new networks for new purposes. 
Coleman stresses the importance of social closure in social organization in order 
to increase the effectiveness and trustworthiness of social organization. The individual 
has little control over its functions, once social organizations are formed (cf. Becker 
1996). This definition of social capital as a property of collective social structures has 
boomed studies on social capital (Fukuyama 1995; Guiso et al. 2000; Putnam 1993). 
Most of these studies use survey-based measures of country-level trust that affects 
collective level outcomes as economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997) and government 
corruption (LaPorta et al. 1997). Moreover, most of the economic literature of the post-
Coleman era use these group effects at the state, regional, and country-level as the unit of 
analysis, reflecting the notion that the formation of social capital is a group-level attribute 
and should be studied at some high level of aggregation (Glaeser et al. 2002). However, 
the interest in this literature review is on social capital as either an asset or liability for the 
individual. For a more individually oriented view on social capital we must shift to the 
open network view. Paradoxically, where Coleman's theory on closed networks starts 
with rational choice, Burt's theory (1992) on open networks starts with structure. 
2.4.3.2 Open networks and social capital 
Burt's (1992) view on social capital starts with social structure. Burt'transforms the social 
structure in a capital in its own right. His interest is not on whom we reach (Lin 1990), 
but how we reach. Burt transforms the function of social structure from constraint to 
t ^ 
" This could have problematic implications for discounting future utilities of social relations. 
30 opportunity, from freedom to power and from absolute to negotiated control. He defines 
social capital: 
"Relations with other players, friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive 
opportunities to use your financial and human capital." (Burt 1992; 9). 
The individual actor becomes an entrepreneur in a competitive arena where everybody is 
bargaining for resources. The entrepreneur should position itself in the social structure in 
such a way that he receives information and control advantages. Efficiency is achieved by 
selecting contacts that provide non-redundant information. Non-redundant contacts serve 
as bridges to new information and opportunities. The principle of non-redundancy shows 
strong resemblance with the distinction between weak and strong ties. Based on the 
classic work of Granovetter (1973), weak ties are assumed to be bridges to new and fresh 
information, while strong ties often create redundancy. Burt acknowledges that bridges 
are often weak ties, but does not a priori rule out that strong ties can be bridges too. Burt 
proposes the concept of structural holes in order to complement the information benefits 
with control benefits for being the broker between two unconnected alters. An individ-
ual's optimal strategy should be based on structural autonomy where at his end of the 
relationship he is free of structural holes, while at the other end he is rich in structural 
holes. 
If we compare Burt's (1992) concept of social capital with Coleman's (1990) 
concept of social capital, two things become clear. Social capital in the form of opportu-
nities is individually created and controlled, while social capital as trust and norms is 
created by the collective. Both forms of social capital can be a resource for the individual. 
The parameters to be optimized for information and oppoitunity are network size and 
diversity, while social support demands strong ties and closure. Therefore, networks of 
different configurations should be judged according to their function. Open network 
functions would benefit from capital widening investments, while closed network func-
tions would benefit from capital-intensive investments. 
2.4.4 Mobilization of social capital 
The last moderating phase in the social capital process deals with the instrumental actions 
from the opportunity structure. Mobilized social capital refers to the use of specific 
contacts for certain purposes. The appropriability of social relations (Coleman 1990) 
allows multiple instrumental actions from ties. The status of the contact used in instru-
mental actions is negatively related with tie strength and the status of the contact is 
positively related with an individual's education (Lin 1999). It is assumed that the value 
of the contact used in instrumental action is positively associated with the outcome of the 
action. This last phase in the social capital process gives insight in the productivity of the 
opportunity structure. 
The access and use of social capital is often not separated in empirical literature. 
The only exception is the literature on job search and status attainment. The study of Lai, 
Lin, and Lueng (1998) find support for the negative relation between tie strength and the 
status and resources of the contact used in a job search survey of 1975. Results of this 
study indicate that a contact's resources have a positive impact on the status outcome of 
31 the individual. Furthermore, De Graaf and Flap (1988) find a positive relation between 
the value of the contact used and the outcome of the instrumental action in a Dutch job 
search survey. 
Next to the job search literature, there is implicit evidence of the importance of 
separating access from use of social capital. Coleman's (1988) pioneering work points in 
a similar direction. He uses the High School and Beyond dataset of 4,000 children to 
show the importance of social capital in the creation of human capital. The results show 
that the presence of both parents reduces a child's chance of dropping out of school with 
6.0 percentage points. This indicator of social capital measures a child's access to social 
capital in the form of the presence of both parents. In the same analysis Coleman finds 
that the mother's expectation for child's education (no college versus college) reduces the 
chances of dropping out of school with 8.6 percentage points, controlling for the presence 
of both parents. The mother's expectation captures the mobilization of social capital and 
provides a better predictor than social capital access. 
There is similar evidence in the study on 1,710 business founders in Munich and 
Upper Bavaria (Briiderl and Preisendorfer 1998). Their analysis differentiates between 
levels of support from weak ties, indicated by business partners, acquaintances, former 
employers, and former co-workers and the level of support from strong ties, indicated by 
spouse, parents, friends, and relatives. The results of this study indicate that medium to 
high support from weak ties compared to low support is more positively related to firm 
growth measured by employment or sales, while equally positively related to survival. In 
addition, medium and high support from strong ties compared to low support is more 
positively associated with survival and sales growth, and equally positively associated 
with employment growth. The results seem to indicate that it is not so much the presence 
or the strength of the tie that determines its instrumental effects, but more the actual use 
and motivation of the tie. 
The best illustration for stressing the necessity to separate access from mobiliza-
tion comes from a panel study of 1100 Dutch business founders surveyed between 1994 
and 1997 (Bosma et al. 2004). This study shows that the presence of a spouse is margin-
ally negatively related with survival time and not related with profit, while the actual 
emotional support is positively associated with both survival time and profit. Differentiat-
ing access from use of social relationships in this case seems to transform a social liabil-
ity into social capital. Results have shown that social capital outcomes differentiate with 
the specificity of its measurement. In the next session, we will discuss the consequences 
and benefits of social capital formation for entrepreneurship. 
2.4.5 Social capital outcomes - Integrating self-employment and 
social capital 
The role of social capital in economic, political, and social life has been investigated in 
great detail. But how can social capital benefit entrepreneurship and self-employment? 
There are several theoretical reasons why relationship-specific investments can influence 
productivity and survival. Information conveyed in social relations reduces the uncer-
tainty about competitor and supplier prices in imperfect markets (Stigler 1961). Invest-
ments which are specific to a certain relationship can create trust and economize on 
32 transaction costs and can lead to a concentration of trade between identified partners 
(Ben-Porath 1980). And social relations provide information that reduces search costs 
when markets show frictions (Kranton 1996). Furthermore, social relations can provide 
access to financial capital when entrepreneurs are liquidity constraint. Also, the spouse 
may provide cheap labour or income. However, there are only a few empirical studies 
that have tried to substantiate these theoretical claims. These studies focus mostly on the 
effect of access and mobilization of social capital on the success or survival chances of 
newly founded firms. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the most relevant empirical evidence of the relationship 
between social capital and self-employment. In their study on self-employment, Bruderl 
and Preisendorfer (1998) pose the network success hypothesis. This hypothesis claims 
that the social network is related to organizational performance through better access to 
information, customers and suppliers, and informal credits. They argue that the family 
network often provides unpaid family work and may provide emotional support. Their 
results indicate that support from strong ties, like family and friends, is more important 
for success of new businesses than support from weak ties, like business partners and 
acquaintances. It should be noted that these authors did not measure the structure or size 
of the social network, but merely how the entrepreneur mobilized their social network to 
support business survival. 
Pennings, Lee, and Van Witteloostuijn (1998) examined the effect of social 
capital upon firm dissolution of Dutch accounting firms for the period 1880-1990. They 
focused on specific social capital namely the firm member's connectedness with potential 
clients. The information conveyed in social relations is especially important in this 
industry, where the information of the quality of the professionals is imperfect. Similar 
contacts may offer redundant information and to test for this possibility they included 
network heterogeneity measures. Their results showed that the size of the network 
increased the survival chances of the firm, but network heterogeneity did not alter firm 
survival. 
Quite recently, Bosma et al. (2004) researched the survival chances of a sample of 
Dutch start ups. Building on the social capital investment model of Gleaser et al. (2002), 
they tested how investments in social capital affect the success of a newly founded 
business in terms of survival, profit, and employment. They argue along human capital 
theory that more specific investments in social capital (and human capital) should in-
crease success more than general investments because general investments have a broader 
scope and longer time frame to recoup investments. They find some support that more 
specific investments in human capital and social capital, like gathering information from 
commercial and business channels, increase success more than general investments. All 
three studies use some crude measures and some loose theoretical arguments why access 
and mobilization of social relations can increase the success chances of entrepreneurs. 
In the last years, empirical studies started to investigate the connection between social 
relations and firm performance including social networks into the production function of 
firms. Ban* (2000) predicts that social networks affect firm productivity indirectly 
through knowledge flows between firms. Fafchamp and Minten (2002) argue that social 
networks provide information and trust to overcome or exploit market imperfections and 
therefore raise profitability. Profitability is increased either directly through price dis-
crimination or indirectly through an increase in the productivity of factor inputs. Both 
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34 studies find strong evidence for a positive relationship between social networks and firm 
productivity. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we reviewed the literature on entrepreneurship and social capital. We 
surveyed the canonical theoretical models on self-employment entry and exit. Self-
employment entry is mainly investigated from an occupational choice perspective, while 
the theory of self-employment exit is mainly dominated by Jovanovic (1982) learning 
model. Then, we surveyed the empirical evidence of determinants of the probability of 
entry and the probability of exit. Especially the results of the empirical studies that 
investigated the determinants of self-employment selection were contradictory. We have 
found several reasons for these contradictory results. The main problem is the sampling 
frame used. Researchers have both used stock and flow sampling techniques to investi-
gate the determinants of self-employment. Inferences from stock samples do not provide 
any information on determinants of the probability of entry, unless simultaneously 
information is known about the probability of exit. Even if this information is available, 
these results are only valid under steady state conditions. Empirical research on the 
determinants of the probability of exit is less methodological flawed. Most researchers 
use a flow sample and respect the time dimension by utilizing duration analysis. 
Besides the theoretical and empirical research on self-employment, we investi-
gated if and how social capital can be used for entrepreneurship. We restricted our focus 
on individual social capital, which we defined as the purposeful investment in social 
relationships with expected returns. These expected returns can be as broad as resources, 
information, trust, and control embedded within social relationships and social networks. 
We surveyed the origin of social capital from sociology and economics. These ap-
proaches differ mainly in their perception of the formation of social capital. From an 
economic perspective, investments in social capital are a rational decision trading off cost 
and returns. From a sociological perspective, investments in social capital are constrained 
by the social structure the person is embedded in. From an integral perspective, both 
approaches have their merits, and economists like Gary Becker have introduced many 
sociological concepts, as group behaviour and norms, in economic analyses. 
Finally, we have surveyed the empirical literature that simultaneously analysed 
social capital and self-employment. This literature is scarce and underdeveloped. Most 
studies merely research the effect of the size of the social network on self-employment 
performance measures, like sales, growth, and survival. Although these studies confirm 
that social capital may be an important predictor of self-employment success, the reason 
why and how social capital leads to success has not been put in a proper theoretical 
perspective. 
Based on the survey of the literature, we propose the following recommendations 
for research. (1) Although the theory on self-employment entry and exit is well devel-
oped, different theoretical models are used to explain self-employment entry and exit; 
occupational choice models for entry and learning models for exit. Both theories have 
their merits. The occupational choice model performs better in predicting individual 
thresholds, while the learning model is better able to explain the behavior of firm after 
35 entry in the market. However, both models have their limitations as well. Both models 
ignore the sunkness of the set up costs. Introducing sunk costs in theorizing on individual 
entry and exit decisions can explain why individuals are reluctant to enter or exit self-
employment. Focusing on the sunkness of the set up costs, would fit nicely in the re-
search on investment decisions under uncertainty (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 1994). We 
apply the research on investments under uncertainty to the self-employment decision in 
chapter 7. (2) The theory on self-employment entry should differentiate between different 
types of self-employment. This suggestion was already made in Carroll and Mosakowski 
(1987) but has not been fulfilled to date. Actually, Carroll and Mosakowski are the only 
ones who have differentiated family self-employment from de novo self-employment. In 
chapter 4 of this dissertation, we will build a model that differentiates between family 
self-employment and de novo self-employment. (3) The research on self-employment 
selection has mainly been studied, theoretically and empirically, from a static perspective. 
This has lead to biased parameter estimates and neglected the inherent timing of the self-
employment decision. In chapter 3 and 4, we investigate the timing of the entry decision. 
(4) The literature review has shown that social relations can increase self-employment 
success. However, these studies have not explicitly modelled why and how social rela-
tions are productive. In chapter 8, we will investigate the formation of productive social 
relations in an entrepreneurial context. 
36 2.6 Appendix 
From the text we have: 




(2.10) Apr{iF) = tfx'0lt.)*pjF 
OX: 
and 
(2.11) log[Pr(5£)] - A iog[Pr(/F)] 
OX • ox. 
Partial differencing using the rules: 
8F(G(x)) a jF . 5G 
dx dG dx 
r)F 1 dG 
where (2.12b)F = iog(G), and (2.12c) G = Pr(x)> with (2.12d) — = — , and (2.12e) —• 
dG G ox 
equation (2.9) or equation (2.10). 




1 * 3 
K '
 1 Pr(SE) dx, Pr(IF) dx 
Rewrite (2.8) into 




Pr (IF) Pr (SE) 
37 Fill in (2.14b) into (2.13) renders: 
(2.15a) Yj 
1 , 5 Pr (SE) E(T) , 8 Pr {IF) 
Pr (SE) OX  I  ?r(SE) dx  j 
or equivalently 
(2.15b) y j =  1 
Pr(S£) 
d ?T{SE) d Pr(lf) 
dx.  J  dx.. 
E(T) 
which gives equation (2.7) in the text. 
38 Chapter 3 
Time aggregation bias in estimating 
the probability of entrepreneurship 
39 3 Time aggregation bias in estimating the probability of 
entrepreneurship 
3.1 Introduction 
The application of a static single period classification method to multiperiod data, like the 
simple probit and logit, implicitly assumes that the probabilities of choice are stable over 
time. The temporal process that generates change has reached an equilibrium state 
(Carroll 1983: 425), and the probability to become an entrepreneur has no duration 
dependence. In order to understand the choices of individuals for entrepreneurship, we 
need to think about the stochastic processes that are consistent with individuals making 
choices. Then, the data-generating process should dictate model choice (Lancaster 1990). 
Failure to do so will guarantee misspecification and lead to incorrect inferences. 
This paper examines the empirical effects of time aggregation bias when researchers 
apply a static single period classification methodology to multiperiod decisions. When 
social researchers study qualitative choices, they sometimes use static research methods 
which ignore the temporal dimensions of the research problem. By estimating single-
period classification models with multiple-period data, they produce choice probabilities 
that are biased and inconsistent estimates of the true population probabilities (Shumway 
2001:87). 
Studies on time-aggregation can be classified in two ways. This first type of 
studies discuss the consequences of applying static research methods to multiperiod data 
(Allison 1984; Carroll 1983; Cox and Oakes 1984; Shumway 2001). Utilizing a static 
methodology by aggregating the time dimension and dichotomizing the dependent choice 
variable is both arbitrary and inefficient (Allison 1984; Cox and Oakes 1984). It is 
arbitrary because the end date of the time dimension is often determined by the researcher 
and it is inefficient because it ignores the information contained in the variation through 
time. Shumway (2001) provides the econometric properties of static models and dynamic 
hazard, or duration, models. He shows theoretically and empirically the inconsistency of 
the static estimator. The hazard approach is theoretically preferable, because it corrects 
for periods at risk and allows for time-varying covariates. 
The second type of studies focuses on the effects of time-aggregation within dura-
tion models (Bergström and Edin 1992; Petersen 1991; Petersen and Koput 1992; Roed 
and Zhang 2002). These studies investigate on the effects of grouping data into intervals, 
for example daily information into weekly data. Petersen (1991) and Petersen and Koput 
(1992) show that the bias of time-aggregation in estimates increases with the size of the 
time interval. 
Another purpose of this study is to investigate the sensitivity of time to entrepre-
neurship regressor estimates to distributional assumptions of the discrete hazard. Previous 
research on the sensitivity of duration estimates focused on the sensitivity of the estimates 
to distributional assumptions of the parametric baseline hazard (Addison and Portugal 
1987; Bergström and Edin 1992). Others have focused on the sensitivity of parameter 
estimates to different specifications of the cumulative density function of the discrete 
40 hazard (Royston and Parmar 2002; Sueyoshi 1995), Bergstrom and Edin (1992) provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of time aggregation on parameter estimates of different 
distributional assumptions of the parametric baseline hazard in continuous duration 
models. We follow Sueyoshi's (1995) methodology and focus on the sensitivity of 
parameter estimates in grouped duration models. We add to this literature by addressing 
the sensitivity of the estimates to different specifications of the cumulative density 
functions (CDF) of the discrete hazard, like the logistic, normal, and type I extreme value 
(cloglog), to time aggregation. 
We use the research of Cramer, Hartog, Jonker and Van Praag (2002), on the ef-
fect of empirical relevant variables on the probability of entrepreneurship in the Nether-
lands in a retrospective survey of labor market histories between 1953 and 1993 of 
approximately 1700 individuals, as an example of a study using dynamic data and a static 
estimation technique. We examine and test the implicit assumptions of their static 
estimator and its empirical consequences in terms of precision and predictive accuracy, 
and show the information that can be gained by employing dynamic estimators. 
We apply a variety of dynamic estimation techniques. For grouped duration mod-
els, we use semi-parametric estimation techniques and compare it to alternative ap-
proaches. We follow Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Han and Hausman (1990), and 
Meyer (1990) by non-parametrically estimating the effect of time on the probability of 
entrepreneurship. We apply this technique to different functional forms of the discrete 
hazard of which the cloglog specification is the discrete variant of the continuous propor-
tional hazard model, Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984) among others, 
discuss the importance of allowing for unobservable differences between individuals 
(unobserved heterogeneity). Unobserved heterogeneity may stem from omitted variables, 
but also from misspecification of the parametric baseline hazard. We allow and test for 
this unobserved heterogeneity in this dataset. We also address another possible source of 
11 
unobserved heterogeneity in the proportional hazards model: time-varying coefficients . 
Non-proportional hazards may result from an interaction between time and the regressors. 
We test for non-proportional hazards in a Cox partial likelihood framework (Cox 1972). 
Deviations from proportionality in covariates can be estimated with flexible spline 
models (Royston and Parmar 2002). This method of estimation leads to interesting 
conclusions in our dataset. We find that the positive effect of the self-employed parent, 
one of the most consistent predictors of entrepreneurship selection within the self-
employment literature, is only significant within the first decade after compulsory school-
ing. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 addresses the process that 
generates the data. It presents the information in the data and models the transition to 
entrepreneurship as a stochastic point process. Section 3.3 derives the grouped duration 
models that will be estimated. Section 3.4 discusses the dataset used by Cramer et al. 
(2002). Section 3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 concludes, 
13 See Hastie and Tibshirani (1993) for a good reference on time-varying coefficients models. 
41 3.2 The process that generates the data 
3.2.1 The information in the data 
After compulsory schooling, individuals face several career options: continue schooling, 
obtain social security, work in the labor market, or become self-employed, which we 
label entrepreneurship. What are the chances that an individual becomes an entrepreneur 
after compulsory schooling? What are the factors influencing the chance to become an 
entrepreneur? To answer these research questions, we have to research the transitions into 
entrepreneurship. The process of movement from a non-entrepreneurship career to 
entrepreneurship generates a sequence of points over time - the times at which a transi-
tion to entrepreneurship is made. Figure 3.1 provides the first transition times to entrepre-
neurship for 1981 compulsory school leavers from the North of Brabant in 1953. 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of entry years into self-employment 
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Figure 3.1 shows that utilizing a static approach by aggregating the time dimension and 
dichotomizing the dependent variable (1 if individual became self-employed between 
1953 and 1993, 0 otherwise) is both arbitrary and wastes information. It is arbitrary 
because there is nothing special about the 40-year dividing line except that the study 
ended at that point. It wastes information because it ignores the variation on either side of 
the dividing line. One might suspect, for example, that someone started as an entrepre-
neur immediately after compulsory school had a different initiate motivation to become 
entrepreneur than someone who started at the age of 50. 
Moreover, static models assume that the probability of becoming self-employed is 
exponentially distributed and Markov independent or memoryless. This means that the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur in any period after time t is always the same, 
conditional on everything that happens up to time but not on t itself, Figure 3.1 shows 
that this assumption is at least suspicious. Markov independence is violated in the pres-
42 ence of duration dependence: the probability of becoming self-employed changes over 
time. 
The Poisson process is a stochastic point process where the probability to become 
entrepreneur is exponentially distributed. Since the static models assume Markov inde-
pendence, we will start with the Poisson process. The next section shows that these static 
models are just censored and aggregated versions of a dynamic hazard model. It shows 
that the probability that someone becomes ever self-employed (static model) in life is a 
function of the rate of event occurrence (hazard rate) and time. 
3.2.2 Modeling the transition to entrepreneurship as a Poisson proc-
What is it that generates the different entry years into entrepreneurship? We begin by 
describing the data which constitute our information about the transfers towards self-
employment. Let yit be a variable representing binary data, where 
This is the most disaggregated form of data used and enables one to model explicitly both 
the cross-sectional and time-series processes underlying the data. The only information 
loss is when the event occurs during the time period t. 
Listing the duration between the state of never self-employed to ever self-
employed is a different way of coding these events. Duration may be coded as a discrete 
or continuous variable. Since we have only yearly information we use a discrete variable, 
where we count the number of time units (years) t between the events. We denote this 
variable yi : 
The only information lost by this coding of the transition is the precision of when within 
a year the transition occurred. 
Given Markov independence, we can express the static approach in terms of the 
hazard rate: the rate of event occurrence. The hazard rate is better understood as the 
expected number of events in a time interval that is one unit long. Let y be the true 
number of times an individual becomes self-employed. The binary-censored static data 
are then obtained by transforming y* into 
ess 
(3-D y„ = \ 
1 if a transition to self - employment occurs during t 
0 otherwise 
(3.2) ^.=£1 = 7; 
(3-3) y„ = 
0 if )'], = 0 
1 if y'„ > 0 
43 The distribution of the data yu is then given by 
(3.4) Pr [Y„=y  it 
Since y is distributed Poisson with mean A (Lancaster 1990; Ross 1993), it follows that  j ' 
for some interval At (Alt et al. 2000): 
(3.5) Pr [)',-, = O] = exp(- X&t ) 
Pr[v„ = l] = 1 - exp(- AAO 
or equivalently 
(3.6) /(y„ = V, \A) = (1 - exp(- AAtf" (cxp(- Mt)f
y 
Equation (3.6) gives the relation between the probability of an event occurring and the 
rate of event occurrence X. Let A, the rate of event occurrence, be a log-linear function of 
a set of explanatory variables X 
(3.7) /t = exp(A73) 
Filling in equation (3.7) into (3.6) gives 
(3.8) f(Yu = yu | X,0)= (1 "exp(-exp(^)A0)
v" (exp^exp^^))
1^ 
Which is a simple binary choice model with a type I extreme value error distribution (also 
known as the cloglog distribution) (Alt et al. 2000). Note that this static estimator 
becomes a dynamic estimator if the time interval is split into smaller time units. 
Cramer et al. (2002) assumed a normal distribution of the error term. More impor-
tantly, they aggregated 40 years into 1 interval. Petersen (1991) shows that the larger the 
time interval the higher the bias of the aggregation. Shumway (2001) provides an econo-
metric specification of the aggregation bias. The static approach does not take into 
account the number of periods at risk. For the static approach it does not matter whether 
one becomes self-employed after 1 or 40 years. Shumway (2001) shows that the esti-
mated parameters of a static approach are always upward biased. Furthermore, some 
personal characteristics, like age, vary through time and their effect on the probability of 
entrepreneurship may also vary through time. These so-called time-varying covariates 
and time-varying coefficients cannot be included in static estimators, but are easily 
handled with a dynamic estimator. What should be evidently clear from this section is 
that the static estimator is only a censored (aggregated) version of the dynamic estimator. 
The only difference is that the dynamic estimator utilizes all information available in the 
data. Both estimators answer who becomes an entrepreneur, however the dynamic 
estimator also provides information about when that individual becomes an entrepreneur. 
44 3.3 Grouped duration models 
In this section, we discuss the use of duration (dynamic) models as a more flexible and 
robust alternative to static models. Since the underlying data generating process is 
continuous, we model durations first in continuous time (Heckman and Singer 1984, 
Lancaster 1990). Since our data is grouped into years, we derive the grouped (discrete) 
analogue of the continuous duration model and show that the discrete hazard model is 
equal to a dynamic binary choice model (Allison 1982; Jenkins 1995; Singer and Willett 
1993; Sueyoshi 1995). Then we discuss the implications of different specifications of the 
functional form of the discrete hazard. Next, we discuss the discrete way to handle 
deviations from Markov independence by allowing non-parametric duration dependence. 
Besides duration dependence, the discrete hazard model allows for testing for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Then, we deal with the implicit proportionality assumption in discrete 
hazard models and offer a flexible alternative based on splines to deal with non-
proportional hazards (Royston and Parmar 2002). 
3.3.1 Duration models 
We start with the information of equation (3.2) to derive a more flexible duration model. 
Let T be a positive, continuous random variable for the time to entry into entrepreneur-
ship after compulsory schooling. The hazard rate, or the rate of event occurrence, at time 
t is defined as the conditional probability of entry into self-employment, given that the 
individual has not been self-employed before t (survival up to t): 
(3.9) A(t)= lim 
{/ ->0 
?r(t < T < t + dt | T > t) 
dt 
The next step is to allow for population heterogeneity. If we allow the hazard to differ in 
terms of observed covariates X with associated parameters p, then (3.9) can be written as: 
(3.10) Mt.x,fi)= ^±T<t + at\T>t,x,p) 
ft —  dt 
The associated survivor function is equal to the integrated hazard: 
(3.11) s(t,X,ji) = Pr(r £t) = exp 
( 
- |/t(.v, X,/3)ds 
o 
The associated probability density function of the survivor function yields: 
(3.12) f(t, X, p) = X{t, X, fi)s(t, X, J3) 
45 In our empirical example of entrepreneurs, the continuous realisations of T are grouped in 
years, and defined as durations th for/W,..., J. Survival to time t,- is the same as surviving 
each of the intervals fa-l, tfj for k=l,...,j. Therefore, we can express the overall survivor 
function in tenus of interval-specific conditional survivor functions a defined as (Sueyo-
shi 1995): 
(3.13) ak(X,ß) = S(tk,X,ß I T > = exp 
ljA{s
9X9ß)ds 
By the definition of conditional probabilities, the survivor function at arbitrary duration th 




The likelihood contributions for grouped data are based solely on the survivor function 
(or equivalently on its mirror function, the Failure function) S(t) and hence upon aj 
evaluated at various . Note that the probability of an observed exit in the j-th interval is 
given by: 
(3.15) 
where the left-part of the equation is the probability of surviving the first j-1 intervals, but 
not surviving the j-th (again following the rules of conditional probability). Also note that 
I-aj is the interval specific failure function. 
We can rewrite equation (3.15) to arrive at the probability of failure (entry into 
self-employment) in the j-th interval: 
(3.16) 
PrifH < T </JT,fi)- S{tH,p)-s(tj,x,p) = 
Equation (3.16) implies that a discrete (grouped) duration model is equivalent to a 
sequential discrete choice model with error distribution functions F (Sueyoshi 1995). 
Note that the likelihood function depends on the specification of F. Equation (3.16) 
equals equation (3.8) in the case of a cloglog specification of F, 
3.3.2 Different specifications for the failure function 
Although applying the type I extreme value link to equation (3.8) and (3.16) is 
convenient and leads to the easy interprétable proportional hazards model, other specifi-
cations for F are possible (Jenkins 1995, Royston and Parmar 2002, Sueyoshi 1995). 
Since the within behaviour of the hazard cannot be identified from grouped duration data, 
46 evaluation of the alternative duration specifications should focus on the implications of 
various functional forms of the discrete hazard specification: 
(3.17) mj - aj{X,0)-F{XJ3) 
In contrast with the continuous hazard rate, the discrete hazard rate is a probability. We 
investigate the three most frequently used functional forms: the normal, logistic, and type 
I extreme value. We are particularly interested in how the estimated parameters differ in 
interpretation and how different specifications lead to different estimated durations and 
probabilities of entry into self-employment (goodness-of-fit). Moreover, we test for the 
effect of using different specifications of the discrete hazard on the bias from aggregating 
time. 
The previous sections have shown that the type I extreme value CDF is the dis-
crete analogue to the proportional hazards model. A one unit change in the covariate 
leads to a proportionate change in the hazard. The logistic specification leads to a propor-
tional logit model. A one unit change leads to a proportional effect in the log of the odds. 
The normal specification leads to a less well-known specification and non-proportional 
effect. Sueyoshi (1995: 419) has shown that a one unit change in a covariate leads to a 
disproportionate effect because the effect also depends on time. 
3.3.3 Duration dependence 
So far, we have assumed that the probability of becoming self-employed is stable over 
time. This has been the assumption in most of the empirical studies of entrepreneurship/ 
self-employment selection. However, these studies did not study explicitly the duration to 
become ever entrepreneur, but more the chance that someone becomes an entrepreneur in 
some arbitrary time interval. None of these studies followed school leavers over time 
(inflow sample). Rees and Shah (1986) found that the probability of being an entrepre-
neur is convex in age in the UK. However, Evans and Leighton (1989) found in the US 
that the probability of entering self-employment is independent of age. Still, there are 
various reasons why the probability to become self-employed may differ over time. In the 
first years after compulsory school, individuals need to learn the skills or earn the neces-
sary financial capital to start their own business (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). When 
learning these skills and earning a threshold level of financial capital, an individual's 
probability to become self-employed may be lower than after this first period. At the end 
of an individual's working career, the probability to become self-employed may level off 
again. Starting a business is an investment, and the time to capitalize on the investment 
decreases. In these hypothetical cases, the chance of becoming self-employed is clearly 
duration dependent. 
The most common way to introduce duration dependence is to assume a propor-
tional hazards model of the form: 
(3.18) 
47 where A0(/) is the baseline hazard at t, which can take several forms and is possibly 
unknown. From equation (3.11) we know that we can write the probability that a spell 
lasts until time tt given that it has lasted until t-1 as a function of the hazard: 
(3.19a) Pr (T >tk\T> tkA) - S{tk \ T > tk,) = exp 
equals 
(3.19b) Pr(r>^ \T >tk_])= txp 
which can be written as: 




(3.20) r(f)=ln \\{s)ds 
h-1 
Equation (3.20) is equivalent to extending equation (3,16) with time dummies and 
estimating the sequential discrete choice model with a type I extreme value CDF. 
The log-likelihood contribution for the whole sample of N individuals can be 
written in terms of equation (3.19c) following the result of equation (3.16) as: 
N 
(3.21) log/?) = £  dt log[l - exp{- exp|/(&() + J3X]}]-- £ exp\r(k,)+J3X] 
t-\ 
where 3. = 1 if T-t is smaller or equal than the censoring time and y = [/(0)y(\\..y(T)] , a 
set of time dummies capturing the baseline hazard (semi-parametric) (Prentice and 
Gloeckler 1978). Based on this specification of the likelihood we can easily test for 
duration dependence with a likelihood ratio test. Duration dependence is existent if the 
grouping as a whole is significant. In this proportional hazards specification, one might 
also capture the duration dependence parametrically, by assuming a parametric distribu-
tion like the Weibull or Gompertz, for the baseline hazard. We will return to parametric 
specifications of the baseline hazard, when we discuss non-proportional effects. 
48 3.3.4 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Duration dependence may also be a result of unobserved heterogeneity (Elbers and 
Ridder 1982). Unobserved heterogeneity affects duration dependence by a so-called 
weeding out effect. The most entrepreneurship prone individuals tend to enter self-
employment faster. Therefore, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the base-
line hazard may become smaller. Unobserved heterogeneity has been found more impor-
tant in parametric formulations than in non-parametric (Jenkins 2004: 87). Wrongly 
specified parametric distributions inflate unobserved heterogeneity. In our semi-
parametric discrete (grouped) duration model we control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Following Meyer (1990), we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity affects the hazard 
multiplicatively. Controlling for unobserved equation (3.18) can be written as: 
(3.22) v{Xt/}) 
where 9 is a random variable and is assumed to be independent of X, 




log ifr,/?,,/)=£ log 
M 
dexp  -tfjexp \y{kt)+fiX}i/i{0) 





The significance of unobserved heterogeneity can be tested by a likelihood-ratio test 
under the null-hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity. 
3.3.5 The proportionality assumption 
With the exception of the normal specification, the dynamic discrete choice models 
based on the type I extreme value and the logistic specification assume a proportional 
relationship between the predictors and the hazard (Jenkins 1995; Singer and Wiliett 
1993; Sueyoshi 1995). Different values for the predictors shift the baseline hazard. 
Sometimes, the predictors do not only shift the baseline hazard, but they may also alter 
the baseline hazard. For instance, the influence of parents on the probability of becoming 
self-employed may be higher in the early ages of an individual, when the person is more 
dependent on parental financial assistance and advice. In this case, the effect of self-
employed parents may increase the hazard of becoming self-employed less when the 
individual ages. If the predictor also changes the shape of the hazard, then there is a non-
proportional relationship between predictors and the hazard. Sueyoshi's suggests (1995) 
that more general models should allow for interactions between the time-dependence in 
the hazards and the explanatory variables. Non-proportional relationships can be included 
in the model by exploring statistical interactions between the predictors and the hazard. 
We test for proportional hazards. We use Stata's specification test of the propor-
tionality assumption based on Schoenfeld (1982) residuals, which tests for a nonzero 
slope of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on functions of time (Grambsch and Therneau 
49 1994). Under the null hypothesis of proportional hazards, the parameter estimates 
modelled as a function of time should have a zero slope. A rejection of the null hypothe-
sis indicates non-proportional effects. 
A rather ad-hoc approach in a discrete time setting to deal with non-proportional 
hazards is to include an interaction between each time-dummy and the covariates (Singer 
& Willett 1993). This approach can be implemented easily in a discrete time formula-
tion, but at the cost of a substantial reduction in the degrees of freedom. A more flexible 
approach to allow for non-proportional hazards rests on parametric splines (Royston & 
Parmar 2002). The parametric splines model extends the non-parametric approach based 
on time dummies with a parametric baseline hazard based on splines. More important, the 
splines can be interacted with the coefficients of the non-proportional predictors leading 
to parametric time-varying coefficients for the predictors. More general models with 
time-varying coefficients are advocated by the seminal paper of Hastie and Tibshirani 
(1993). They have been applied in the self-employment exit literature by Kauermann, 
Tutz, and Bruderl (2005). If we test for non-proportional hazards, then we can estimate 
the following flexible parametric spline model based on one to six splines and on three 
specifications of the error distribution: logistic, normal, type I extreme value. In the case 
of only minor deviations of the proportional hazard assumption, Royston and Parmar 
(2002) advice to follow the proportional hazards assumption. The parametric spline 
model with possible time dependent covariate effects is based on the integrated propor-
tional hazards model and formulated as follows (Parmar & Royston 2002: 2184): 




t, dim(y)=m+J and thej-th component of y (l<j<rn+l) is 
(3.25) Yi = 
yj{) k = 0 (proportional hazards model) 
Vjq + Xm Yt**i ^ - * (
non" P
roPorti°nal hazards for xxxk) 
where z = ln(t) and H(t;X) is the integrated hazard function. 
3.4 An example of a study using dynamic data and a static es-
timation technique 
For our analysis we use one of the models estimated on the North Brabant Dataset in 
Cramer et al. (2002). The North Brabant longitudinal data set contains information about 
3167 individuals who were bom 1939/1940 and went to school in the Dutch province 
North Brabant in 1952 (Hartog 1989; Jonker 1995). Then researchers took a random 
sample of pupils who attended the sixth grade of primary school 2874 individuals 
provided information about their school performance and family background. In 1983 all 
3167 individuals were contacted again. 2588 people responded and were asked about 
their later education, labor market status, earnings, and household composition. In 1993 
50 at the age of approximately 54, the 3167 school children of 1952 were approached for the 
third time. The questionnaire mailed in 1993 contained questions on the labor market 
status since 1983 and especially on self-employment experience. 2099 individuals 
answered in 1993. Due to attrition and item non-response the final sample consists of 
1657 individuals. 
Cramer et al. (2002) applied a static estimator to multi-period data. They modeled 
the choice for entrepreneurship as respondents report self-employment at any time 
between 1953 and 1993. We are interested in the exact timing of this choice, In the 
original dataset, each respondent has one record of data. Before we can apply our dy-
namic estimation techniques, this person-oriented dataset must be converted into a 
person-period dataset in which every person has multiple records, one per year. 
For the explanatory variables we use Cramer et al.'s second model. The explana-
tory variables included are intelligence, gender, vocational schooling, self-employed 
parent, education of parent, and transformed price. The transformed price is a measure of 
risk aversion extracted from a lottery question in the survey. 
3.5 Data analysis with dynamic techniques 
Table 3.1 shows the estimation results. Model 1 - 3 show the results of the binary choice 
models. Model 4 -6 provide the results of the grouped duration data. All models assume a 
constant probability of becoming entrepreneur over time (Markov independence). The 
differences in results stem only from accounting for the variability over time. Model 7 -
9 show the results of the semi-parametric grouped duration models when accounted for 
non-parametric duration dependence by including time dummies. And model 10 shows 
the result of a grouped duration model with time dummies accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity by gamma frailty
14. The number of observations differs between the 
models. Model 1-3 have 1657 observations, the number of individuals in our sample. 
Model 4-6 have 62035, the number of person-period observations. Model 7-10 have only 
58729 person-period observations. In period 3 and 4 there were no transfers to self-
employment. The two periods (13304 person-period observations) were dropped because 
the outcome was perfectly predicted (multicolinearity). In order to compare the coeffi-
cients of the probit, logit, and cloglog, we have to take into account the different vari-
ances of these distributions, being respectively cr = l, cr = /r/V3 , and o-~;r/V6 . There-
fore we standardize the coefficients with respect to probit estimates by dividing the logit 
and cloglog estimates by their respective variances. 
Table 3.2 compares the within sample predictive accuracy of the models de-
scribed above. To construct the table, we sort all observations (persons or person-periods) 
into deciles based on their predicted probability values
15. The table reports the percentage 
of entrepreneurs that are classified into each of the five highest probability deciles. It also 
lists the percentage of entrepreneurs classified among the least 50% of individuals 
(observations) to fail. There are 260 entrepreneurs to evaluate the prediction accuracy. 
14 This model is estimated by PGMHAZ8 (Jenkins 2004) 
15 Shumway (2001) uses a similar approach to assess the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of static and 
dynamic models. 
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53 Model I is the same model as the second model of Table 3 in Cramer et al. (2002: 35). 
Although we were not able to replicate their results entirely, we do find similar effects 
and come close in significance levels. Note that Cramer et al. provide elasticities while 
we provide coefficients. 
Model 4 equals model 1, but respects the time dimension of the data. Differences 
are striking. Conform to the theoretical predictions (S hum way 2001); applying a static 
methodology to dynamic data, not accounting for periods at risk leads to overestimating 
the parameters of interest. This result corroborate our prediction that applying a static 
methodology to multi-period data leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Within the probit framework, the parameter estimates of the static methodology are 
almost twice as large as the estimates of the dynamic methodology. The dynamic models 
(4 - 6) are also consistently more accurate than the static models. Table 3.2 shows that 
the dynamic probit model classifies almost 52% of all entrepreneurs in the highest two 
deciles, compared with 45% of the static model. It also classifies less entrepreneurs below 
the median probability. 
In line with standard knowledge of static binary choice models, the goodness of 
fit is not greatly affected by applying a different functional form in the static methodol-
ogy. Based on the log-likelihood and the AIC, we see that the logit model performs only 
marginally better than the probit, which in turn performs marginally better than the 
cloglog. Goodness of fit among the dynamic models (model 4-6) are also very similar. 
Interestingly, the parameter estimates of the logit and the cloglog model are less sensitive 
for neglecting time variation. With the exception of the constant, the results of the 
cloglog model are remarkably stable between the dynamic and the static methodology. 
Especially the parameter estimates of the cloglog model seem insensitive to time aggre-
gation. 
This (in)sensitivity of the parameter estimates to time aggregation can be theoreti-
cally explained by the difference in exit probability of the static and the dynamic models 
and the behavior of the derivatives of the log discrete hazard function for different 
distributional assumptions. The expected empirical exit probability reduces strongly 
between the static and the dynamic approach: from 15.69% (260/1657) in the static 
models to 0.42% (260/62035) in the dynamic models. Sueyoshi (1995: 421) has shown 
that a change in an explanatory variable cause a proportionate change in the discrete 
hazard of the form: 




using the fact that dln[g(x)]/dx = g'(x)/g(x). 
In order to see the cause and the effect of time aggregation on the parameter 
estimates, we plot the derivatives of the log cumulative distribution functions, 
f(Xp)/F(Xfi), for the probit, logit, and cloglog specifications against various values of 
F(Xb). Given that X is stable in the static and dynamic approach, the change in P b must 
come from the sensitivity off(XJ3)/F(xp) against the change in F. Figure 3.2 plots the 
derivatives of the log discrete hazard function for the various specifications at values of 
54 the empirical exit probabilities F(xp)
K\ Figure 3.2 shows that the probit specification is 
very sensitive for exit probabilities lower than 0.5. Note that in our empirical example of 
time aggregation, the exit probability reduces from 0.157 to 0.004. According to Figure 
3.2, we would expect that time aggregation results in a sharp change in the parameter 
estimates of the probit model and hardly any change in the cloglog model and minor 
changes in the logit model. Table 3.1 confirms these predictions. Parameter estimates of 
the static probit model are twice as large as the dynamic probit model, while the estimates 
of the cloglog remain stable. The effects of time aggregation on the parameter estimates 
differ significantly between the various specifications of the cumulative density functions 
(discrete hazard). 
Figure 3.2: Derivatives of the log hazard function, f(z)/F(z), evaluated at values of the 
hazard probabilities F(z); various specifications for the discrete hazard function F 
F(z) 
Proportional (cloglog)  Logit 
Probit 
Models 7-9 allow non-parametrically for duration dependence. Duration dependence 
significantly increases the fit of the model. Duration dependence is significant for all 
specifications being: model 4 versus 7 (%
2 (38) = 156 with a p-value of 0,000), model 5 
versus 8 (^
2(38)-l58 with a p-value of 0.000), model 5 versus 9 (;r(38)=l5S with a p-
value of 0.000). Figure 3.3 plots the non-parametric baseline hazard. The baseline 
hazard can be easily retrieved in discrete setting from substituting the estimated time 
dummies back into their respective distribution functions. We observe clear violations of 
Markov independence. 
16 Sueyoshi (1995: 422) provides a similar figure to discuss the behavior of the different specifications of 
the log discrete hazard. He does not mention time aggregation. 
55 Figure 3.3: The non-parametric baseline discrete hazard; various specifications for the 
discrete hazard function F 
years 
Proportional (cloglog)  Logit 
Probit 
The models with duration dependence have a better fit than the models without 
duration dependence. Also the predictive accuracy of the models with duration depend-
ence is strikingly better. The models with duration dependence classify more entrepre-
neurs in the highest decile and less individuals below the median probability. 
For the models with duration dependence (model 6-9), Table 3.1 shows that the propor-
tional odds and the proportional hazard model perfonn better than the dynamic probit. 
Although the AIC and likelihood criteria can hardly discriminate between the propor-
tional hazard and proportional odds model, the predictive accuracy of entrepreneurship is 
highest for the proportional odds model. According to Table 3.1, the proportional hazards 
model performs marginally better than the proportional logit However according to 
Table 3.2, the proportional logit model predicts entrepreneurship more accurately. 
Next, we consider the interpretation of the covariates for the different distribu-
tional assumptions and model specifications. Parameter estimates in non-linear models 
do not have a clear interpretation. This problem is enhanced through the dynamics in the 
duration models. We use the conventional approach to consider the behaviour of the 
models evaluated at mean values of the explanatory variables. The discrete hazard is 
computed by evaluating the appropriate cumulative distribution function at the sum of an 
aggregator representing xp and, for the static and the Markov model, the constant. Note 
that both models assume independence of the discrete hazard with respect to time. The 
discrete hazard for the models with duration dependence (7-9) is computed for each 
period by evaluating the CDF at the sum of the aggregator and the period-specific inter-
cept term. 
56 Figure 3.4: Proportionate change in discrete hazard induced by the self-employed Father 
various specifications for F 
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In Figure 3.4 we analyse the change in the log discrete hazard associated with our strong-
est predictor, the self-employed father. The discrete change is computed as the difference 
in F when the indicator is first set to 0 and then to 1 (keeping the aggregator constant at 
its mean), and evaluating the proportionate change in F: F(1)/F(0) - 1 (Sueyoshi 1995). 
Figure 3.4 shows the results of this exercise. 
We first consider the effects of time aggregation. For all specifications, Figure 3.4 
shows that the static models underestimate the effect of the self-employed father on the 
discrete hazard. For example, the marginal effect of the self-employed father on the 
hazard increases the discrete self-employment hazard by around 190 % for the static 
models, but almost 230 % for the dynamic Markov models. This result contradicts the 
findings in Table 3.1. The results in Table 3.1 showed that the parameter estimates for the 
static logit and probit decreased drastically, and the cloglog remained almost the same. 
Unlike the estimated parameters, the behaviour of the discrete hazard is extremely 
consistent for different specifications of the CDF (a result of Markov Independence). 
The consistency between the various specifications disappears when we deviate 
from Markov independence and allow for duration dependence. Figure 3.4(d) plots the 
57 effect of the self-employed father on the discrete hazard for various CDF. The logit and 
the cloglog specifications show clear proportionality. However, the probit specification 
deviates from proportionality. For example, after 7 years after compulsory school, the 
self-employed father increases the self-employment hazard by almost 280% and after 12 
years only by 180%. We conclude from these results, that the various CDF perform 
equally well under Markov Independence. However, when the data inhibits duration 
dependence, the probit specification deviates strongly from proportionality. The likeli-
hood criterion for the models with duration dependence indicates that a model with 
proportional hazards performs better than a model without proportional hazards. How-
ever, a more formal test for proportionality is conducted later. Before we discuss the 
proportionality assumption, we discuss unobserved heterogeneity. 
Model 10 in Table 3.1 provides the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model when 
adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity as in Meyer (1990) estimated by PGMHAZ8 
(Jenkins 2004). The results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no unob-
served heterogeneity. The likelihood ratio test and the AIC indicate that model 10 is the 
best fitting model. Unfortunately, the goodness of fit is not reflected in the predictive 
accuracy of the model. Interpretation of the coefficients in models with unobserved 
heterogeneity is complicated. As expected from evidence with unobserved heterogeneity 
models (Jenkins 2004), most of the estimated parameters in the models with unobserved 
heterogeneity (model 10) are larger than the in the models without unobserved heteroge-
neity (model 9): a result of the so-called weeding out effect. 
How does controlling for unobserved heterogeneity influence the effect of the 
self-employed father on the discrete hazard? Figure 3.5 shows that the model without 
unobserved heterogeneity underestimates the true effects of the self-employed father 
significantly
17. The effect rises from 220% to 370%. Figure 3.5 shows clearly that the 
bias for not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is more severe than the time-
aggregation bias and the bias of not controlling for duration dependence. 
Overall, the static models provide biased and inconsistent estimates. Reasons are 
threefold. First the static models do not account for the periods at risk. Cost is overesti-
mating parameters of interest. Secondly, static models assume that there is no duration 
dependence. We test the null-hypothesis of no duration dependence and reject the as-
sumption of no duration dependence. Thirdly, there is unobserved heterogeneity in the 
data. For prediction accuracy, the picture is less clear. Although dynamic models are 
superior, they differ in accuracy. A possible reason is that our goodness-of-fit criterion 
focuses on the predictive accuracy of entrepreneurship entry and not how well the models 
discriminate between entrants and non-entrants. Unfortunately, the calibration test 
statistics of static discrete choice models can not be easily transferred to dynamic discrete 
choice models. 
Note that our best fitting models, the logit and cloglog specification assumes pro-
portional hazards. Although our proportional models outperform our non-proportional 
model based on the probit specification, the assumption of proportional hazards may not 
be true. To test the proportionality assumption, we estimate a semi-parametric Cox model 
based on Partial Likelihood (Cox, 1972)
1 . This model treats time as a nuisance parameter 
and only concerns rankings. Table 3.3 presents the results of the test. The overall test of 
17 Note, that the aggregator is evaluated at mean unobserved heterogeneity. 
18 Results available on request 
58 proportional hazards is rejected. The main driver of this non-proportionality is the self-
employed father and to a lesser extent the education of the father. 
Figure 3.5: Proportionate change in discrete hazard induced by the self-employed father: 
cloglog specification for F 
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Table 3.3: Test of proportional hazards assumption (based on Cox PH model) 
rho  Chi2  df  Prob>Chi2 
Intelligence  0.04934  0.55  1  0.4568 
Gender  0.00604  0.01  1  0.9197 
Vocational schooling  -0.07490  1.5!  1  0,2187 
Father independent  -0.19863  10.14  1  0.0014 
Father educated  0.13386  4.72  1  0.0299 
Transformed price  -0.10971  2.94  1  0.0863 
Global test  27.58  6  0.0001 
Most approaches to deal with non-proportionality rely on some ad-hoc methods, like 
interactions between time dummies and covariates. We use a more consistent approach 
based on splines (Royston and Parmar 2002). This approach combines the flexibility of 
functional forms in the link functions (logit, probit, or cloglog) of the grouped (discrete) 
approach with the flexibility of the continuous approach in the parametric baseline 
hazard. 
We tested several spline models. We tested models without time-varying coeffi-
cients and spline models with time-varying coefficients for self-employed father and the 
59 education of the father. All fitted models with only the self-employed father performed 
better than the fitted models with the self-employed father and the education of the father. 
Table 3.4 compares different specifications of the CDF for the spline with the self-
employed father as time-varying coefficient. A1C criteria points toward a parametric 
spline model with five knots and a time-varying coefficient for the self-employed father. 
Table 3.4: AIC values for several spline duration models 
No time-varying coefficients  Time-varying 
father 
coefficient:  self-employed 
d.f.  PH  PO  PP  PH  PO  PP 
1*  1800.04  1788.55  1767.90  1797.29  1787.89  1769.76 
2  1708.85  1706.52  1722,33  Î 694.96  1696.88  1720.88 
1710.96  1707.86  1709,43  1699.45  1700.71  1707.81 
4  1705.24  1701.53  1698.65  1676.96  1677.07  1679.06 
5  1692.29  1689.37  1689.35  1665.65  1667.41  1674.68 
6  1692.79  1690.35  1691.93  1670.39  1672.49  1680.13 
* PH model with d.f.-l is the Weibull model, PO model with d.f.=l is the log-logistic model 
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results of this model. Note that this model, except 
for the self-employed father, provides almost identical results as the non-parametric 
proportional hazards model. Figure 3.6 provide the baseline hazard. If we compare the 
parametric model with the non-parametric approach, we do not find striking differences. 
We still observe a convex relationship between age and entrepreneur ship. 
Figure 3.6: The baseline hazard function 
in 
60 Table 3.5: Estimation results - Parametric spline model 
Spline 1  Spline 2  Spline 3  Spline 4 Spline 5 
Intelligence  0.938 
(0.558)+ 
Gender  -0.842 
(0.152)** 
Vocational schooling  0.320 
(0.155)* 
Father independent  8.353  -2.253  -1.424  0.614  -0.150 -0.013 
(3.743)*  (1.202)+  (0.786)+  (0.206)**  (0.044)** (0.019) 
Father educated  0.842 
(0.310)** 
Transformed price  -0.389 
(0.117)** 
Constant  -16.262  4.086  1.594  -0.252  0.058 0.017 
(3.734)**  (1.185)**  (0.780)*  (0.199)  (0.038) (0.017) 
Observations  62035 
Parameters  17 
Log-likelihood  -815.83 
AIC  1665.65 
The difference stems from the time-varying effect of the self-employed father. 
This result is striking but not surprising. Figure 3.7 plots the time-varying coefficient as a 
function of time. The effect of the self-employed father is very strong initially and 
decreases in strength within the first ten years after compulsory schooling. After the first 
ten years, the effects of the self-employed father remains stable (a proportional effect). 
From a theoretical perspective the finding makes sense. Social capital from the family is 
more important in the early years. The young individual is more dependent on its parents, 
can learn from his self-employed parents, and the parents may serve as a role model. 
Time-varying coefficients may also be another reason for the contradicting results in the 
empirical literature on determinants of self-employment selection. 
Finally, we would like to address some limitations. Besides the limitations ad-
dressed in Cramer et al (2002), an implicit limitation in their study becomes explicit in 
our dynamic modelling. From the data, it is not clear when the individuals finished their 
vocational schooling. The other variables are stable over the lifetime; however it is not 
certain when vocational schooling takes effect. In our approach, we considered it to take 
effect immediately after compulsory schooling. Since this is an arbitrary approach, we 
ran several models that assumed different times at which vocational schooling took 
effect. We did additional analysis with vocational schooling taking effect after 5 and 10 
61 years. We transformed vocational schooling in a time-varying covariate. That did not 
influence the results significantly
19. The effect of vocational schooling became a bit 
stronger and more significant, while leaving the other results almost unaltered. 
Figure 3,7: The non-proportional effect of self-employed father over time 
t 
3.6 Conclusion 
We have modeled the process if and when an individual becomes an entrepreneur. We 
have modeled the probability to become self-employed as a stochastic point process with 
an absorbing state (ever an entrepreneur). We have utilized the simple Poisson process to 
explain that the probability that an individual becomes ever self-employed (which can be 
estimated by a static method) is a function of the hazard rate, the rate of event occurrence, 
and time. The static estimator is merely an aggregated version of a dynamic estimator 
and therefore less efficient than our dynamic estimators. We have shown that if the 
process that generates the data is the continuous Poisson process and the data is grouped 
into intervals» then the natural candidate for an empirical dynamic model is a grouped 
duration model with a type I extreme value error distribution. 
We have shown that modeling the probability that an individual becomes self-
employed directly in terms of the hazard rate (continuous or discrete) offers several 
advantages over the static approach. The dynamic approach correctly specifies the 
periods at risk. The static approach may result in serious time aggregation, which leads to 
biased and inconsistent estimates. The static approach implicitly assumes that the prob-
ability of becoming self-employed is independent of time (Markov independence). The 
10 Results available on request of the authors. 
62 dynamic approach can handle easily deviations from this assumption by allowing non-
parametrically or parametrically for duration dependence. Duration dependence may be a 
result of unobserved heterogeneity. Our dynamic approach can easily handle unobserved 
heterogeneity. Finally, the dynamic approach respects two possible extensions that 
influence the process that generates the data: time-varying covariates and time-varying 
coefficients. Time vaiying coefficients can be nicely handled in a parametric way, which 
allows clear interpretation of the results. 
We have studied the implications on a study on self-employment selection in the 
Netherlands between 1953 and 1993. We have replicated the findings of a static approach 
(Cramer et al. 2002) and also redone the analysis by a dynamic approach. Although, we 
do confirm their main findings, we have shown the clear superiority of the dynamic 
model in terms of parameter estimate precision and prediction accuracy. We have shown 
that the self-employed father increases the probability to become self-employed in the 
dynamic model with 40 up to 200 percentage points. Next, we reject the implicit assump-
tion that the probability to become self-employed is independent over time. We do find 
clear duration dependence. The probability to become self-employed rises at young ages 
but decrease at old ages. Also, our dynamic models are far more accurate in predicting 
entrepreneurship. The dynamic model with duration dependence classifies 95% more 
individuals in the highest probability decile than the static model. A dynamic approach 
may also include time-varying coefficients to deal with deviations from implicit assump-
tions of proportionality. In this data, we did find a time-varying effect of the self-
employed father. Having a self-employed father seems especially important during the 
initial stage of an individual's entrepreneurial career. 
Our results regarding time aggregation in grouped duration models can be easily 
generalized. We have shown the sensitivity of parameter estimates to different specifica-
tions of the distribution functions in the presence of time-aggregation. We have found 
that parameter estimates are not reliable to consider the effects of time aggregation. We 
propose that a plot of the effect of a predictor on the proportionate change in the discrete 
hazard evaluated at the mean of the aggregator Xf3 is a better way to assess the effect of 
time aggregation for different specifications of the error distribution. 
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64 4 The dynamics of business succession and de novo 
self-employment: A multiple risks approach
20 
4.1 Introduction 
Most empirical studies on self-employment focus on the determinants of self-
employment selection or on how liquidity constraints inhibit new venture creation
21. 
However, Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) and our study find that more than one third of 
self-employment is family self-employment and not de novo self-employment. More 
important, we find that people who take over a family business are different from those 
who found an entirely new business. While real founders enter self-employment with the 
burden of financing the sunkness of start up expenses, continuation of a family business 
is like entering self-employment with a valuable set of assets already existent. People 
who take over control in a family business are less constrained and may enter self-
employment faster than real founders. In this paper, we build a theoretical model that 
explains the dynamics of family business succession and de novo self-employment. From 
this model we derive hypotheses that explain the timing of the entry decision for these 
alternative types of self-employment. 
We believe that knowledge on the timing of the self-employment decision and its 
determinants are important for the following reasons. If self-employment and its deriva-
tive entrepreneurship are important for economic growth and innovation (e.g. Cosh et al. 
1999; Geroski and Pomroy 1990) then it is not only desirable that individuals become 
self-employed but also that they become self-employed early in their careers. Self-
employment experience is namely an important predictor of future self-employment 
(Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Evans and Leighton 1989) and of self-employment 
success related to profits (Bosma et al. 2004) and related to survival (Holmes and 
Schmitz 1996; Quadrini 1999; Taylor 1999). 
Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) indicate that any complete theory of the self-
employment process should at least do two things. First, the modelling framework should 
take a dynamic perspective. A static approach cannot account for the fact that self-
employment is episodic, individuals attributes change over time, and that the self-
employment propensity may vary over the life-cycle. Second, the modelling framework 
should differentiate between the various ways in which one may become self-employed. 
The factors that account for each route into self-employment are likely to differ from 
each other. A survey of the theoretical and empirical literature until today indicates that 
these recommendations have not been incorporated. 
This chapter is based on the paper "The dynamics of business succession and de novo self-employment: 
A multiple risks approach" by Blumberg, Kok, and Pfann (2006). 
21 For example, Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) investigate the determinants of transition rates into self-
employment for West-Germany, Evans and Leighton (1989) examine the determinants and the process of 
selection into self-employment in the US, and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) build a structural model of how 
liquidity constraints affect the probability of becoming self-employed in the US. 
65 Therefore, our model of the self-employment process advances the literature on self-
employment in the following ways. (1) We formally link and test the theoretical concepts 
of human, financial and social capital, to the timing of the decision to become self-
employed in a dynamic framework. (2) We differentiate between family self-
employment and de novo self-employment. Unlike Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), we can 
test for the hidden possibility that the existence of self-employed parents merely reflect 
family self-employment instead of the intergenerational transfer of skills or capital. 
Previous research that investigated the dynamics of the self-employment decision 
found that the probability of self-employment is independent of age (Evans and Leighton 
1989). Our duration analysis with time varying covariates over a time period of 40 years 
of a sample of Dutch individuals from the North of Brabant, a province in the Nether-
lands, shows that self-employment may indeed be independent of age for a considerable 
period of our time frame. However, this picture changes dramatically when we differenti-
ate between family business succession and de novo self-employment. Our results 
indicate that the family business succession and de novo self-employment have opposing 
and offsetting dynamics and the age independence of self-employment is the result of 
aggregating these types of self-employment. The chances of taking over a family business 
are initially high and eventually decreasing, while the chances of starting up a new 
venture are initially low and eventually increasing. Our dynamic theory accounts for 
these differences. 
Not only do the dynamics of self-employment differ between real founders and 
family business successors, also the determinants of self-employment differ between 
these self-employment types. Our results indicate that higher educated and possible 
wealthier fathers are especially relevant for real founders who face more binding liquidity 
constraints. Self-employed parents are more relevant for family business successors, 
because they do not only transfer important self-employment specific skills and wealth to 
their offspring, but they also provide their offspring an opportunity to take over the 
family business. However, this opportunity may be constrained. Our results indicate that 
siblings may be a resource for real founders, but they are more a liability for family 
business successors, as they compete for taking over the family business. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces a rational choice 
model of the self-employment process. This dynamic model differentiates between de 
novo self-employment and family business succession and links the theoretical concepts 
of human, financial, and social capital to the timing of these self-employment decisions. 
Section 4.3 derives hypotheses from our model with respect to human and social capital 
and the dynamics of family business succession and de novo self-employment. The data 
and methods to test these hypotheses are described in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the 
outcome of the duration analysis with multiple risks. Section 4.6 concludes. 
66 4,2 Theory development 
4.2.1 A rational choice model of the self-employment decision 
We build our theoretical model with the following objectives in mind. First, we wish to 
link the theoretical concepts human, financial, and social capital, directly to the waiting 
time into self-employment. Second, we wish to account for the different types of entre-
preneurship, their effect on human capital and liquidity constraints and thresholds, and 
their dynamics over time. Third, we wish to focus on the intertemporal capital accumula-
tion decisions of individuals. 
Figure 4.1 provides an economic model of the self-employment decision process 
over the life course of an individual. This rational choice model assumes that individuals 
collect information on the alternatives, assess the value of the attributes of the alterna-
tives, and choose the alternative with the highest perceived utility given the available 
constraints. This maximizing behavior is the building block of most choice models in 
economics. We choose the occupational choice model as our starting point. Within the 
occupational choice framework, the individual chooses the occupation with the highest 
perceived income or utility (see e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). For example, the 
individual decides to work for a pay in the labor market or decides to earn its income with 
self-employment. The individual will opt for self-employment if the expected utility is 
higher in that option. 
Self-employment refers to a particular income generating mechanism that is dif-
ferent from paid labor. The utility derived from paid labor depends on income and a 
vector of personal characteristics (e.g. education, race, marital status, and number of 
children) (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 
1994). For a self-employed entrepreneur, the individual's gross earnings are a function of 
its entrepreneurial ability, the capital invested in the business and an individual random 
component summarizing the unknown good fortune of the entrepreneur. 
Lucas (1978) general equilibrium model of entrepreneurial selection argues that 
individuals with high entrepreneurial ability should enter entrepreneurship directly when 
entering working life. However, most entrepreneurs do not become immediately self-
employed but work first in the labor market (Carroll and Mosakowski 1987). During the 
time that individuals spend in the labor market, they accumulate non-transferable job-
specific human capital. This labor market specific human capital raises the income in the 
labor market, making wage earners more reluctant to exit their job and enter self-
employment. This is consistent with the finding of Evans and Leighton (1989) that the 
return to wage experience in self-employment (2.1%) is lower than the return to wage 
experience in wage work (5.6%). 
Therefore, in theory, the existence of non-transferable job specific human capital 
should induce would-be entrepreneurs to enter self-employment as early in their career as 
possible. Furthermore, job shopping theory (Johnson 1978) argues that individuals should 
take more risky job alternatives early in the career. By pursuing risky alternatives, 
individuals learn whether they possess abilities that are highly valued and paid accord-
ingly. 
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is it then that empirical studies do not find high self-employment rates or young individu-
als? 
The answer must not be searched exclusively in the difference of expected earn-
ings in both income options, but in the availability of the options. Even for individuals 
that are willing to become self-employed and who can earn more as self-employed, self-
employment may be not an option. Self-employment differs in some important aspects 
from employment in the labour market. Self-employment demands a variety of skills 
(Lazear 2005), involves considerable and partially sunk start up costs, while the success 
changes are uncertain (Jovanovic 1982) and difficult to predict and therefore hard to 
finance in the capital market (Zeira 1987). Therefore, capital must be raised in the capital 
market and skills and capabilities must be learned through schooling or work experience 
in order to start a new venture. Capital market constraints limit the ability of entrepre-
neurs to finance new ventures (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989). And human capital constraints 
limit the ability of entrepreneurs to manage a business (Calvo and Wellisz 1980). There-
fore, willing young individuals lack often financial and human capital to start up a 
venture. 
Liquidity constraints are a stylized fact in the self-employment literature. Evans 
and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) provide evi-
dence that greater personal wealth, winning lotteries, or inheritance relaxes liquidity 
constraints and eases the transition to self-employment. With perfect capital markets, 
entrepreneurs would not face liquidity constraints. However, starting entrepreneurs face 
liquidity constraints because the exact profitability of the business idea is not measurable 
(Zeira 1987). The expected profitability hinges on the business owner's perception of his 
entrepreneurial ability (Frank 1988; Jovanovic 1982) and he often finds it "impossible to 
persuade potential suppliers of equity capital to share his subjective belief' (Steigum 
1978: 637). The capital market is not the only means through which an entrepreneur can 
raise capital. Basu and Parker (2001) point that family loans are the largest source of 
funds after bank loans. Family members share more easily the beliefs of their offspring 
and have more trust in the propensity of the offspring to pay back the loans. In the 
absence of external financing possibilities, the prospective entrepreneur might finance the 
business itself by working and saving money to overcome the financial capital thresholds. 
However raising capital through saving is time consuming and therefore the absence of 
external financing options increases the waiting time into self-employment. 
Besides financing a business, a business must be managed. The entrepreneur must 
be a jack-off-all-trades (Lazear 2005). Searching and evaluating business opportunities, 
building and fulfilling contracts, hiring and firing employees, and managing and book-
keeping are part of the entrepreneur's tasks. Some researchers claim that these mentioned 
capabilities are inborn (Lucas 1978; Jovanovic 1982), while Calvo and Wellisz (1980) 
argue that these capabilities are acquired through a learning process. Dunn and Holtz-
Eakin (2000) find evidence for intergenerational transfer of these skills. The offspring of 
self-employed parents are more likely to enter self-employment and children of more 
successful entrepreneurs are more likely to enter self-employment than children of less 
successful entrepreneurs. While differing on the source of these capabilities, all research-
ers argue that individuals that acquire sufficient knowledge of these entrepreneurial 
69 processes become entrepreneur. The speed of learning and accumulating of these capa-
bilities determine the waiting time into self-employment (see Figure 4.2). 
The entrepreneur not only chooses self-employment, he also chooses for a certain 
type of self-employment. There are various types of self-employment (Cooper and 
Dunkelberg 1986; Webster 1977). The two most important ones are the take over of the 
family business and the founding of an entirely new business (Carroll and Mosakowski, 
1987). Certainly, the human and financial capital thresholds will depend on the route 
followed. People who take over a family business cannot be compared to those who 
found an entirely new business. Newly founded firms suffer from liability of newness, i.e. 
they face lower early survival chances because they miss stable exchange relations, do 
not have established a reputation yet, or must learn by doing (Hannan and Freeman 1989; 
Jovanovic and Lach 1989). Furthermore, while real founders enter self-employment with 
the burden of financing the sunkness of start up expenses, continuation 
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of a family business is like entering self-employment with a valuable set of assets already 
existent, Taking over a family business evolves often gradually where the successor 
learns the tricks of the trade internally inside the business. Because of this internal 
learning and financing, the human and financial capital thresholds are presumably lower 
for individuals entering family business and will therefore require less time to enter self-
70 employment. Figure 4.2 depicts the effect of disentangling self-employment into real 
founders and family self-employment on the waiting into self-employment. Real founders 
have to accumulate more financial and human capital to overcome liquidity and capabili-
ties thresholds. 
We summarize these theoretical arguments revisiting Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 shows 
the relationships between human, financial, and social capital and their relationship to the 
different types of self-employment, starting up a new venture and taking over a family 
business. Most theorizing focuses on the direct link between human capital and self-
employment. We argue that the theory is more complex. A complete theory must intro-
duce the intervening human capital, liquidity, time, and availability constraints to explain 
the relationship between the time dependent capital endowments and self-employment 
types. These constraints can be perceived as attributes of the alternative self-employment 
types. We argue that these constraints differ between types. We assume that real founders 
face higher financial and human capital constraints than those who take over a family 
business. 
The concepts of human and social capital are umbrella terms. In the next section, 
we derive hypotheses for these concepts embedded in our rational choice theory of self-
employment. 
4.3 Hypotheses development 
4.3.1 Entrepreneurial capabilities and human capital 
Penrose (1959) first notes what defines entrepreneurial capabilities. She identified four 
qualities an entrepreneur should have: (1) ambition, (2) fund raising ingenuity, (3) 
versatility"", and (4) good judgment. In order to become successfully self-employed one 
may learn to improve these capabilities through time. These entrepreneurial capabilities 
drive selection into entrepreneurship in Lucas' (1978) general equilibrium model. In-
spired by Lucas model, Calvo and Wellisz (1980) explain the impact of educational 
attainment on the probability of selection into an entrepreneurial position through mana-
gerial ability. Investment in education enhances managerial ability, which would relax the 
human capital constraint and therefore increase the choice for self-employment. This is 
depicted in Figure 4.2. Human capital accumulation may be endogenous with financial 
capital accumulation. The higher educated attract higher wages and have more possibili-
ties for saving or external lending (Bates 1990). Therefore, investment in education 
relaxes both human capital and liquidity constraints. 
However, there is also a direct link between educational attainment and self-
employment selection. The direct link between human capital and self-employment in 
Figure 4.1 represents the effect of human capital on the different types of income generat-
ing mechanisms. The direct link between educational attainment and self-employment 
selection represents the value trade-off between being self-employed and some outside 
option like working in the labor market. Le (1999) argues that higher levels of education 
23 Note the close resemblance with Lazear's (2005) jack-of-all-trade hypothesis. 
71 might generate better outside options (i.e. better working conditions or better pay). 
Therefore, better outside options through education might decrease the probability of 
self-employment. Thus, investment in education relaxes human capital constraints, while 
at the same time raising better outside options. These offsetting forces can account for the 
fact that some studies find a positive effect of education on the probability of self-
employment (e.g. Alba-Ramirez 1994; e.g. Van Praag and Van Ophem 1995) while 
others find a negative (e.g. Evans & Leighton, 1989; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989) or no 
effect (e.g. Blanchflower and Meyer 1994; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). 
Figure 4.3 provides a graphic representation of this mechanism. If an individual 
invests in education, he relaxes his human capital constraint (line B in Figure 4.3 and the 
arrow between human capital and human capital constraint in Figure 4.1). At the same 
time, the investment in education generates better outside options (line A in Figure 4.3). 
These better outside options act as opportunity costs for becoming self-employed. 
Logically, there is a point (point Z in Figure 4.3) where an increase in the level of educa-
tion raises opportunity costs to such a level that the outside option is the preferred choice 
over self-employment. 
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72 Figure 4.2 has shown that human capital thresholds determine the waiting time into self-
employment. We have also reasoned that thresholds are larger for real founders (line D in 
Figure 4.3) than for family business (line C in Figure 4.3). Given equal outside options 
for individuals, these two results indicate that an increase from lower to vocational 
schooling would induce more individuals into family business (the triangle XYZ in 
Figure 4.3) and less individuals into founding new ventures (the triangle VWZ in Figure 
4.3). 
Lazear (2005) provides a related argument with his jack-off-all-trades hypothesis 
of entrepreneurship. He states that self-employment requires a variety of skills. Entrepre-
neurs must have sufficient knowledge in a variety of fields to put together the many tasks 
needed for survival and success in business, while for wage earners it suffices and pays to 
be a specialist in the field demanded. Higher or specialist education, like university 
studies, often implies a higher level of specialization than vocational studies. While on 
the other hand, primary schooling and lower vocational schooling might not produce 
enough human capital to overcome the required human capital constraint for self-
employment. Both arguments show that it pays for specialized and low educated to work 
in the labor market, while a vocational education is preferable for self-employment. 
Therefore, when an individual finishes a vocational schooling he will have a higher 
chance to become self-employed and thus: 
Hypothesis la: Vocational schooling will reduce the waiting time into self-employment. 
If starting up a business requires more human capital then taking over a family business 
then the pioneering founder must face a higher human capital constraint and it must 
follow that (see Figure 4.3): 
Hypothesis lb: The role of vocational schooling is larger for family self-employment. 
While on the other hand, increased specialization instead of or after vocational schooling, 
will increase the availability and pay of an outside option and thus: 
Hypothesis 2a: Specialized education will increase the waiting time into self-
employment. 
Both the jack-off-all-trade hypothesis and the mechanism in Figure 4.3 are inconclusive 
of the effect of specialized education on the type of self-employment. However, Laband 
and Lentz's (1983) economic theory of occupational following provide some useful hints. 
Their rational choice theory of occupational following states that the likelihood that the 
offspring follows their parents occupation increases in the interface between the home 
and the workplace and the presence of undissipated monopoly-type rents, like for exam-
ple family business reputation. They state that if most followers acquire their human 
capital skills directly from their parents, indices of later acquisition such as formal 
education and training programs should be negatively related to the incidence of follow-
ing (Laband & Lentz, 1983: 476). As the incidence of following is higher in family self-
employment then in de novo self-employment, the negative effect of formal education on 
self-employment must be more pronounced for family self-employment. This is consis-
73 tent with the empirical finding of Carroll and Mosakowki (1987) that higher general 
education increases the probability of entering self-employment while it lowers the 
probability of entering family self-employment after entry into the labor force. And 
therefore, 
Hypothesis 2b: The role of specialized education is larger for self-employment via a 
family business. 
4.3.2 Social capital and family background 
Next to human capital we introduce social capital as another important input for self-
employment. Social capital refers to resources that individuals have at their disposal, or 
which they can access by means of their social relations. Social capital differs between 
people and can form a considerable advantage in learning how to focus on becoming self-
employed (for more general notions on social capital see Burt 1992; Coleman 1988; 
Coleman 1990; for more general notions on social capital see Flap 1990). Although the 
concept of social capital origins from sociology, it has caught increasing interest in 
economics (see e.g. Becker 1996). The importance of social capital for the success on the 
labor market, i.e. finding a job, has been studied by Granovetter (1973). He distinguishes 
two kinds of relations: strong and weak ties. Strong ties are characterized by frequent and 
intense communication. Loose contacts to other people, like former colleagues and 
college friends, represent weak ties. Empirical evidence suggests that strong ties are the 
dominant factor for successful business founding (Briiderl and Preisendorfer 1998). In 
our study, we focus on strong ties, namely one's parents, one's siblings, one's partner and 
one's children. 
The social ties considered here offer various forms of resources that may be help-
ful to succeed in starting a business. First, social relations can offer access to financial 
capital. Research on ethnic entrepreneurship reveals for example that within the closely 
knitted communities of Chinese and Korean immigrants, business starters obtain financial 
start capital from their social relations (Bates 1997; Light and Bonacich 1988). Another 
tie providing income security is a working partner, whose earnings can cover private 
expenses for housing, food etc. when the new business does not yet generate sufficient 
initial benefits. Second, social relations form an inexhaustible source of knowledge, 
know-how and experiences. In general, network ties can form an essential complement to 
one's own human capital and those network ties accumulate important information 
through time as well. Family members with specific human capital, for example a mother 
with a degree in accounting or law, are valuable contacts for fiscal and juridical prob-
lems, Very special ties are self-employed parents. Children from self-employed parents 
learn what it needs to be self-employed early in their childhood. Their parents are their 
entrepreneurial role model. And, parents with self-employment experience are more 
likely to support the self-employment decision of their children because their own experi-
ence enables them to assess such a decision more accurately. 
To assess an individual's strong ties, i.e. the family relationships, we focus on the 
parents and the spouse through time. Experience refers mainly to specific entrepreneurial 
capabilities that have been transferred from the parents to the child during the up bring-
74 ing. The educational level of an individual's parents is an indicator capturing the transfer 
of more general human capital as well as a proxy for the amount of financial resources 
accessible through family ties. Thereby, we assume that higher educated parents are 
wealthier relative to lower educated parents. 
Parental self-employment experience and educational level characterize the par-
ents' background. Having a self-employed parent has been found as one of the most 
consistent predictors for off-spring self-employment (e.g. Carroll & Mosakowski 1987; 
Dunn & Holtz-Eakin 2000). However, there are many reasons why having self-employed 
parents increases offspring self-employment. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) study in 
particular these intergenerational links. They argue and find evidence for two possible 
mechanisms through which self-employed parents increase offspring self-employment. 
Successful self-employed may be more willing and able to provide offspring with finan-
cial capital to relax liquidity constraints (the link between SC and FC and FC and FCC in 
Figure 4.1). The second reason why self-employment may be correlated among genera-
tions is because parents may transfer entrepreneurial capabilities and skills through 
valuable work experience, reputation, or other entrepreneurial human capital (the link 
between SC and HC in Figure 4.1). The direct transfer of entrepreneurial skills is also 
consistent with the rational choice of occupational following, which states that parents 
transfer job specific human capital for intergenerational welfare maximization (see e.g. 
Becker and Tomes 1979; Laband and Lentz 1983). 
The educational level of the parents is an indicator capturing the transfer of more 
general human capital as well as a proxy for the amount of financial resources accessible 
through family ties. Thereby, we assume that higher educated parents are wealthier 
relative to lower educated parents. The intergenerational transfer of wealth relaxes the 
financial constraints (see Figure 4.2), thereby increasing the chances that the offspring 
may overcome initial set up costs and reduce the time into self-employment. 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Having a self-employed parent shortens the offspring's waiting time into 
self-employment. 
Hypothesis 4a: Having a highly educated parent and possible wealthier parent shortens 
the offspring's waiting time into self-employment. 
Is it possible that the presence of self-employed parents merely reflect family self-
employment instead of the transfer of entrepreneurial skills? This question was legiti-
mately raised by Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) in their research on intergenerational 
transfers of skills and wealth. Although they indirectly tested for this possibility by 
comparing father and son's occupation and industry classification, a formal test of this 
possibility has not been undertaken up to today. The possibility of family self-
employment is indicated in Figure 4.1 by the link between self-employed parents and the 
availability of family business constraint. Although individuals may take over a family 
business from aunts and uncles, the offspring from self-employed parents are more likely 
to have the possibility to take over a family business. The existence of a direct link 
between self-employed parents and the probability that a family business is available 
should be reflected in a stronger effect of self-employed parents on taking over a family 
business as opposed to starting up a business from scratch. Therefore, 
75 Hypothesis 3b: The role of a self-employed parent is larger for entering self-employment 
via a family business. 
The reverse can be said for the role of the educational level of the parent. Although some 
general skills might be transferred from parent to children, the main effect of the educa-
tional level of the parent is the transfer of wealth. Here we assume that the higher the 
educational level of the parents the more Financial resources are accessible. We expect 
that social capital associated with access to financial capital is more relevant for real 
founders than for self-employed who take over a family business. 
Hypothesis 4b: The role of the parent's education is larger for real founders. 
However, an individual's chance of taking over the family business depends not only on 
his skills but also on the number of competitors willing to take over the family business. 
The more siblings the possible business successor possesses, the more competitors he 
faces that might take over the family business. These siblings would increase the family 
business availability constraint, thereby lowering the chance to take over the family 
business. On the other hand, social capital in the form of siblings may offer time and 
support to the business when necessary (the link between SC and time constraint in 
Figure 4.1). These opposing forces make it difficult to predict the role of siblings on the 
probability of self-employment. However, if we differentiate the types of self-
employment we might disentangle these opposing effects. So that, siblings reduce the 
chance to take over or enter family self-employment but increase the probability of 
starting up a business from scratch. 
Hypothesis 5a: Having siblings reduces the likelihood that self-employment is entered via 
a family business. 
Hypothesis 5b: Having siblings increases the likelihood that self-employment is entered 
via a de novo firm. 
Besides one's parents and siblings, one's spouse might be an important determinant of 
self-employment as well. Next to her human capital, a spouse helps a self-employed 
partner providing monetary, physical as well as emotional support. Furthermore, the 
spouse is often an unpaid reliable employee stepping in when work mounts up (Sanders 
and Nee 1996). We have argued that social capital associated with access to financial 
capital is more relevant for real founders than for self-employed who take over a family 
business. Similarly, we assume that social relations providing stable income sources are 
also more important for real founders who face higher levels of uncertainty and failure 
risks. Applying these arguments to the dimensions of social capital used here, we hy-
pothesize that the effect is stronger for the real founders. 
Hypothesis 6a: Marriage shortens the waiting time into self-employment. 
Hypothesis 6b: The role of marriage is larger for real founders. 
76 Up to now we emphasized the supportive features of social relations. However, social ties 
are two sided and based on some kind of reciprocity. Hence, from time to time social 
relations will make a claim on one's own resources. Such social demands can restrict the 
pursuit of other goals. For example, children have the right to claim affection and time 
that can not be invested in building up the business. Furthermore, the larger risk associ-
ated with an income from self-employment is more problematic for someone who is 
responsible for dependent children than for someone without such responsibilities. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 7: Having children lengthens the time (duration) to self-employment. 
4.3.3 The dynamics of entering self-employment over the lifecycle 
Until now, we have investigated the effects of human and social capital determinants on 
the propensity to become self-employed and the strength and direction of the effects on 
different types of self-employment. In this section, we will investigate the route into self-
employment. More specific, we will investigate the shape of the different routes into self-
employment. 
Unfortunately, the time dimension has been largely ignored in the econometric 
modeling of the self-employment process. This is partly due to the absence of an empiri-
cal time dimension in the highly influential studies based on the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLS) dataset (see e.g. Evans & Leighton 1989; 
Dunn & Holtz-Eakin 2000). We do not refute the quality of this research, however we 
will pose the hypothesis that the lack of duration dependence found in these studies may 
be partly attributable to the inability of these studies to separate the different types of self-
employment. 
In the less often quoted study of Carroll and Mosakowski (1987), there are some 
very definite hints towards duration dependence among the divergent routes of de novo 
self-employment and family self-employment. They find that from the individuals that 
end up in family self-employment 42% have family self-employment as their first job. 
While only 5% of the real founders have self-employment as their first job. These figures 
show that the timing of the self-employment decision differs greatly among individuals 
who take over family self-employment and real founders. More important, these findings 
show that these routes may be opposing. Individuals that take over a family business do 
so most likely in the beginning of their career, while pioneering founders become self-
employed later in their careers. The fact that these routes seem opposing and that family 
self-employment may account for one third of total self-employment raises the possibility 
that at the aggregate these opposing routes may offset duration dependence. 
The question remains what accounts for these empirical findings? We refer back 
to our conceptual model to account for the difference in early self-employment. Consis-
tent with the theory of occupational following (Laband & Lentz 1983), job shopping 
theory (Johnson 1978), and the accumulation of labor marker job-specific human capital, 
individuals that have the intention to become self-employed should become self-
employed early in their career. However, unlike family self-employment which has 
relatively low human and financial capital thresholds, starting up a business from scratch 
77 requires large amounts of financial and human capital. In order to reach these thresholds, 
skills must be learned either through working experience or prolonged learning and 
wealth must be accumulated through savings. These accumulation processes take time, 
and therefore, a much lower fraction of de novo entrepreneurs will enter self-employment 
early in their life than family self-employed. 
Only if sufficient amounts of human and financial capital have been accumulated, 
then de novo self-employment will rise. However, prolonged working in the labor market 
to accumulate human and financial capital will simultaneously increase job-market 
specific human capital which reduces self-employment (Evans & Leighton 1989). The 
same effect occurs for family self-employment. The longer the potential family self-
employed is employed in the labor market and accumulates labor market job-specific 
human capital the lower will be chance that he will shift to self-employment in the future. 
The difference in early self-employment for de novo self-employed and family self-
employed is reflected in the mean age of the self-employed in the study of Carroll and 
Mosakowski (1987). The mean age for pioneering founders is thirty and a half years 
while the mean age for family self-employed is 23 years
23. 
What will be the dynamics of self-employment for these two types of self-
employment? What are their baseline hazards? Our dynamic theory dictates that the 
baseline hazards must have at least the following features. The baseline hazard for family 
self-employment must be initially high and then decreasing afterwards. And the baseline 
hazard for de novo self-employment should be initially low, then increasing and possibly 
decreasing at later stages of the lifecycle. There are several parametric distributions of the 
baseline hazard consistent with our theory. For family self-employment, the possible 
candidates are the Weibull (decreasing) or Gompertz (decreasing) distribution. While for 




The hypotheses developed above are tested on a data set consisting of 1339 people. This 
sample is part of the North Brabant longitudinal data set which contains information 
about 3167 individuals who were born 1939/1940 and went to school in the Dutch 
province North Brabant in 1952 (Hartog 1989; Jonker 1995). Then researchers took a 
random sample of pupils who attended the sixth grade of primary school. 2874 individu-
als provided information about their school performance and family background. In 1983 
all 3167 individuals were contacted again. 2588 people responded and were asked about 
their later education, labor market status, earnings, and household composition. In 1993 
at the age of approximately 54, the 3167 school children of 1952 were approached for the 
A notable exception forms the de novo entrepreneur who might transfer his labour market job specific 
capital into a new business idea. This often happens in so-called spin offs from large corporations. 
78 third time. The questionnaire mailed in 1993 contained questions on the labor market 
status since 1983 and especially on self-employment experience. 2099 individuals 
answered in 1993. Due to untraceable individuals and non-response 1339 individual were 
interviewed at all three points of time, i.e. in 1952, 1983 and 1993. Taking the 1952 data 
as a population for the data collection in 1983 non response is not systematic for family 
background and school performance (see Hartog 1989). 253 individuals provided incom-
plete information, which leads to a final sample of 1086 individuals. 186 of these respon-
dents have ever been self-employed and provided information on the year of founding or 
acquiring business (see van Praag 1996 for more detailed information on the dataset). 64 
took over a family business and 122 were real founders. 
4.4.2 Used methods and operationalization 
Contrary to earlier empirical research presented above, we apply duration analysis to test 
our hypotheses. Rather than conditioning on a time independent inverse Mill's ratio, as 
often used in traditional probit studies, we model a time varying hazard function. The 
basic principle of hazard models is to estimate the time it takes until an event occurs 
given that the event did not occur earlier. We estimate the time it takes to acquire the 
necessary resources to become self-employed. Hence, the dependent variable is the 
difference between year of entry into self-employment and the year of finishing compul-
sory education. 
The chance of becoming self-employed is related to the available human and so-
cial capital (see Table 4.1 for the descriptives of the variables). Two variables serve as 
indicators for human capital: (1) VOCATIONAL SCHOOLING and (2) SPECIALIZED EDUCA-
TION. VOCATIONAL SCHOOLING is a time varying dummy taking the value of 1 at the time 
the individual completed MBO (Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs). MBO is a general 
vocational education in the Netherlands. The variable SPECIALIZED EDUCATION is a time 
varying dummy taking the value of 1 at the time the individual completes his higher 
education. Higher education in the Netherlands is HBO (higher vocational schooling) or a 
university degree. 
The social capital endowment is focused on strong ties, i.e only close family ties 
are considered. Four ties are distinguished: (1) parents, (2) siblings, (3) marital status, and 
(4) own children, of which the first two are constant and the latter two vary through time. 
The variable SELF-EMPLOYED FATHER is a dummy that equals one if the respondent had a 
self-employed father and hence grew up in a self-employed environment. Access to 
parent's general human capital and possibly financial wealth is captured by the EDUCA-
TIONAL LEVEL OF THE FATHER. The variable SIBLINGS is a continuous variable that 
indicates the number of brothers and sisters of the respondents» 
The independent variables on social capital presented above are constant for the 
observation time 1952 to 1993. The acquired education of the respondent, the father's 
educational level and economic status are not likely to change in this period. Each 
respondent's value for these factors is fixed before the self-employment decision is made. 
This chronological order is not predetermined for the two other social capital variables 
MARRIED and CHILDREN. A person who is married at the second interview wave in 1983 
could be married before as well as after becoming self-employed. The same holds true for 
79 Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
• " ••• .--i.i. —^ 
Mean  Standard Deviation 
Vocational Schooling*  .21  .41 
Specialized Education*  .27  .44 
Sel f-Employed Parents  .39  .49 
Educational Level Father  2.52  .86 
Siblings  5,90  2.71 
Married*  .83  .38 
Children*  .11  .31 
IQ  104.73  10.27 
Female  .36  .48 
Commercial Training*  .43  .50 
Rank  3.34  2.54 
* in 1993 
having children. Observing that respondents have children in 1983 does not tell us 
anything about parenthood at the time the respondent became self-employed. Since the 
year is known that a person got married and eventually divorced and remarried again the 
variable MARRIED can vary over time for each respondent. It takes the value one in the 
years a respondent is married and the value zero otherwise. Using the birth year of 
respondent's children we are able to construct a time varying co-variate CHILDREN. This 
variable turns one in the year the first child is born and turns zero again when the young-
est child becomes 16 where we assume the child is not dependent on his parents anymore. 
Defining 16 as the age a child is not dependent on its parents anymore is certainly a little 
bit arbitrary. However, changing the independence year between 16 and 21 did not 
substantially alter the results. 
We followed earlier empirical studies in the considered controls. All our respon-
dents were born in 1939/40, so that age is not included. We control for gender with the 
dummy variable FEMALE. The variable IQ is an additive scale of the results of three IQ-
tests that were taken while the respondents attended primary school in 1952/3. Cron-
bach's a, an indicator for the reliability of additive scales, for the three kinds of IQ scores 
is .759 and sufficiently high. IQ and IQ SQUARED might be an indicator for general 
human capital. Entrepreneurial human capital is measured by a bi-variate variable con-
structed from the kind of education. The time-varying control variable COMMERCIAL 
TRAINING gets the value one if the attended education incorporated some commercial 
training and the value zero otherwise. Finally, we add the variable RANK to control for 
the rank of the respondent within his brothers and sisters. 
In the original data set each respondent was represented by one record. Introduc-
ing the time-dependent co-variates VOCATIONAL SCHOOLING, SPECIALIZED EDUCATION, 
COMMERCIAL TRAINING, MARRIED and CHILDREN enlarged the number of records for 
respondents. Thus, records are nested within persons, our unit of analysis. We controlled 
for this respondent nesting using robust estimations of the standard error in all analyses. 
80 4.4.3 Model 
In our statistical model we estimate the time it takes to become self-employed after an 
individual finishes compulsory school (indicating the start date at which individuals are at 
risk of becoming self-employed). The sampling frame that generated our data can be 
considered a random inflow sample with right censoring. The beginning of the sample 
period corresponds to the start of a spell. Therefore, our sampling frame does not suffer 
from the widely neglected initial conditions problem (Heckman and Singer 1984). 
Consequently, we do not have to assume a time-homogenous (stationary) environment. 
More formally, this 'ideal' sampling scheme (flow data) is said to be uninformative of 
duration t (Lancaster 1990: 163). Although our data is grouped into years, we model 
durations in a continuous time framework, because we believe that ratio of the length of 
the grouping interval to the typical spell length is small enough (Jenkins 2004). The 
continuous framework is mathematically more tractable and the parameter estimates are 
more comparable across different studies (Lancaster 1990: 12). Modeling durations in 
continuous time, in stead of discrete time, even in the case of aggregation (grouping), is 
advocated by Heckman and Singer (1984) and Lancaster (1990), at least if the process 
that generates the duration data is not intrinsically discrete. 
The appropriate method to study durations is estimating a survival model. Let t be 
a continuous duration random variable with density function f(t), cumulative density 
function (Failure function) F(t) and hazard function 6(t). Note that 0(t) = f(t)/S(t). We 
first model the duration of a spell /, the time it takes before an individual becomes self-
employed after finishing compulsory school, without distinguishing the entry routes. Let 
tu t2,...,tn be the observed durations in our sample, where an indicator c\ equals 1 if the 
spell is completed and 0 if the spell is censored. Then the contribution of the i-th individ-
ual to the log likelihood is given by (cf. Lancaster 1990; Jenkins 2004): 
(4.1) In L. = c. In 0. fa) + In S, fa) 
where Sfti) is the survivor function, which is equivalent to l~F(t). The survivor function 
is related to the hazard function by: 
(4.2) £. (tt) = exp  - 19{(ii)du 
o 
So that the log-likelihood contributions in (4.1) can be written in terms of the hazard as: 
f, 
(4.3) In L, = c,. In Qt fa)- ƒ 0. (n)du 
0 
where the continuous time hazard rate, d{t), can take several functional forms. Since, this 
is the first paper to consider the functional form of the hazard, we estimate several 
functional forms. We choose the appropriate functional form on three criteria: (1) theo-
retical background: are the functional forms consistent with our theory, (2) statistical 
81 tests: because most of the models are non-nested, we use Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) for model selection (Kennedy 2003: 117), (3) appropriate for testing our hypothe-
ses. The last point is especially important in our case. Thomas (1996) and Booth and 
Satchell (1995) show that parameter estimates are only directly comparable if the para-
metric distribution of each risk take the proportional hazards form. In order to test our 
hypotheses, we restrict our analyses for the multiple risk models to the proportional 
hazards distributions. 
Now we consider the different entry routes, taking over a family business and 
starting from scratch (pioneering founder). Therefore, we model duration t jointly with 
the entry route. Let £ be a discrete random variable indicating the entry route or cause of 
exit from the not self-employed state. So that we consider the joint distribution of t and E. 
Denote the y-th (j = 1 (family business), 2 (real founder) cause-specific hazard for indi-
vidual i by dj^t). 
If we assume independent failure types (independent multiple risks), the overall hazard 
function is given by: 
(4.4) 
j -I 
and the overall survivor function by: 
(4.5) £,(/,) = exp 
0 7=1 
Let Cjj be an indicator which equals 1 if i enters via route j\ 0 otherwise (censored or entry 
via other route). Then the log-likelihood contributions are given by: 
(4.6a) In L{ = ^ c}i In 0(l {tt) + In Si [t{) 
(4.6b) In I,- = ,(',)- Jl^M' 
7=1 0 .H 




So that the overall log-likelihood can be separated into a sum of independent single 
cause-specific hazards, which can be estimated separately by treating the durations 
ending for other reasons as censored (Jenkins 2004; Narendrenathan and Stewart 1991; 
Thomas 1996). From equation (4.6c) it becomes clear that each cause-specific hazard can 
have its own parametric functional form. The appropriateness of the multiple risks 
specification (versus the single risk model) can be tested by a non-nested likelihood-ratio 
82 test (Lindeboom and Theeuwes 1991; Narendrenathan and Stewart 1991). Under the null 
hypothesis of equal risks (9U - 02i = (0.5)6>), the maximum log-likelihood value of the 
multiple risk model equals the maximum log-likelihood of the single risk model plus the 
logarithm of a 0.5 multiplied by the total number of uncensored observations (the total 
number of entrants into self-employment irrespective of the route). 
4.5 Results 
Before we discuss the results of our duration analysis, we need to choose an appropriate 
parametric distribution for each model. Table 4.2 provides the log-likelihood and AIC 
values for the following parametric distributions: (1) proportional hazards: Exponential, 
Weibull and Gompertz; and (2) accelerated failure time: Log-Logistic and Log-Normal 
(see Cleves et al. 2004 for a detailed description of the distributions). We only estimate 
proportional hazards distribution for our multiple risk models in order to be able to test 
our hypotheses. The AIC values point toward the Log-Normal distribution for the single 
risk model, the Weibull distribution for de novo self-employment and the Gompertz 
distribution for family self-employment. These distributions are consistent with the 
shapes predicted by our theory (more about the interpretation of these distributions later). 
The interpretation of the coefficients differs between accelerated failure time models and 
proportional hazards models, A positive coefficient in the accelerated failure time model 
increases the waiting time into self-employment and a negative coefficient reduces the 
waiting time. A positive coefficient in the proportional hazards model increases the 
hazard of becoming self-employed, or equivalently, reduces the waiting time into self-
employment and for a negative coefficient vice versa. 
Table 4.2: Selection of parametric distributions - AIC values 




Single Risk  Self-Employment  1250.6  1251.5  1240.5  1221.3  1239.3 
Family Business  554.5  555.2  523.7  -
Multiple 
Risk 
Real Founder  914.6  910.6  916.6  - <•* 
Next, we discuss the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogene-
ity poses the risk that the duration dependence might be the result of some omitted 
variable. The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in our model is complicated. First, as 
noted by Van Praag (2001), the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity with time-varying 
regressors raises many complications. The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in a 
multiple risk framework poses even extra challenges. Multiple risk models can be esti-
mated from computer programs designed for single risk models (Thomas 1996). How-
83 ever, the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity cannot be estimated in a single risk 
model, but should be programmed separately. Even if this would be possible, the inter-
pretations of these coefficients are not straightforward (Jenkins 2004). Alternatively, we 
might gain some understanding of the presence and severity of unobserved heterogeneity 
by estimating two separate single risk models with individual unobserved heterogeneity 
specifications. The results from these estimations found no unobserved heterogeneity for 
family self-employment and some unobserved heterogeneity for de novo self-
employment. Fortunately, the direction of the effects of the parameter estimates remained 
largely consistent, with some reductions in significance levels in the single risk of de 
novo self-employment
24. More importantly, the shape of the baseline hazard proved 
consistent for both specifications with and without unobserved heterogeneity, 
Table 4.3 shows the results of the duration analysis for the whole sample. The ta-
ble differentiates the single risk of becoming self-employed from the different routes 
toward self-employment: taking over a family business and starting from scratch. Overall, 
the results show that social capital is a better predictor of self-employment selection then 
human capital. Furthermore, the result of our likelihood ratio test confirms the appropri-
ateness of the multiple risks specification versus the single risk specification 
(^'(14) = 35.25 with a p-value < 0.01). Separating family business succession from real 
founding is a successful innovation. 
In particular, we find that vocational schooling increases the probability of self-
employment. The positive sign of the variable VOCATIONAL SCHOOLING indicates that the 
variety of skills offered at vocational schooling reduces the human capital constraint and 
reduces the waiting time into self-employment. Hypothesis la is supported. We also find 
support for hypothesis lb. Although, the effect of Vocational Schooling is not significant 
for both routes into self-employment separately, the effect of vocational schooling is 
larger for family self-employment. 
We also find a negative effect for SPECIALIZED EDUCATION on the probability of 
self-employment. This seems to indicate that SPECIALIZED EDUCATION increases the 
availability and pay of the outside option more than that it reduces the human capital 
constraint. This effect is not significant and therefore we cannot support hypothesis 2a. 
However, if we differentiate the different types of self-employment this picture changes. 
SPECIALIZED EDUCATION decreases the probability of family self-employment. This 
finding is consistent with the argument of Laband and Lentz (1983) that later acquisition 
of human capital such as formal education is negatively related to the incidence of 
following. Since the negative effect of SPECIALIZED EDUCATION on family self-
employment is larger than the effect on de novo self-employment, we do support hy-
pothesis 2b. The role of Specialized Education is larger for family self-employment. 
The results of our human capital indicators pose some interesting new light on the 
effect of human capital on self-employment. Entrepreneurs more often follow vocational 
schooling, being presumably more jack-of-all-trades. Furthermore, the stronger effect of 
vocational schooling on family self-employment than on de novo self-employment 
provides new information on the mechanism through which human capital affects self-
employment selection. First of all, this effect suggests that individuals that take over a 
family business are less human capital constrained. As they are less human capital 
24 Reduction in significance is often observed (and critiqued) when including unobserved heterogeneity. 


























































IQ -.094 -.015 .126 
[.088] [.163] [.123] 
IQ Squared .000 .000 -.001 
[.000] [.000] [.001] 
Female -1.074 -1.201 -.969 
[.203]** [.345]** [.247]** 
Commercial Training .320 -.690 -.221 
[.161]* [.318]* [.217] 
Rank .010 .082 -.060 
[.038] [.068] [.051] 








eu =e2,=\ / 20, 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 % 
standard errors in parentheses 
-.087 1372 
[.015]** [.126]** 
84.76** 76.95** 44.59** constrained, they may enter self-employment earlier, and do not accumulate unnecessary 
large amounts of labor market job-specific human capital. Moreover, we find evidence 
that formal education reduces self-employment in general and occupational following in 
particular. 
Next to human capital, we put forward social capital as an important determinant 
of self-employment selection. The strong and positive effect of the variable SELF-
EMPLOYED FATHER supports hypothesis 3a. Having a self-employed father reduces the 
time into self-employment. The presence of a significant effect of SELF-EMPLOYED 
FATHER on the probability of de novo self-employment annihilates the possibility that a 
self-employed father means only family self-employment. These results indicate that self-
employed fathers transmit entrepreneurial specific skills to their offspring. Because the 
effect of the self-employed father is stronger for family self-employment, we do find 
strong support for our hypothesis that self-employed fathers reduce the family business 
availability constraint and increase the chance of taking over a family business. So, we 
find support for hypothesis 3b. 
The existence of this family business availability constraint is nicely illustrated by 
the significant and negative effect of the variable SIBLINGS on the probability of family 
self-employment. Keeping the rank of the child constant, we find that an increase in the 
number of siblings reduces the chances of taking over a family business. This supports 
hypothesis 5a and provides a clear example that social capital is not always beneficial but 
can have negative effects too. The results show no significant support to our hypothesis 
that more siblings increase the chances of starting a firm from scratch. Therefore we do 
not find support for hypothesis 5b. 
The effect of the variable EDUCATIONAL LEVEL FATHER is positive and signifi-
cant. Since we assume that a highly educated father is also probable wealthier, a wealthy 
father may transfer wealth to his offspring and relax the liquidity constraint. This sup-
ports hypothesis 4a. The assumed relation between father's education and wealth is 
strengthened by the stronger effect of the father's education on de novo self-employment. 
As the de novo self-employed is more liquidity constrained, the effect of a wealthy father 
should be stronger for de novo self-employed. This finding supports hypothesis 4b. 
Besides inherited family and family resources, an individual obtains additional 
resources and liabilities through commitments over time, like marriage and children. We 
expected that marriage increases the probability to become self-employed. This hypothe-
sis (6) is confirmed in our single risk model, where the time-varying variable MARRIED 
reduces the time it takes to become self-employed. In our multiple risk framework, it is 
shown that the effect of marriage is stronger for family self-employment. This contradicts 
our expectations and therefore hypothesis 6b is not supported. 
The existence of a time constraint may also account for the negative effect of the 
time varying variable CHILDREN on family self-employment. The single risk model shows 
no significant effect of children on self-employment and thereby providing no support for 
hypothesis 7. However, these children do increase the waiting time of family self-
employment. 
Our control variables provide the following information. Women are less likely to 
become self-employed and less likely to take over a family business than starting a new 
venture. De novo self-employment can be better structured around raising a child. Com-
mercial training reduces the likelihood of self-employment, especially among family self-
86 employment. This indicates that all specialization, even commercial, reduces occupa 
tional following. 
4.5.1 The dynamics of real founders and family self-employment 
What can we say about the dynamics of self-employment? Table 4.3 provides the esti-
mated shape parameters and Figure 4.4 shows graphically the estimated baseline hazards 
for the single risk model of becoming self-employed and the multiple risk models of real 
founding and taking over a family business. Figure 4.4a plots the baseline hazard of 
becoming self-employed. The hazard of becoming self-employed increases strongly over 
the first ten years and then remains constant. The strong rise in the first ten years is partly 
due to our sampling. We follow the individuals from the age of 13 up to 53. Although at 
risk of becoming self-employed, most individuals pursue some additional schooling after 
primary schooling. Remarkably, we find that the probability of becoming self-employed 
remains basically the same over a period of thirty years. This is consistent with the 
absence of duration dependence in the NLS dataset, whose starting age is on average 19 
years (e.g. Evans and Leighton 1989; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). 
Figure 4.4: Baseline hazards 
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However, this picture changes dramatically if we differentiate between real foun-
ders and family self-employment. Figure 4.4b and Figure 4.4c provide the baseline 
hazard for taking over a family business and de novo self-employment respectively. The 
baseline hazard of de novo self-employment is the mirror image of family self-
employment. Consistent with our theory, we find that if individuals take over a family 
business, they do so in the beginning of their career. The longer they postpone that 
decision, the less likely they are to take over the family business. In contrast, the prob-
ability that an individual starts a business from scratch is initially low. Only after enough 
skills and capabilities are learned through education and working experience, then the 
individual may be able to become self-employed. Clearly, the results indicate that taking 
over a family business or starting from scratch are two different processes and that 
aggregating these two processes might off set and bias duration dependence. 
4.6 Conclusions & perspectives 
In this paper, we investigated the dynamics of self-employment. We have built an eco-
nomic theory of the self-employment process, where an individual's human, financial, 
and social capital determine the waiting time into self-employment. Our analysis reveals 
clear differences between people who took over an existing family business and people 
who founded a new firm. 
Taking over a family business cannot be compared by starting up a business from 
scratch. Continuation of a family business is like entering self-employment with a valu-
able set of assets already existent, while real founders enter self-employment with the 
burden of financing the sunkness of the start up expenses. Furthermore, the uncertainty of 
the expected profitability is much lower for a firm that has learned about its true produc-
tivity, than for the de novo firm whose expected profitability is more a reflection of the 
subjective beliefs of the business owner. This is also reflected in the finding that the 
probability of entering self-employment is age dependent and that the shape of the 
duration dependence is self-employment type dependent. Because learning may take 
place in the family business and less sunk costs have to financed, the hazard of taking 
over a family business is highest in the earliest stages of ones professional career. In 
contrast, starting up a business from scratch takes more time. First the would-be self-
employed has to accumulate enough skills, capabilities, and capital to overcome set up 
88 costs and to become self-employed. The real founder's probability of entering self-
employment is initially low and increases only gradually over his life. 
We tested hypotheses about the influence of human and social capital on the wait-
ing time to become self-employed using a data set that is unique in terms of composition 
and the duration time covered. We have found that the relationship between human 
capital and self-employment is complex. On the one hand, investment in education 
produces necessary skills and increase self-employment. While on the other hand, in-
vestment in education produces better outside options and reduces self-employment. We 
found that vocational schooling is most suited for self-employment, while individuals 
pursuing specialized education are more likely to work as a wage worker. 
Next to human capital, we introduced social capital as an important predictor of 
self-employment. We have found that social capital can reduce the waiting time into self-
employment considerably. Self-employed parents transfer entrepreneurial skills and can 
transfer the family business to their offspring. High educated parents that transfer wealth 
are especially relevant for real founders who face more binding liquidity constraints. 
However, social capital is not always beneficial, especially for those who take over a 
family business. We found that children demand time and reduce the probability of taking 
over a family business. Furthermore, coming from a large family reduces the chances of 
taking over the business. Having siblings increases competition for the succession of the 
family business. 
Results of previous (empirical) research that can not differentiate between family 
self-employment and de novo self-employment must be reconsidered in the light of our 
study (e.g. Evans and Leighton 1989; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). First and foremost, 
the time dimension must be brought back in theorizing and econometric modeling of self-
employment selection. We have shown that aggregating these two types of self-
employment might off set the dynamic nature of self-employment. Aggregating taking 
over a family business and starting from scratch resulted in a constant hazard for a 
considerable period of our researched time span. Moreover, disentangling the different 
routes into self-employment alters the causal nature of some of the determinants of self-
employment. 
More significantly, the rejection of the static nature of self-employment opens 
new paths of inquiry. Studying the waiting time into self-employment bears close resem-
blance with studying the real options nature of investments. The real options nature of 
investments dictates that in the presence of irreversible costs, the uncertainty of self-
employment success can make individuals reluctant to become self-employed. This may 
be especially true for real founders whose success changes are more uncertain and who 
face higher partially irreversible set up costs. 
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The Limburg dataset 5 The Limburg dataset 
5.1 The survey 
5.1.1 History 
The research on starting entrepreneurs in South-Limburg is embedded in the research 
institute Business Investment Research Center (BIRC) at the University of Maastricht
25. 
Investment is broadly perceived within BIRC. Within three subprograms the following 
investment are investigated: 
• the dynamics of physical investments of industrial firms 
• investments and disinvestments in human capital of large firms 
• investments in the form of market entry 
The research on starting entrepreneurs is part of the last subprogram. So the decision to 
become an entrepreneur is perceived as a decision to enter the market of entrepreneurs. 
Through this perspective, we combine research on the labor market, i.e. the market for 
entrepreneurs, with research on market entiy and exit. After all, every creation of a new 
company is also the entry of a new player on a market. 
Why did we choose to study market entry with the specific case of entrepreneur-
ship? Although more than 90% of the Dutch businesses are considered small businesses, 
the majority of economic research focuses on middle and large scale businesses. So with 
this study we hope to enrich the knowledge about small businesses. 
The social networks of our respondents are an important theme in this research. 
There is growing interest from practice and theory in this theme. Nearly no conversation 
on entrepreneurship with experts from the field and entrepreneurs themselves ends up at a 
certain point with the importance of the personal networks for entrepreneurship. Entre-
preneurs frequently utilize their personal relations. Until now, the mechanisms behind the 
relationship between networking and successful entrepreneurship are hardly researched. 
This research is the first step to bridge this gap. 
5.1.2 Aim 
5.1.2.1 Research population 
Starting entrepreneurs form the core of our main questions. Answering the question who 
becomes self-employed and who not requires that persons who are not self-employed are 
part of the research population. After all, without such a control group of non-self-
This institute was founded in January 1997 by Professor Dr. Gerard A. Pfann and aims to provide new 
insights in investment decisions. The financial backbone of the institute is a PIONIER subsidy provided by 
NWO, the Dutch organization for scientific research, to Gerard A. Pfann in 1996. 
91 employed it is not possible to show what differentiates self-employed from non-self-
employed. The choice for self-employment is a conscious choice: people think carefully 
and thoughtfully before they start up their own business. Among the wage workers, there 
are certainly people who have thought about starting up a business; however there are 
also people who never have had the idea to start up a business themselves. For research 
purposes, it is problematic to interrogate individuals about decisions that have not come 
to their mind. In the evaluation of hypothetical situations people cannot base their an-
swers on their own experience so that their answer often does not reflect their own 
opinion but what, according to them, others - in our case potential self-employed - think. 
So the ideal population for researching the determinants of self-employment consists of 
all individuals that have ever considered becoming self-employed. 
5.1.2.2 Time span 
In the research, potential self-employed entrepreneurs are investigated who considered 
becoming self-employed or who started up a business in 1998 or 1999. We choose this 
time period for two reasons. On the one hand, we were trying to prevent a large lap of 
time between the moment of interview and the establishment of the business, because 
people recollect events in the past badly. On the other hand, we had to safeguard that the 
recently started enterprises had at least had a chance to establish themselves on the 
market, in order to be able to subsequently evaluate which starting businesses could be 
considered successful and which until now less successful. 
5.1.2.3 Choice for South Limburg 
Within the Business Investment Research Center, research on a national scale had already 
been performed, like for example research towards self-employment on the Brabant 
dataset and research towards the dynamics of investment decisions of Dutch industrial 
firms. To stress the positive interplay between the University of Maastricht and the local 
region we decided to concentrate the research towards self-employed entrepreneurs in 
South Limburg. 
From a more scientific point of view, a regional focus offers also the advantage 
that some macro-economic factors, which differ on a national scale, are for the research 
population constant. A regional focus provides us the opportunity to research the phe-
nomenon self-employment at micro level free from macro influences. 
5.1.3 Development and execution of the research 
5.1.3.1 Execution of research 
Because the execution of an empirical research would exceed the capacity of the Business 
Investment Research Center, it was decided to subcontract the fieldwork to a professional 
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93 survey organization. After an intensive search and selection process, the Business In-
vestment Research Center decided to outsource the fieldwork of the research to R&M in 
Maastricht and Prolnfo in Heerlen. 
The development of the questionnaire covers the first part of the execution proc-
ess (see Figure 5.1 for a schematic description of the complete execution process). In the 
initial stage, we have had consultations with experts from the field. The aim of these 
conversations was to obtain a better picture about what is going on in the field and what 
are important practical issues of starting entrepreneurs. Next to the recently started 
entrepreneurs, we had conversations with individuals who worked with starting entrepre-
neurs on a daily basis. 
The employees of the Starterscentrum South Limburg acted as an important 
sounding board for us in order to not loose sight of the practical relevance. In the consul-
tations with bank directors and accountants for example, we mainly informed ourselves 
about the financial and administrative aspects of starting a new enterprise. These conver-
sations formed the basis of a first version of the questionnaire. Then, the first versions 
were discussed with several colleagues, who had ample experience with the execution of 
similar empirical research, and the remarks and comments were incorporated in a second 
version. 
5.1.3.2 Execution process 
When the questionnaire passed the test of our colleagues, it was tested in practice. 
For this we put the questionnaire to the field experts, who were consulted before, and to 
some recently started entrepreneurs, with the request for critical comments and we invited 
them in a so-called focus group discussion. On two days, we went through the question-
naire and requested them for a general impression. Then, we discussed about the clarity 
and clearness of each question and the accompanying answer possibilities. The many 
suggestions from these focus group discussions were then incorporated in a third version 
of the questionnaire, the concept questionnaire. 
From part two onwards, the selected research organizations R&M and Prolnfo 
were closely involved. The concept questionnaire was once more put through thoroughly. 
Until then, the concept questionnaire only existed in paper form and now this paper 
version was translated into an electronic version, so that the interviewers could make use 
of a laptop at the interviews. In technical jargon, such an electronic questionnaire is 
called a CAPI-questionnaire, where CAPI stands for "Computer Assisted Personal 
Interview". This first version of the CAPI-questionnaire was tested in the interview 
laboratory of R&M. Once more, three starting entrepreneurs were asked to answer an 
experienced interviewer in the interview laboratory. After a thorough analysis of the 
course of the three trial interviews and the answer behavior of the three test subjects, a 
few more improvements were incorporated in the questionnaire. For example, we discov-
ered that the interview lasted longer than the preliminary expected 60 minutes and that 
therefore some questions had to be deleted. In the meantime, R&M and Prolnfo had 
already selected the interviewers for the research. The chosen interviewers, who mainly 
had experience with interviewing 'professionals' and companies, completed subsequently 
an introduction and training specifically aimed at this research on starting entrepreneurs. 
94 At November 27 2000, the first interviews were conducted by R&M and Prolnfo, 
which resulted in 135 interviews at the end of 2000. After Christmas the fieldwork was 
suspended for four weeks, on the one hand because respondents are hard to reach around 
the turn of the year, but mainly because we would analyze more specifically the first 135 
interviews in order to correct possible problems in this relatively early stage of the 
research. Fortunately, only marginal changes were needed. For example, we discovered 
that more than 20% of the respondents were hesitant in providing financial data about 
their business. Therefore, we decided to offer the respondents the choice not to provide 
the exact sales but merely an indication. Between February 6 and May 23 2001, the 
remaining 1088 interviews were conducted (see also Figure 5.2). Only the fieldwork of 
this research took 6 months. This is clearly longer than normally in a commercial re-
search period. Nevertheless, we choose consciously for a similar long research period, 
because this improves the response rate. By means of this long research period it is 
possible to approach respondents at a later time, if they are temporarily very busy. 
Figure 5.2: Interview dates 
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5.1.4 Conduct 
5.1.4.1 Response and non-response 
Empirical research lives from the cooperation of the respondents. For making inferences 
from the collected data, it is of utmost importance that a lot of individuals are willing to 
cooperate in the research. However, a part of the approached individuals were for one or 
the other reason not willing to collaborate, which creates non-response. 
95 5.1.4.2 Non-response in the Limburg survey 
The population consists of two subpopulations, namely businesses which subscribed at 
the Chamber of Commerce in 1998 and 1999 and individuals in that period that had 
contact with the Starterscentrum because they indented to start up a business. The total 
size of these two subpopulations is 7.453 addresses. In 62 cases, addresses were recorded 
twice, so that the valid original population consists of 7.391 addresses. Of these 7.391 
addresses, 5.119 were registered as starter (69%) and 2.272 (31%) as non-starter. A 
problem with this population is that it is not completely compatible with the by us desired 
population. As was indicated before, the research focuses on individuals who in 1998 or 
1999 became self-employed by starting a business or who at least seriously considered it. 
During the telephone screening, we discovered that 1.350 (18.2%) did not comply with 
this constraint. Most of these companies did not belong to our target population because 
they were founded long before 1998. Furthermore this group consists of business who 
were not established by a natural person (for example a subsidiary company raised by 
DSM) or empty administration partnerships who were established solely for tax reasons 
and do not develop any economic activities. We end up with a final research population 
of 6.041 addresses. 
During the telephone screening, it became apparent that some addresses did not 
correspond any more. By consulting several other information sources (telephone book, 
WebPages on the Internet) it was tried to retrieve current data. But also after this update 
1.196 (19.8% of 6.041) addresses were untraceable. These 1.196 addresses were from the 
subpopulation starters and non-starters. We suspect that the main reasons for this fall out 
are: a) already quitted businesses b) people or businesses, which moved outside the 
community. 
Furthermore, we could not reach 386 addresses because nobody answered the 
phone, although the telephone number had a connection. It should be noted, that the 
employees of the telephone screening tried on average 10 times at different times to reach 
anyone at that number. Finally, 4.459 addresses were reached for the screening. 
The aim of the screening was to acquaint the respondents with the research and to 
ask for their cooperation for a, at their suitable time, personal interview. 1.323 respon-
dents (21.9% of the original population and 29.7% of the reached addresses) preferred not 
to cooperate with the screening. 120 respondents were not able to cooperate with the 
research, because they had not mastered the Dutch language or passed away. Finally, we 
screened 3.016 individuals. 1.577 respondents promised during the screening to cooperate 
with the subsequent personal interview. These respondents received further information 
about the research and a confirmation of the appointment for a personal interview. After 
their initial promise, 354 of these 1.577 respondents renounced to cooperate with the 
research. Finally, we personally interviewed 1.223 respondents. 
What do these numbers mean in terms of non-response? Based on the address 
database of the Chamber of Commerce and the Starterscentrum, we can assume that 
6.041 individuals in 1998 and 1999 in South Limburg seriously thought about becoming 
self-employed or have become self-employed. These 6.041 addresses form our gross 
sample. We could not reach 1.856 addresses, because the known address was not valid 
(1.196), the respondents could not be reached after several trials (540), the respondents 
were seriously ill or passed away (30), or because the interview was not possible due to 
96 language problems (90). So our net sample is 4.185 addresses, i.e. with 4.185 individuals 
successful telephone contact was established. 
At the time we established successful contact, there exist a possibility that the 
respondent refuses cooperation. 1.087 respondents (26%) refused to collaborate to the 
preliminary telephone inquiry, 1.439 (34%) provided limited information via the tele-
phone but preferred not to cooperate with the personal interview and 436 (11%) promised 
initially cooperation, however renounced at a later moment. 1.223 (29%) spoke to our 
interviewers in a personal interview. In terms of non-response, this means that of the 
established contacts, 29% were willing to cooperate to this research and 71% refused it 
explicitly at some time of the research. Of the 1.223 successful interviews, 841 (69%) 
were registered as starter and 382 (31%) as non-starter. So the ratio starter and non-starter 
among the respondents is exactly the same as in the address database. However, during 
the telephone screening and the interviews, we encountered that 159 registered non-
starters were by then starters and 13 non-starters originally were registered as starter. This 
displacement between the information of the registration and our information from the 
contact of the respondents is shown in Table 5.1. Finally we interviewed 987 (80.7%) 
starters and 236 (19.3%) non-starters. These last numbers are an indication of the earlier 
expressed suspicion that non-response among non-starters is higher. 
Table 5.1: Displacement starters and non-starters 
Starter according to interview 
No Yes Total 
Registered No 223 159 382 
Starter (58) (42) (100) 
[94] [16] [31] 
Yes 13 828 841 
(2) (98) (100) 
[6] [84] L62L 
Total 236 987 1223 
(19) (81) (100) 
HOP] HOP] [1001 
5.2 Survey follow up: Matching Limburg dataset with Chamber 
of Commerce dataset in 2004 
One of our aims was to determine the success of the decision to become self-employed. 
However, as we were interested in individuals who started their business in 1998 or 1999 
and that our interviews were conducted from November 2000 till May 2001, the success 
of the self-employment decision was hard to measure with the existing data. Some of our 
97 
{ targeted firms were only operating for less then a year. Therefore, we decided to conduct 
a follow up research with our target population. 
For this follow up research, we decided to contact the Chamber of Commerce and 
asked for their cooperation in the research. The staff at the Chamber of Commerce 
allowed full access to their databases. Therefore, we were able not only to obtain the 
status of the firm in May 2004 of our 987 registered starters, but also the status of the 
complete population of registered starters in 1998 and 1999. After a thorough clean up of 
the database, the new updated database consisted of 5.822 registered starters. Note that 
this database is somewhat larger than our initial database of starters (5.119). This discrep-
ancy is possible due to late registrations, which the Chamber of Commerce allows for. 
The Chamber of Commerce database allows for several reasons for deregistration. Table 
5.2 shows the reasons for deregistration and their frequencies. Finally, we matched our 
database with the newly created database to obtain the status of the firm of the inter-
viewed self-employed. 
Table 5.2: Deregistration reasons 
Code  Population  %  First Time  %  Self- % 
(N=5822)  (N-619)  Employed 
Before 
(N= 184) 
Deregistration due to  21  10  0.45 
rectification 
Deregistration by virtue of  24  260  11.58  7  8.43  o  J  6.82 
the Chamber of Commerce 
Deregistration due to  25  3  0.13 
change in legal form or 
economic activity 
Deregistration due to  27  1651  73.51  65  78.31  28  63.64 
discontinuance (general) 
Deregistration due to  28  105  4.67  6  7.23  7  15.91 
discontinuance by bank-
ruptcy 
Delayed deregistration  29  128  5.70  2  2.41  2  4.55 
Unknown  31  7  0.31 
Deregistration due to  32  74  3.29  3  3.61  4  9.09 
economic transfer 
Unknown  91  8  0.36 
Total  2246  58  44 
Discontinuance rate by May  38.58%  13.78%  23.91% 
2004 
98 5.3 Some (descriptive) results from the data 
In this part of the chapter, the (potential) starter is the focus. Here we would like to 
answer what differentiates individuals that have started a business from those who have 
considered becoming self-employed, but finally denounced. 
5.3.1 The self-employment decision 
5.3.2 Starting entrepreneur versus non-starting entrepreneur 
5.3.2.1 Demographics 
In this section we describe the differences in objective individual characteristics between 
starters and non-starters. 82% of the interviewed men have started a business and 80% of 
the women. So there exist no substantial difference between starters and non-starters with 
respect to gender. Research among the Dutch labor force shows that woman are less 
inclined to become self-employed. This figure also emerges from our data. 910 (74.4%) 
of our respondents is man and merely 313 (25.6%) is woman. These results indicate a two 
step process. The first step describes if somebody seriously considers self-employment at 
all and it turns out that man consider this option more often. However among the group of 
individuals who have seriously considered starting up their own business, an equal 
portion of man and woman truly starts up a business. 
At the time of the interview, the average age of the starter and the non-starter is 
both 40 years. Figure 5.3 indicates that age is normally distributed for both the starters 
and the non-starters. Comparing the youngest age category with the oldest age category, 
we see that young individuals are more likely to abandon the idea to become self-
employed. 
Table 5.3: Cross-tabulation marital status and self-employment status 
Marital Status  Starter  Non-Starter 
Married or unmarried living 78  76 
together 
Single or divorced  22  24 
Finally, we have data about the marital status of the respondents when they started up a 
business. The percentages in Table 5.3 clearly indicate that the marital status of starters 
and non-starters do not differ. About three quart of the starters and non-starters is married 
or lives together. 
99 Figure 5,3: Age distribution 
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5.3.2.2 Social background 
Previous research among the labor force indicated unanimously that individuals with self-
employed parents choose more often to become self-employed themselves. In this re-
search we choose to interview people who at least seriously considered self-employment. 
In our sample, more than one third (35%) of the respondents are from a family with self-
employed parents. In national cross sectional samples this percentage never exceeds 10%. 
This reveals that individuals with self-employed parents also sooner consider self-
employment at all. In our sample, 83% of the respondents with self-employed parents 
choose for self-employment and 80% of the respondents without self-employed parents 
choose for self-employment. This difference is not significant (at the 5% level) and 
therefore the choice for self-employment is not influenced by the fact that the parents are 
self-employed. So given that somebody seriously considered self-employment, the social 
background in terms of self-employed parents does not influence the self-employment 
decision. 
Another characteristic of the social background is the educational background of 
the parents. The average educational level of the parents of starters and non-starters is 
lower vocational schooling. Furthermore, it becomes apparent from this sample that in 
the last decennia education expansion has taken place (see Table 5.5 for educational level 
starters and non-starters). Also other research shows that in the Netherlands, but also in 
other countries, the educational level of the offspring (in our sample intermediate voca-
tional schooling) is higher than the educational level of the parents (in our sample lower 
vocational schooling). Table 5.4 provides the distribution of the highest education of the 
parents for the starters and non-starters. In general, the differences between the two 
groups are not remarkable. The visual differences in the educational categories VWO and 
WO are based on small numbers, and not on a systematic difference. 
100 Table 5.4: Distribution parental education 
Educational Level  Total  Starter  Non-Starter 
Basis  14.9  15.2  13.6 
LBO  19.5  19.4  19.9 
MAVO/HAVO  16.5  16.3  17.4 
VWO  3.1  3.6  1.3 
MBO  18.2  18.1  18.2 
HBO  14.8  14.9  14.4 
WO  J  4.8  6.8 
5.3.2.3 Human capital 
The term human capital stands for the knowledge, skills, and experience of an individual. 
During the course of life, everybody builds human capital by following education and 
through learning from experience. Everybody can use its human capital either in a regular 
job or to become self-employed. Further onwards in this chapter, we present the distribu-
tion of several specific elements of the human capital for starters and non-starters. Table 
5.5 presents the distribution of schooling over starters and non-starters. Both for the 
starter as for the non-starter the median is at intermediate vocational schooling. There are 
only minor differences between the educational level of the starter and the non-starter. 
Table 5.5: Distribution respondents over educational levels 
Educational Level  Total  Starter  Non-Starter 
Basis  4.4  4,0  6.2 
LBO  12.8  12.9  12.8 
MAVO/HAVO  14.9  15.3  11 -»  I j.j 
VWO  3.0  3.4  1.3 
MBO  27.4  27.0  29.2 
HBO  27.5  26.5  31.4 
WO  10.0  11.0  5.8 
More than half of the respondents had vocational schooling or higher. This might 
indicate that schooling types, that besides general skills also teach more practical and 
direct applicable skills, promote the possibility for individuals to think about self-
employment. Respondents with a finished HBO education are more likely not to choose 
101 for self-employment than individuals with another education. We cannot trace this back 
to the better perspective of higher educated on the labor market. After all, we see that of 
respondents with a university degree (WO) a larger part of the potential self-employed 
actually do become self-employed. 
Although some of the entrepreneurs (among our respondents 40%) are completely 
on their own, the establishment of a company often means that the self-employed is also 
employer. Therefore, the starting entrepreneur employs individuals who he has to super-
vise. We asked in our research whether the potential entrepreneur had leadership experi-
ence in his previous jobs. More than half (53%) of the respondents had leadership experi-
ence and less than half did not have had leadership experience (47%) in a previous job. It 
seems that leadership experience does not affect the probability of starting up a business. 
55% of the non-starters and 53% of the starters had leadership experience; a non-
significant difference. However, leadership experience has an effect on the type of 
business started. In Table 5.6 we cross tabbed leadership experience with the size of the 
company. From the table it is shown that starting entrepreneurs who had leadership 
experience in their previous job also have a higher probability of starting up a company 
with employees. The higher the number of employees in a firm the higher is the chance 
that the starter had leadership experience. Comparative research between the Netherlands 
and the US shows that in the Netherlands relatively few individuals choose for self-
employment compared to the US, Besides several other factors, this is often explained by 
a less favorable entrepreneurial climate. This might become apparent in the fact that 
entrepreneurs do not get a second chance when their first attempt failed. In our research, 
we find that 20% of the respondents have been self-employed before and have gained 
useful experience for a renewed self-employment decision. From our data it becomes 
clear that people, who have been self-employed before, have a higher probability to start 
up a business than people without self-employment experience. Almost 90% of the 
respondents with self-employment experience established a business, compared to 79% 
of the respondents without self-employment experience. 
Table 5,6: Cross tabulation leadership experience and number of employees 
Leadership  None  1  2  3-5  6-9  >9 
Experience 
No  34.7  36.0  12.4  8.8  4.3  o  J.O 
Yes  26.2  34.0  11.1  12.4  7.1  9.2 
5.3.2.4 Social capital 
The social networks and the social environment of the potential self-employed played a 
central role in this research. In this section, we report some results on the importance of 
the social networks of our respondents. Both starters and non-starters indicated that they 
were mainly satisfied or very satisfied by the support they received from their direct 
social environment (see Figure 5.4). This indicates that in most cases the direct social 
environment is willing to support the starting entrepreneur. 
102 Figure 5.4: Satisfaction support social network 
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53.2.4.1 Social network size 
Figure 5.5 shows the network size for starters and non-starters. For starters the average 
network size is 4.83 and for non-starters is 4,53. At first sight these distributions of both 
groups look similar. This is partly due to the fact that the naming of the network contacts 
was heavily guided by the questionnaire. At a closer inspection, it is shown that starters 
have on average significantly larger networks than non-starters. We must be careful to 
conclude that individuals who are becoming self-employed have larger social networks. 
Individuals who are planning to become self-employed may have more contact with 
prospective suppliers and customers. 
Figure 5.5: Social network size 
o  (N 
in 
W  c  0)  T3 
C 
O 












. s • 
? ; 
<1 
-. r: r 
0  1  8  10 
starter  non-starter 
103 53.2.4,2 Social network composition 
Besides the size of the network, we have also investigated the composition of the social 
networks. We investigated the composition of the network along the following criteria: 
• the proportion self-employed and non-self-employed 
• proportion family members and non-family members 
• proportion weak and strong ties 
Figure 5.6 shows the information about the composition of the network with respect to 
the proportion of self-employed in the network. Other self-employed can be an important 
resource in the own network. Contact with other self-employed is useful for a starting 
entrepreneur for the following three reasons. First, other self-employed have at their 
disposal important information that is relevant for starting up a business. For example, 
other self-employed can provide advice to the starting entrepreneur concerning problems 
with defaulters or the treasury. Second, other self-employed have contact with third 
parties, who can help the starting entrepreneur. Finally, other self-employed have often 
similar norms and values, go trough similar problems and challenges, and therefore form 
a natural ally. 
Figure 5.6: Distribution of proportion of self-employed over starters and non-starters 
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Furthermore, our research shows that people with relatively many other self-
employed in their network have a higher probability of becoming self-employed. The 
median of the share of self-employed in the networks is 0.5 for starters and 0.33 for non-
starters and differs significantly. Four out of five respondents, who in the end have started 
a company, build a network in which at least a quarter of the members are self-employed. 
More than a quarter of the non-starters have no self-employed contact. 
In second instance, we have investigated the extent to which family members are 
counted as part of someone's personal network. More than a quarter of the respondents 
has no family member in their network and in more than halve of the cases the family 
104 members consists of halve the network. Figure 5.7 shows that the differences between 
starters and non-starters with respect to the proportion of family members are much less 
pronounced than the proportion of self-employed. On average 32% of the network 
contacts of the non-starters are family members and of the starters this is 29%. Although 
the difference is small, it is significant. Furthermore, it is evident that people with a 
network with a high proportion of family members are often member of the non-starter 
group. 
Figure 5.7: Distribution of proportion of family members over starters and non-starters 
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The theory of social networks differentiates between so-called weak and strong ties. 
Strong ties are in a different way useful than weak ties. Strong ties, like the partner and 
some very good friends, can provide emotional support and offer help in hard times. 
Furthermore, the strong ties form someone's frame of reference. The strength of weak 
ties is that they provide different information and also provide access to other unknown 
individuals. Because the circle of friends of strong ties looks like ones own circle of 
friends, strong ties offer much less really new information than weak ties. One can obtain 
this information also directly. Weak ties are often embedded in different circle of friends 
and therefore they provide access to new unknown information. An example of a weak tie 
is the old fellow student, who one encounters at a reunion. 
A possible indicator of the strength of a tie is the frequency of contact. For Figure 
5.8, we assumed that a strong tie is someone with whom a respondent contacted weekly 
or more often, while all contacts with a lower frequency are assumed weak ties. Both for 
starters and non-starters, two third of the network contacts are strong ties. So given these 
results, there seems no difference between starters and non-starters concerning the 
proportion of strong ties in the network. 
105 Figure 5,8: Distribution of proportion of strong ties over starters and non-starters 
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South Liraburg has many associations and participation is a possibility to build a social 
network. Furthermore, it is often suggested that the Limburgian economy is tightly 
interwoven with associational life. In order to test this suggestion, we asked on a five 
point Likert scale to what degree starters and non-starters participate in club life. The 
participation rate for starters is 2,34 and for non-starters at 2.76, Non-starters are signifi-
cantly more active in the Limburgian associational life. Figure 5-9 provides an explana-
tion. Almost 50% of the respondents are member of a club and are active in the club. But 
the active non-starters participate more strongly than starters. It should be noted though, 
that this difference bears on starting entrepreneurs, Exactly the starting up of a company 
is time consuming so that other activities sometimes suffer. 
Figure 5.9: Participation in associational life 
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106 5.3.2.5 Starting up: Motives 
Table 5.7 classifies the motives for starting up a business. The cells indicate the percent-
age of the respondents that think a certain motive is important. Becoming self-employed 
is for many a big challenge and so more than two third of the respondents indicated that 
the new challenge was an important motive. Almost half of the respondents indicated that 
they always wanted to become self-employed and that this wish was an important motive 
for the transfer to self-employment. It strikes that these reasons are more important for 
starters than non-starters. About one third of the respondents bring forward that they 
either saw a gap in the market or thought that they could offer a better product or service 
than was currently available on the market. The availability of certain resources was also 
important for some of the respondents. 30% of the respondents indicated that the avail-
ability of clients or orders promoted the start up and 18% indicated that the sufficient 
availability of capital was an important motive. Another important motive is that self-
employment better suits the combination of working and taking care of the family. People 
that think of becoming self-employed out of these motives, also do become self-
employed. 
Table 5.7: Start-up motives 
Start Up Motive  Total  Starter  Non-Starter 
Looked for new challenge  69.9  70.6  66.9 
Self-employment was always goal in life  47,5  49.8  37.7 
Could provide better work than market  36.5  36.9  34.7 
Saw a hole in the market  32.6  36.4  33.4 
Self-employment yield more money  29.7  28.8  1 1 C  jjO 
Was secured of clients and orders  28.9  29.9  24.6 
Combination of work and family  23.6  25.3  16.5 
Had available financial means  17.3  18.1  9.7 
Few opportunities at former employer  13.2  13.6  11.9 
Acquaintance/ colleague wanted to start together  10.3  10.4  9.7 
Threat of losing former job  7.4  7.2  8.1 
Self-employment is family tradition  7.0  7.2  5.9 
5.3.2.6 Satisfaction 
In the meantime, time lapsed between the decision to become self-employed and the 
moment of interview. Therefore, we asked them how satisfied they look back at the 
decision to start or not to start a company. On a five-point Likert-scale the average 
satisfaction of the non-starters is with 3.15 significantly lower than those of starters with 
4.30. Figure 5.10 shows the satisfaction distribution of starters and non-starters. People 
who have actually set up a business are much more satisfied than people, who have 
107 abandoned this idea. Four out of five starters is satisfied or even very satisfied with their 
decision to become self-employed. 
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Beside the subjective observation of the respondents, we have also investigated to 
what extent the financial situation of the starters and non-starters have improved. In 
Figure 5.11, we compare the income ahead of the self-employment decision with the 
income at the time of the interview. This means that we compare the starter's previous 
income from paid labor with their income as self-employed. It should be noted that 
comparing the incomes of self-employed with non-self-employed is extremely difficult. 
On the one hand, the income of employees is often augmented by secondary payments, 
like a thirteenth month salary, holiday allowance, and obliging costs for child care. 
Furthermore, some employers pay for pension build-up and other social insurance. On the 
other hand, self-employed have more margin to reduce their income tax by private 
expenses. Furthermore, it is known that self-employed work more hours per week than 
the average employee. Although the yearly income of the self-employed may be higher, 
then it is still possible that its hourly wage is lower. In this research we focus on the 
personal yearly income and omit possible differences in working hours. 
Non-starters improved yearly on average Dfl. 5.000 and starters on average Dfl, 
5.850, but this difference is not significant. The differences between starters and non-
starters are not so much in the average income growth but more in the distribution. The 
income change of starters varies more strongly. For a quarter of it diminishes with 25%, 
but in contrast, a third experiences an income growth of more than 25%. Almost half of 
the non-starters experience no income change. For a fifth, it grows with 5 to 25% and 
another fifth of the non-starters a growth of more than 25%.Only a seventh of the non-
starters experience an income reduction of more than 5%. From this result it becomes 
clear that self-employment is more risky. After all, half of the starting entrepreneurs 
experience large income differences both in the positive as in the negative direction. 
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5.3.3 Entry and exit timing 
Besides the interest in who becomes self-employed and who survives as an entrepreneur, 
we are interested in the dynamics of these decisions. Therefore, this section investigates 
when an individual becomes an entrepreneur in his lifecycle for the first time and how 
long his or her first company survives. Since we only have the exit information of firms 
that started in 1998 or 1999, we will do this exercise only for the 803 firms that sub-
scribed in 1998 and 1999. For this we split our sample of starters in first time starters and 
non-first time starters. 52.4% of the starters become entrepreneur for their first time in 
their life. In the following section, we provide non-parametric estimates of the time it 
takes before individuals decide to become self-employed
26. 
5.3.3.1 Non-parametric entry hazard 
It is interesting to observe the enormous variety of ages at which individuals decide to 
become self-employed. It becomes clear from the data that this choice is not made at the 
beginning of the career. The average age of the individuals that became self-employed for 
the first time within the time window 1998 and 1999 is 39. For individuals with self-
employment experience the average age is 44. The youngest age at which an individual 
starts its first business is 21 years and an entrepreneur can be as young as 25 when he 
starts either a second business or tries self-employment for the second time. 
Figure 5.12 shows the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier entry hazard for the first 
time self-employed and the experienced self-employed. The entry hazard shows retro-
For the validity of our approach, we assume that the economy is in a steady state. 
109 spective when the group of entrepreneurs has the highest probability to become self-
employed over their lifetime. For first time self-employed, the hazard of becoming an 
entrepreneur is highest at age 50. 
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5.3.3.2 Non-parametric exit hazard 
When an individual starts up a business, it is possible that the firm performs below 
expectations and the individual decides to exit self-employment or goes bankrupt. At 
May 2004, 38.6% of the in 1998 and 1999 created businesses do not exists anymore. For 
the first time starters in our sample this percentage is 13.8%. There exists a large and 
significant difference between the probability of exit of the firms in the sample and the 
firms in the population. There are several reasons for this. As was mentioned before, 
some may have been forced to exit before we could contact them. As business owners 
have often their business at home, business exit sometimes implies that the family has to 
move either because they sell the adjoining store or because the new financial situation 
forces them to live in a smaller home. Also, when the business is performing below 
expectations, people may be less motivated and enthusiast to tell about their business. 
Well-performing stailers are often proud and enthusiast to tell about their business and 
are therefore more likely to be willing to participate. 
It is well-known that probability of exit of a firm shows an inverted U-shape over 
time. Initially, the firm faces a low probability of exit. There are abundant financial 
resources and the entrepreneur knows that it takes time to learn how to manage a com-
pany. After a few years, the entrepreneur may find out that the business performs below 
expectations and that exit is the only option. During this time the probability of exit 
increases. Afterwards the probability of exit declines because only the able entrepreneurs 
remain in business. Figure 5.13 shows the exit hazard for the whole population of entre-
110 preneurs till May 2004. One clearly observes the inverted U-shape relation over time. The 
probability of exit peaks at 500 days. 
Figure 5.13: Non-parametric exit hazard (in days) 
Smoothed hazard estimate 
analysis time 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduced the Limburg dataset. The Limburg dataset consists of 
detailed information on labor market history, social background, and social networks of 
1223 individuals that seriously considered becoming self-employed around 1998 and 
1999. In 2004, this dataset was matched with a dataset of the Chamber of Commerce that 
provide information about the status of the self-employment decision. In this chapter, we 
have provided some initial summary statistics of both datasets concerning the self-
employment decision. 
Ill Chapter 6 
Non-response bias and business 
idea discontinuance rates 




The purpose of this article is to determine whether using only survey respondents pro-
duces biased results and determine the extent of this bias. In particular, we look at the 
bias in estimating the probability that an individual interested in becoming a business 
owner, abandons the idea of becoming self-employed. Unbiased estimation of the discon-
tinuance probability is only possible when discontinuing the idea to become self-
employed is equal among respondents and non-respondents. There are good reasons to 
believe that an individual that abandons the idea of becoming self-employed would be 
less likely to respond to the survey than an individual who pursued the idea of becoming 
self-employed. The death, illness or negative emotions and reduced enthusiasm associ-
ated with the decision to abandon the business idea serve as examples. 
Previous research has shown a causal link between non-response behavior and the 
variable under study (dependent variable); for business turnover rates (Holmes and 
Schmitz 1996) and for unemployment duration (Van der Berg et al. 2005). The bias from 
ignoring non-response can be estimated by combining survey/ administrative data (Van 
der Berg et al. 2005; Wang et al. 1992), using the number of call-backs in telephone 
surveys (Potthoff et a1. 1993), or use a structural model of the joint process of non-
response and the process under study, like business turnover rates (Holmes & Schmitz 
1996). 
In this paper we investigate the sources of non-response. More specific, we inves-
tigate non-response bias directly by combining personal interview/survey data with 
telephone screening data, and indirectly by a structural model of the joint process of non-
response and business idea continuance in the flavor of Holmes and Schmitz (1996). We 
deviate from the Holmes and Schmitz model in that we consider only single-owner firms 
or one owner of a multiple-owner firm. Holmes and Schmitz assume furthermore that 
non-response is independent from business turnover. We estimate a choice model that 
relaxes this restrictive assumption. 
The empirical ordering (sample analogs) shows that individuals that abandoned 
the idea of becoming self-employed are less willing to corporate at the different phases of 
the research. For example, if an individual decides to take part in the telephone screening 
the discontinuance probability is 15%. If the individual decides to offer more information 
during this telephone screening, the discontinuance probability drops below 12%. Finally, 
if the individual from the telephone screening decides to take part in the final survey, the 
discontinuance rate drops to 7%. The results from the structural model confirm that the 
discontinuance rate from the personal interview is biased downward, but the results of the 
respondents to the telephone screening are remarkably close to the non-respondents of the 
research. Furthermore, the result from a multinomial logit model indicates that non-
27 This chapter is based on the paper "Non-response bias and business continuance rates" by Kok and Pfann 
(2006). 
113 response is not independent with business idea continuance. Individuals that decide not to 
become an entrepreneur are less likely to participate in the survey. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides the data. The Limburg sur-
vey is introduced and a taxonomy of non-response is presented. Section 6.3 provides the 
research problem and gives a first look at the data. Direct evidence of discontinuance bias 
among respondents is given. Section 6.4 provides a simple model of the joint process of 
non-response and discontinuance. Section 6.5 investigates a sequential decision model. 
Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 The data 
6.2.1 The Limburg survey 
The survey "Self-employment in the South of Limburg'
1 was a sample drawn from the 
population of potential business starters in South Limburg in 1998 and 1999. The re-
search population is extracted from two databases: (1) The registration database of the 
local chamber of commerce contains all new firms, who registered a business in South 
Limburg in 1998 or 1999. (2) The address database of the "Starterscentrum South Lim-
-) a 
burg" contains addresses of persons, who had serious plans to become self-employed" . 
The total size of this population is 7453. 62 addresses were double. During the telephone 
screening we checked whether the self-employment decision took place between 1998 
and 1999. 1350 addresses did not meet this criterion. Our final research population 
encompasses 6041 individuals. 
The research agency attempted to contact the whole population. First contact was 
established by telephone. During the telephone screening, individuals were informed 
about the research and asked for their cooperation in a personal interview at a date of 
their preference. 4472 addresses were reached for the telephone screening. And 3016 
individuals completed the telephone screening. Each individual that completed the 
telephone screening was asked "What happened to your idea to become self-employed?". 
2084 out of the 3016 respondents also provided information about some demographics 
like, age, education, gender, and parental self-employment. 1577 individuals initially 
gave permission to cooperate with a personal interview. However, 354 individuals 
decided afterwards not to partake in the personal interview, leaving 1223 completed 
surveys. 
6.2.2 A taxonomy of non-response 
Table 6.1 provides a list of the 25 non-response categories as coded by the survey agency 
for the telephone screening. Figure 6.1 provides a taxonomy of screening sample non-
response. We grouped these 25 non-response categories into four types. Two types of 
non-response are based on the fact that no direct contact was possible by the survey 
" The Starterscentrum is a foundation sponsored by the chamber of commerce and other local authorities to 
encourage successful self-employment by providing training and advice. 
114 agency, and the other two types are based on possible direct contact. We distinguish 
between non-response due to the fact that the individual has moved residence (labelled as 
MOVED) or due to the inability of the survey agency to contact the individual (NO-
CONTACT). Non-response due to refusal of the individual to cooperate with the tele-
phone screening (REFUSAL) and non-response due to other reasons, like illness or 
language problems (OTHER). 
Table 6.1: Non-response categories 
Variable  Code  # individuals 
Appointment  1  20 
Engaged  2  1 
No reply  3  18 
Quota full  4  1 
Refusal  5  281 
Terminated  6  30 
Uncertain appointment  21  62 
2 x no reply  22  37 
3 x no reply  23  17 
4 x no reply  24  18 
5 x no reply  25  122 
Answering machine  26  72 
Voicemail  27  46 
Fax/ modem  28  43 
No connection  41  875 
Refusal: no interest  42  620 
Wrong address  43  321 
Long-term ill/ death  44  23 
Too old/ dement  45  7 
Language problems  46  90 
Gone during research period  47  154 
Request out of sample  49  109 
Too many approaches  50  47 
Secret number  51  11 
Completed  13  3016 
Total number of individuals  6041 
115 Figure 6.1: Flow diagram of non-response taxonomy 
116 Our parameter of interest is the probability that an individual abandons the idea to be-
come self-employed, shortly, discontinuance rate. We constructed this variable from the 
question: "What happened to your idea to become self-employed?'
1. Table 6.2 provides 
the distribution of answers to these questions for the telephone screening sample. The 
discontinuance rate is defined as the number of individuals that abandoned the idea to 
become self-employed relative to the total number of individuals that answered this 
question. We define the continuance rate as 1 - discontinuance rate. For the telephone 
screening sample the overall discontinuance rate is 15.09 %. 
Table 6.2: Distribution of business idea continuance 
=3E 
What happened to your idea to become self-employed? 
I am self-employed 
I am not self-employed, but will be in the coming six months 
I am still in the orientation phase 
I have abandoned the idea to become seif-employed 
Frequency  Percent 
2186  72.48 
74  2.45 
301  9.98 
455  15.09 
Total  3016 100 
On the basis of the responses to the business idea continuance question, we can 
classify the respondents in one of the four cell listed in Table 6.3. Cell 1 consists of 
individuals that could not be directly contacted (non-response category NO-CONTACT 
and MOVED). 1569 individuals of the 6041 individuals are in this category. Cell 2 
consists of individuals that could be contacted, but whom did not partake in the telephone 
screening because they refused or were not able to fulfill the telephone screening (non-
response category REFUSAL and OTHER). Cell 3 consists of individuals who respond to 
the telephone screening and reported that they continued their business idea. 2561 indi-
viduals are in this category. Finally, ceil 4 consists of individuals who did also respond to 
the telephone screening; however they reported that they abandoned the idea to become 
self-employed. 
Table 6.3: Business idea and response status: Cell counts in the Limburg telephone 
survey 
Cell no. Description of response Number of individuals in cell 
1 Non-response due to no contact 1569 
2 Non-response due to refusal 1456 
3 Respondent continued business idea 2561 
4 Respondent discontinued business idea 455 
117 Our research is concerned with the stability of the discontinuance rate at several 
stages of the research. In specific, we compare the discontinuance rate for the individuals 
that completed the personal interview (N=1223), completed the telephone screening 
(N=3016), and whom did not respond (N=3025). The next section presents the research 
problem and provides some direct evidence that the discontinuance rate differs among the 
samples. After that, the discontinuance rate from the non-respondents is estimated by a 
structural model for the joint probability of non-response and business idea continuance. 
6.3 The research problem and some initial statistics 
In this section, we present the research problem and notation along the work of Holmes 
and Schmitz (1996). We also provide evidence that individuals who have abandoned the 
idea to become self-employed are less likely to give permission for a personal interview 
than individuals that have not abandoned the idea, conditional on partaking in the tele-
phone survey. Thereby, we provide direct evidence of a causal link between discontinu-
ing the idea to become self-employed and survey non-response. 
We follow the notation of Holmes and Schmitz (1996). Define the indicator 
variable x, such that x,- =D if individual i discontinues the idea to become self-employed 
and Xj = S if his or her idea has survived the research time. Let the variable y. be an 
indicator variable such that y. = R if individual i responds and completes the telephone 
screening and j, = N if / does not respond to the telephone screening. And let Pr(x, y) be 
the joint probability distribution of continuance and non-response. 
Our ultimate interest is the probability that an owner discontinues his or her idea 
to become self-employed; that is Pr(x,. =£)) . How is the probability Pr(x,. = D) estimated 
from the sample? This unconditional discontinuance rate can be written as the weighted 
average of the discontinuance rate of the respondents and the non-respondents (Holmes & 
Schmitz 1996: 233), as 
(6.1) Pr(x, =D) = Pr(^. =7?)Pr(x( -D\y{ = /?)+Pr(y,. = N)?v(xi = D\yt = N) 
We have sample analogs of the probability of response and non-response, as well as the 
probability of discontinuance conditioned on response. We have no sample analog for the 
term Pr(x, = D \ y, = N). Holmes and Schmitz argue that researchers often use 
Pr(x,. = D\y,= R) as an estimate of Pr(x,. =D). If Pr(x,. ~D\yi - R)< Pr(x; = D | yi = N), 
this estimate may be biased. If Pr(y/ = N | xi =D)< Pr(j>,. = TV | x/ = S), then 
Pr(x,. =D\yt -R) will underestimate Pr(x(. = D) (Holmes and Schmitz 1996: 234). 
In this section we provide some preliminary evidence that 
Pr (y. = N | Xj ~S)< Pr(^(- =N\Xj = D). For this preliminary evidence, we use information 
on non-response in the population of respondents to the telephone screening. We assess 
the quality of the estimate Pr(x/ ~D\y{ =R) for Pr(x/ = £>)? We address that question in 
Section 6.4 when we develop some models of the joint process of business idea continu-
ance and survey response. 
118 We introduce some extra notation to validate our claim. Let the variable v, be an 
indicator variable such that v, = R if individual / gives permission to partake in the 
personal interview and v, = N if / is not willing to partake in the personal interview. Also 
let the variable w, be an indicator variable such that w, = R if individual / is willing to 
provide extra information about their personal demographics in the telephone screening 
and Wf = N if individual i is not willing to provide more information during the telephone 
screening. Note, that we have sample analogs of these probabilities. 
What would be the bias, if we did not go to the trouble of asking the discontinu-
ance status during the telephone screening, when respondents decided not to partake in 
the personal interview? So, how well is Pr(jt(. = D\vi = R) a substitute for 
Pr(x,. = D | y. = R) and finally for Pr(x, = £>)? 
6.3.1 Sample analogs discontinuance rate 
We do some analysis to validate our claim that discontinuance is related to non-response 
at subsequent stages of cooperation during our research. Table 6.4 shows substantial and 
significant differences in the discontinuance rate and explanatory variables in the differ-
ent samples. The individuals that give permission to partake in the personal interview 
have a substantial lower discontinuance rate than the individuals that do not partake in the 
personal interview. Table 6.4 provides the sample analogs of the probability of discon-
tinuance Pr(x/ = D) conditional on the different samples in our research and provides a 
lower and upper bound of the population discontinuance rate, Pr(x,=D). Table 6.4 
makes clear that using the discontinuance rate of the personal interview Pr(x, = D | v, = R) 
as an analog of the population discontinuance rate Pr(x,. = D) will always result in a 
downward bias in this sample. 
In summary, we have reported the following facts from the Limburg dataset. First, 
an individual is more likely to non-respond in the phases of the survey if he discontinued 
his idea to become self-employed. Second, the survey discontinuance rate is always 
biased downward. These two facts together suggest a connection between an individual's 
discontinuance event and the probability that the individual fails to respond to the survey. 
The next sections make a first attempt to uncover this connection by explicitly modelling 
the process and estimating the parameters of this process. 
6A A simple model of survey non-response and discontinuing 
the business idea 
This section introduces our simplest model of the joint process of continuing the idea to 
become self-employed and survey response along the work of Holmes and Schmitz 
(1996). 
119 Table 6.4: Discontinuance rate at different phases of survey 
Sample Name 
Sample Size 
No of Discontinuance 
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6.4.1 Determination of business idea status 
Each individual in the population of prospective business owners dies with probability a. 
If an individual dies, the individual discontinues his idea to become self-employed with 
probability 1. We refer to an individual who does not die as a healthy individual. 
We model a healthy owner's decision to continue self-employment or not by 
assuming that it is based on an expected entrepreneurial ability index z. The entrepreneu-
rial ability index z takes on two levels, ze{l,2}, with higher z meaning that it is more 
desirable to continue the idea of becoming self-employed. Specifically, we assume that, if 
an individual draws z = 1, then becoming an entrepreneur is unprofitable for the individ-
ual. At the other extreme, if an individual draws z = 2, then the individual thinks his 
120 business idea is profitable. Let \vz be the probability that an individual draws an expected 
profitability index z. 
There is now sufficient structure in place to calculate the probabilities of continu-
ing the idea to become self-employed. Let us calculate these probabilities for a given 
health status of an individual. If an individual dies, then the individual discontinues his 
business idea with probability 1. Next, suppose the individual is healthy. The healthy 
individual continues his business idea if he or she draws z = 2. Hence, the healthy indi-
vidual continues his business idea with probability w2 and discontinues with probability 
Let <jfx be the probability that the individual experiences event x, conditioned on 
being healthy, where x = C denotes the event that the partner continues, and x = D if the 
individual discontinues. We have then that 
(6.2a) (j)c - w2 
(6.2b) 
6.4.2 Determination of response status 
Regarding survey response, individuals who die do not respond to the survey. We assume 
that a healthy individual does not respond to the survey with probability 0. We follow 
Holmes and Schmitz and assume non-response independent of the business idea continu-
ance or discontinuance. 
6.4.3 Joint determination of continuance and response status 
We have now completely described the joint process determining business idea continu-
ance and survey response. We can now calculate the probability of each of the events in 
the cells of Table 6.3. First, we only model any response versus non-response. The 
probabilities of each of the different events are: 
(6.3a) ƒ, = aOwx + a(l-$)wl +a(\~d)w2 +(l-a)<9w2 +{\-a)Qwx 
(6.3b) f2 =(\-a)frv2 +(l-a0<9iv, 
(6.3c) /3 =(l-aXl-0)w2 
(6.3d) /4=(l-aXl-0)wi 
Consider the event xi = C, which corresponds to cell 3 in Table 6.3. 
This occurs if the individual is healthy, the individual continues the idea to become self-
121 employed, and the individual responds to the survey. The probability of this event is 
given in equation (6.3c). The event yt = R, x. = D corresponds to cell 4 in Table 6.3 and 
equation (6.3d) and follows the same reasoning except that the individual does not 
continue its idea to become self-employed. 
Cell 1 and 2 in Table 6.3 are the non-response categories and both correspond to 
the events Y, = N . These two cells differ in one important respect. For the event in cell 2, 
we know that the individuals were healthy, because they refused to partake in the tele-
phone screening. This event occurs if the individual is healthy, but refuses to provide any 
information concerning his business idea status, so he non-responds. 
For the individuals in cell 1, we do not know why these individuals non-
responded. Either, they died and were not able to respond, or they did not want to re-
spond. In the last case, this would amount to the same situation as the event in cell 1 of 
Table 6.3. However, this probability is augmented by the individuals that have actually 
died from either the entrepreneurs that would continue or discontinue their idea, and from 
either the ones that would or would not respond to the telephone screening. 
The model summarized in equations (6.3a) - (6.3d) has three parameters -
a, 6, and, w2. (Note that w, is determined from wx = 1 - w2.) The model can be written as a 
general multinomial response model with m alternatives, indexed y = l,...,w. Then the 
response probability is: 
(6.4) P> - f
j [a,6, w2) 
Let yf be an indicator function with yf-1 if response j is observed and yf = 0 
otherwise. We have an independent random sample with observations (yt) for t = 1»..., T. 





Assuming the disturbances to be independent identical type I extreme value, we estimate 
this model as a multinomial logit with Biogeme 1.2 (Bierlaire 2003)
29. Table 6.5 presents 
the parameter estimates of the model. 
The probability of death is .019. This is a reasonable estimate within a two-year 
time period because the yearly death rate in the Netherlands is 8.68 per 1000 inhabitants. 
The probability of not-responding to the telephone survey for a healthy individual is .385. 
A considerable difference if one regards the sample non-response probability of .500. The 
probability that an individual perceives his entrepreneurial ability too low to continue his 
business idea is .137. Ones a healthy individual has visited either the Chamber of Com-
merce or the Starterscentrum there is a probability of .863 that he will pursue his idea, at 
least for our research period. 
* Empirically, we estimate the model with six parameters and three non-linear constraints. 
122 Table 6.5: Simple model parameter estimates 
Parameter  Formal Notation 
Probability of 
Death  a  .019 
(.009)* 
Not responding  e  .385 
(.010)** 
Low ability  vvs  .137 
(.041)** 
Discontinuance  probability 
conditioned on 
Not responding  ?v(x = DI y = N)  .1533 
Responding  Pr(.v = D | v = R)  .1509 
Overall  ?r(x ~D)  .1521 
Bias from ignoring non-response  .0012 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
With the parameters of our model, we can calculate the probability that an 
owner discontinues his idea to become self-employed conditioned on not responding to 
the telephone survey: 
(6.6) Pv(xi =D\yi = jV)=ff + (l-a)vv, 
since an individual discontinues his idea either by dying with probability one, or if he 
stays healthy he discontinues his idea with probability wx. This result is reported in Table 
6.5. The probability of discontinuance conditional on not-responding is slightly larger this 
probability for the respondents. The probability of discontinuance for non-respondents is 
.1533 and for the respondents it is .1509. There is only a marginal downward bias from 
using the discontinuance rate for respondents of the telephone survey to estimate the 
discontinuance rate for the entire population. Because non-respondents account for 50% 
of the population and because their discontinuance rate is .0024 higher than respondents, 
the overall discontinuance rate is .0012 (=.50 x .0024) higher than the respondents 
discontinuance rate. This bias, .0012, from using the telephone screening sample to 
calculate the discontinuance rate is much lower than the bias, .081, from using the 
personal interview sample. 
123 6.5 A sequential decision model 
Figure 6.2 presents a sequential decision making model for the telephone sample with 
demographics (N=2054). We use this model to investigate the drivers of the process that 
leads to non-response. We differentiate between personal characteristics and a causal link 
between non-response and business (dis)continuance. 
Figure 6.2 can be seen as a sequential decision flow. At the square node of the 
left, the individual decides to continue his business idea or to discontinue his business 
idea. At one point in time, the individual is contacted by the interview agency. Then 
conditional on the individual's choice to continue or discontinue his business idea, the 
individual decides to participate in the personal interview. As a result, we end with four 
events: the individual decides to continue his business idea and decides to participate in 
the personal interview (xz. = C\w\ = R), the individual decides to continue his business 
idea and decides not to participate in the personal interview (xi - C; wt ~ N), the indi-
vidual decides to discontinue his business idea and decides to participate in the personal 
interview (x. - D\wt = R\ and the individual decides to discontinue his business idea 
and decides not to participate in the personal interview (x,. = D\w. = N). At the right 
extremity of Figure 6.2, we present the empirical counts of the number of individuals that 
choose one of these four events. 
Figure 6.2: Sequential decision model 
124 The model in Figure 6.2 can be written as a general multinomial response model with m 
alternatives, indexed j=l,...,m. Then the response probability is: 
(6.7) pi=f'{fik\Xk) 
where X is a vector of individual characteristics with associated parameter vector f5. 
Let y j be an indicator function with yf = 1 if response j is observed and y} = 0 
otherwise. We have an independent random sample with obseivations (yt) for / = 1,...,7\ 
The log-likelihood for observation t can then be written as: 
m 
(7) i{yM*k) = T<y*
XnfJfa\x*) 
j=1 
Assuming the disturbances to be independent identical type I extreme value, we estimate 
this model as a multinomial logit. Table 6.6 presents the parameter estimates of this 
model. 
The results in Table 6.6 show that there are differences among individuals in their 
response behavior. However, conclusions are difficult to draw from parameter estimates 
only in discrete choice models. In order to provide more evidence we report in Table 6.7 
the partial effects that show the change in the probability of occurrence of an alternative 
to a change in an independent variable evaluated at the means of the independent vari-
ables 
The results from Table 6.7 shows that woman have a higher non-response prob-
ability than men. However, this effect is only significant for respondents that decided to 
continue their business idea. The results show that being a woman reduces the probability 
of responding conditional on continuing business idea with .076 and increases the prob-
ability of non-responding with .063. This evidence suggests that female entrepreneurs are 
less willing to cooperate with a personal interview when they decide to continue their 
business idea. 
Furthermore, the results show that older individuals are more likely to respond to 
a personal interview, irrespective of the decision to continue or discontinue their business 
idea. However, these partial effects are not significant. 
The social background of the entrepreneur is also important to understand non-
response. Individuals with self-employed parents are more likely to refuse to partake in 
the personal interview when they decide to continue their business idea. Coming from a 
self-employed background increases the probability of non-response with 0.55. However, 
this picture changes for individuals from self-employed backgrounds who decide not to 
continue their business idea. Although, these individuals with self-employed parents are 
both less likely to discontinue their business idea (as is reflected by the negative signs of 
the partial effects), the larger partial effect of self-employed parents on the probability of 
non-responds indicates that individuals from a self-employed background that do not 
continue their business idea are less likely to refuse to partake in the personal interview 
than individuals without self-employed parents. These results indicate that individuals 
with self-employed parents are only willing to partake in the interview if they decide not 
to continue the business idea. 
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The partial effects of our education dummies provide a mixed view. Individuals 
with a low education are least likely to refuse to partake in the personal interview. This 
effect is both significant for individuals that did continue and did not continue their 
business idea. Compared with individuals with a vocational schooling, primary education 
reduces the probability of refusal when deciding to discontinue the business idea with 
.061 and .123 when deciding to continue the business idea. The lower educated are most 
likely to partake in the personal interview when they decide to continue their business 
idea. This might be attributable to the fact that lower educated perceive more value in 
cooperating in a personal interview. On the other hand, we can argue that individuals 
with a low education have a lower opportunity cost of time. 
Finally, we investigate the structural relationship between non-response and the 
probability of continuing or discontinuing business ideas. In order to investigate this 
important relationship, we consult the alternative specific constants in Table 6.6. The 
alternative specific constant provides information concerning the rest preference for an 
alternative in the choice set. The results show all very significant alternative specific 
constants reflecting the differential propensity to choose a specific alternative. The result 
127 show an interesting ordering in the preference of alternatives. Overall, the ordering shows 
that more individuals decide to continue than to discontinue their business idea. More 
interesting information can be extracted from the results when comparing response and 
non-response propensity between business idea continuers and business idea discontinu-
ers. Individuals that decide to discontinue their business idea are more likely to refuse to 
partake in the personal interview, In contrast, individuals that decide to continue their 
business idea are more likely to partake in the personal interview. This evidence suggests 
that there is a structural relationship between non-response and the variable of interest in 
this study, namely continuing business ideas. Individuals that do not continue their 
business idea have a higher chance of non-response. 
First, individuals are more likely to cooperate in a personal interview when they 
continued their business idea (/? = -.492). In contrast, individuals that decide to discon-
tinue their business idea are less likely to participate in a personal interview. These results 
together indicate that there is a structural relationship between continuing a business idea 
and non-response. Individuals that decide not to continue their business idea are more 
likely to refuse to cooperate in a personal interview. This structural relationship between 
non-response and the probability of continuing business ideas indicates that surveys 
samples are biased towards individuals that continued their business idea. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed the sources of non-response. Non-response is important be-
cause not accounting for non-response may produce biased estimates concerning the 
variable of interest, in our study the propensity of individuals to continue or discontinue 
their business idea. We have discovered that non-response in our sample is existent and 
important. We have found several sources of non-response. 
The first source of non-response is the possibility of attrition, due to death for 
example, from the database at the time of sampling. Our structural model estimates that 
1.9 percent of our population leaves our population because of attrition in a two year time 
period. The analysis shows that probability of discontinuance among the non-respondents 
is only slightly lower than the probability of discontinuance among the respondents. 
Furthermore, the results from the structural model show that a healthy individual has 38.5 
percent chance of non-response. This is clearly different from the empirical probability of 
non-response of 50.0 percent. 
The second source of non-response is a structural relationship between non-
response and business idea continuance. We tested for this possibility on a subset of our 
sample, namely the individuals that did respond to the telephone screening. During the 
telephone screening these respondents provided demographic information and informa-
tion concerning the status of their self-employment decision. Furthermore, we asked 
whether they would be willing to partake in a personal interview. We modeled the results 
of these questions as a sequential decision model. The results from this model showed a 
clear relationship between non-response and business idea continuance. Individuals that 
continued their business idea were more likely to partake in the personal interview, while 
individuals that abandoned their business idea less likely to partake in the personal 
interview. 
128 The third source of non-response is personal characteristics. Woman and indi-
viduals from self-employed parents are less likely to respond to request to partake in the 
personal interview, while low educated individuals are more likely to participate in the 
personal interview. Differences in response propensity and business idea continuance can 
indicate that individuals trade off the costs and benefits from participating in a personal 
interview. And lower educated were still more likely to participate in the personal inter-
view even when they did not continued their business idea. The opportunity cost of time 
of the less educated is lower. Individuals that did not continue their business idea are least 
likely to participate in the study. The benefits for participating are lowest for the non-
continuers. However, the negative relation between business discontinuance and non-
response can also be attributable to negative emotions associated with the abandonment 
of the business idea. The fact that non-respondents are different can be overcome by 
weighting techniques; however, the fact that non-response is casually related with the 
variable of interest, namely business continuance, can only be reduced by increased 
efforts of researchers in tracing the non-respondents. 
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30 
7A Introduction 
Most researchers acknowledge that starting up a business is costly. Capital must be raised 
to cover investments in buildings, machines, and office equipment. When a business 
performs below expectations, the owner may decide to quit the business and sell the 
remaining assets. However, many discarded assets are scrapped rather than sold (Asplund 
2000). Therefore, a business owner may accept a temporary loss and decide to remain 
self-employed and wait if business conditions turn favorable again to recoup partly sunk 
investment costs. To investigate the determinants and consequences of sunk costs for the 
creation and dissolution of businesses, this paper presents a model of self-employment 
entry and exit under uncertainty when a fraction of the set up costs is sunk. 
The literature offers several frameworks to study entry and exit behavior of firms, 
depending on the unit of analysis. At the industry level, entry and exit is often studied in 
an integrated equilibrium framework, where firm entry and exit is determined simultane-
ously depending on the industry distribution of entrepreneurial abilities (Jovanovic 1982), 
active reinvestments and learning (Pakes and Ericson 1998), the changes in industry 
prices, demand, or some other characteristics of the process for firm shocks (Hopenhayn 
1992). At the individual level, entry and exit decisions are seldom considered simultane-
ously because entry approaches differ from exit approaches. Entry is mainly modeled as a 
choice in an occupational choice framework, while exit is often perceived as a function of 
natural selection (Friedman 1953; Williamson 1991). One exception is Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper, and Woo (1997) who argue that the survival of a firm is not exclusively a 
function of economic performance, but may also depends on individual performance 
threshold levels of the entrepreneur. They claim that entrepreneurs may disentangle their 
economic viable firms if income from self-employment is below the alternative wage 
paid in the labor market. This exit choice is also found in our data where only 5 percent 
of the exits are forced exits in terms of bankruptcy. 
Models of entrepreneurial choice compare between self-employment and an alter-
native means of income such as paid labor (Borjars and Bronars 1989; Evans and 
Leighton 1989). These selection models ignore that starting up a business involves sunk 
costs. Asplund (2000) shows that 50-80 percent of the investments in metalworking 
machinery used in Swedish manufacturing industries are sunk. 
In recent models of investments under uncertainty, the presence of sunk costs in-
troduces an option value of waiting for new information and delaying irreversible deci-
sions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). These models combine the question of whether to invest 
(the "q" value) with when to invest (the option value). The option value of setting up a 
self-employed business is largely ignored in the theoretical and empirical self-
employment models. 
30 This chapter is based on the paper "Reluctance to exit self-employment when a fraction of the set up cost 
is sunk" by Kok and Pfenn (2006). 
131 We believe that the timing of the self-employment decisions is important to un-
derstand who becomes self-employed and what the founding characteristics of the firm 
are. The decision to defer self-employment might increase the opportunity costs of 
becoming self-employed, e.g. the wage earned in the labour market. Models of entrepre-
neurial choice argue that individuals enter self-employment only if the value obtained 
from self-employment exceeds wage earnings. Rather than using the net present value 
rule the existence of sunk costs dictates that an option value model is more appropriate to 
analyze the self-employment decision (see Pindyck, 1991). 
Our paper aims to extend the self-employment model by adding an option value to 
self-employment decisions when a fraction of the set up costs is sunk. In the resulting 
dynamic entrepreneurial choice model, the individual decides on the timing of entry and 
exit. It is instructive to integrate entry and exit decisions into one model, because the 
timing of the entry decision may reveal important information why starting up a business 
is delayed and how this information might influence exit behaviour. More specifically, 
we investigate the effects of uncertainty of future self-employment earnings streams, 
sunk costs, and previous wage levels on entry and exit thresholds. 
Dixit and Rob (1994) argue that exogenous shocks, like technological progress, 
preference change, and policy shifts affect individual productivity and earnings over time. 
The uncertainty of future earnings for entrepreneurs is idiosyncratic, because an external 
shock can change expectations on self-employment earnings for business owners with 
different skills, strategy or technology. We follow Dixit and Rob (1994) and Parker 
(1996; 1997) in modelling the stochastic evolution of future self-employment earnings as 
a stochastic process. 
We apply Dixifs (1989) general theory of entry and exit decisions under uncer-
tainty to produce sharp predictions on how timing and founding characteristics may make 
entrepreneurs reluctant to exit self-employment. We pursue the simple idea that while 
comparing future expected income streams from different labour market choices (such as 
employment or self-employment) people do not only weight the expected value of future 
income streams, but also consider the option values associated with the uncertainty of 
income streams and sunk costs. 
The theoretical model predicts that higher start up costs reduce the transition 
probability out of self-employment. In the empirical application, we measure heterogene-
ity in start up costs by investments in equipment, buildings, machineries, ICT etc. A 
second prediction derived from the model is that persons with steeper expected entrepre-
neurial income growth are more reluctant to exit self-employment. Productivity is meas-
•J i 
ured as a function of personal human capital . Further, the model predicts that idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty about idiosyncratic self-employment earnings is inversely related to the 
decision to leave self-employment. In the empirical application, we utilize the knowledge 
of sunk costs and the timing of the entry decision to proxy idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
Since idiosyncratic uncertainty of self-employment income streams should delay the 
entry decision, the theoretical model predicts that conditional on (observed and unob-
served) business owner heterogeneity, the ordering of entry times might reflect the 
underlying distribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
31 We follow Lazcar (2005) that entrepreneurs should be Jacks-of-all-trade, which implies that entrepre-
neurs must be able to perform multiple roles. 
132 Furthermore, the model predicts that the wage earned prior to entry increases the 
initial commitment in partially sunk capital investments. In the empirical application, we 
estimate the elasticity of previous earnings on capital investments at the time of entry. 
The structural relationship between prior wage levels and capital investment levels might 
explain the hitherto theoretically unexplained empirical Finding that high prior self-
employment entry wage levels reduce the probability of becoming self-employed (Amit 
et al. 1995; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989)
32. 
The predictions generated by our theoretical model are tested utilizing a sample of 
de novo entrepreneurs who entered self-employment between 1998 and 1999 in South 
Limburg, a part of a province of the Netherlands. The results from the econometric 
analysis confirm the theoretical predictions. Sunk costs and idiosyncratic uncertainty 
about self-employment earnings reduce the probability of exit. Jack-of-all-trade entrepre-
neurs have steeper self-employment earnings growth and are therefore more reluctant to 
exit self-employment. The estimated elasticity of previous income levels to initial capital 
investments is .29. The positive sign of this elasticity implies an indirect structural effect 
of previous income levels on self-employment entry and exit via an increase in initial 
partially sunk capital investment. 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 7.2 presents the entrepreneurial 
choice model and explains why entrepreneurs enter the market on a different scale. 
Section 7.3 applies the real option model to the entrepreneurs exit decision problem. 
Section 7.4 presents the econometric model and presents the data. In section 7.5 the 
estimation results are given. Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2 Why do entrepreneurs enter on a different scale? 
One of the predictions of Jovanovic (1982) learning model is that entrepreneurs enter the 
market at the same scale. The fact that entrepreneurs enter at the same scale is the result 
of the assumption that entrepreneurs have unknown entrepreneurial abilities before they 
enter the market. Since no entrepreneur has a priori more information about his success 
changes than another entrepreneur, Jovanovic model assumes that rational entrepreneurs 
should enter self-employment with a firm of equal size. His model does not account for 
the empirical regularity that firms enter the market with different scales. Figure 7.1 
presents the frequency distribution of the size ' (in log-form) of the firm at the time of 
entry of a sample of recently started first time entrepreneurs in the Netherlands in 1998 
and 1999. The observed distribution of capital investments in a newly created business 
among entrepreneurs raises the following question: why do entrepreneurs enter at a 
different scale and what account for these differences? 
32 It is noteworthy that Amit et al. (1995) suggest that future work should address the causality between 
income levels and the probability of entering self-employment. Our inclusion of partially sunk capital 
investments may provide the missing link between high income levels and low probability of entry. 
33 We proxy the size of the firm by capital investments. 
133 Figure 7.1: Distribution of initial capital investment in Firm (log-form) 
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Frank (1988) develops an intertemporal model of exit that account for different 
entry scales. He argues that individuals enter on a different scale because individuals 
have different expectations of success. Individuals that have higher expectations of 
success will enter on a large scale. As a consequence, these individuals with high expec-
tations will be more reluctant to exit from the market, because it takes a longer series of 
adverse signals from the market before these entrepreneurs with high expectations about 
their entrepreneurial ability will adjust their subjective beliefs to their true entrepreneurial 
abilities and exit from the market. Frank's model has intuitive appeal and has also the 
advantage over Jovanovic model that Frank assumes that a part of the entry costs are 
sunk. And before investing these sunk costs, Frank asserts, the firm must expect that 
these sunken expenditures are justified. A weakness in Frank's model is the source of 
these expectations of entrepreneurial ability before entry. He argues that the source of 
these expectations is optimism. More optimistic individuals start larger firms. However, 
Frank assumes that after entry, all entrepreneurs, optimistic or not, face the same un-
known distribution of entrepreneurial abilities and receive an unknown draw from the 
population distribution. Frank therefore seems to assume irrational behaviour of entrepre-
neurs because in his model there is no reason for optimism. 
A more tractable solution to this problem can be achieved by allowing for indi-
Td 
vidual entry thresholds within an entrepreneurial choice model . The mechanism of the 
entrepreneurial choice model is straightforward. Self-employment refers to an income 
generating mechanism that is different from employment in the labour market. Individu-
als choose the occupations with the highest expected payoff. 
Below, we will go through a simplified version of Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) occupa-
tional choice model, and discuss the consequences of assuming that a fraction of the set 
up costs are sunk (Frank, 1988; Asplund, 2000). 
I 
• See e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) for a recent application of the occupational choice framework to 
the self-employment decision. We will use their terminology. 
134 The income of an individual working in the labour market consists of his wage and the 
returns on his assets. Let his wage be a function of its earning ability in a wage job w,., 
assets Af., and the net rate of return r. Then the individuals income as a wage earner is 
wf + rAt. 
The income of the self-employed is more complex. The main difference between 
a wage earner and a self-employed is that the self-employed need to invest capital in 
order to earn income (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). For a self-employed entrepreneur, the 
income is a function of his gross entrepreneurial earnings and the returns on remaining 
assets after capital is invested in the firm. Let the individual's gross earnings as an 
entrepreneur be a function of his entrepreneurial ability the amount of capital invested 
kn and some random components, summarizing the good fortune of the entrepreneur. 
Then, the individual's income as an entrepreneur is Oi f(ki )s + r(Ai - ki;). 
Until now, we have discussed the differences in the income generating mecha-
nism. However, both incomes can be uncertain. Generally among researchers, it is 
•> c 
assumed that entrepreneurial income is more volatile than the income as a wage earner * 
because (1) the uncertain evolution of business conditions'"
6, and (2) the uncertainty of the  'Xi 
entrepreneurs ability or business idea . Most researchers summarize this information in 
the formulation of expected income streams. So that, the standard entrepreneurial choice 
models predict that an individual will opt for entrepreneurship if the expected utility is 
higher in the self-employment option, that is, if, 
(7.1) E{u[9tf{kt )e + r(A, - k,);Z, ]} > e{u[w, + rA, ];Z,} 
Where Z, is a vector of personal characteristics (e.g. marital status, children, 
education, social background). 
Then, what determines capital investments, /c, in the firm? If we follow Jovanovic 
(1982) assumption that 6i is not known prior entry, and can be only learned ex post, this 
question can be easily resolved. Note that we know the value of the right-hand side of 
equation (7.1). This is the value of the income of the previous job. Naturally, this value 
differs among individuals because of standard human capital arguments. Therefore, if 6i 
is unknown and equal among individuals, individuals can only raise their entrepreneurial 
earnings by raising their capital investments k, How much they have to raise their capital 
'' For simplicity, we will assume that the income as a wage earner can be known with certainty. 
3h This "objective" uncertainty rises because of productivity and price shocks. The parameters of the 
stochastic evolution are known to all entrepreneurs and possibly idiosyncratic (Dixit and Rob 1994). The 
specific path through this distribution is unknown and revealed only ex post. This uncertainty is often 
modeled as a stochastic process (see e.g. Dixit 1989; Dixit and Pindyck 1992 or Parker, 1996; 1997 for the 
application of this uncertainty to self-employment decisions), The presence of this type of uncertainty 
provides individuals an option to delay a decision and to wait for more information to arrive as time 
progresses. 
This "subjective uncertainty arises because entrepreneurs learn only about their true entrepreneurial 
ability after they have entered (Jovanovic 1982). Since this uncertainty can only be reduced after entry, this 
type of uncertainty does not provide an option to delay the investment, because there is no chance to obtain 
information about ones true entrepreneurial ability other than experiencing. Individuals only know the 
population average entrepreneurial ability. 
135 investment k to overcome the entry threshold, the right hand side of equation (7.1), 
depends on the income earned in the previous job. Since, the left hand side of equation 
(7.1) is increasing in k, we know that individuals with high previous income levels have 
to invest more capital k to raise their entrepreneurial income above the entry threshold 
level to make it profitable to become an entrepreneur and enter self-employment. 
Table 7.1 provides an OLS regression of the entry size of the firm to a set of re-
gressors including our parameter of interest: previous income levels
3*. The results show 
that controlling for available debt and equity capital, previous income level is a very 
strong predictor of initial commitment in capital investments. The elasticity of income to 
set up costs is .294. Thus a one percent increase in the level of income prior to entry 
implies a .294 percent increase in initial capital investments. Therefore, individuals from 
high income cohorts have to overcome more set up costs to raise their expected income 
level from self-employment high enough to induce entry. 
The question then is, what are the consequences for the exit behaviour of entre-
preneurs of the theoretical prediction (Frank 1988) and the empirical finding (Asplund 
2000) that at least a fraction of these initial commitments in set up costs are sunk? We 
will discuss the consequences of this assumption for the theory of exit in the next section. 
7.3 The entrepreneurs exit problem under heterogeneous irre-
versible set up costs 
From standard occupational choice models and equation (7.1) we know that an entrepre-
neur decides to exit self-employment if his income as an entrepreneur is lower than the 
income as a wage earner, 
(7.2) ƒ(£,> +~k,),Z$< E{u[w, + rA,];Z,} 
Note that equation (7.2) assumes that k can be sold at the same price that capital invest-
ments is bought. What are the consequences for this model of the assumption that a 
fraction of the set up costs is sunken? 
Hypothetically, if k includes a sunk cost component then the decision to exit self-
employment includes and option to abandon the investment (Dixit, 1989). The entrepre-
neur knows that by remaining in business it can avoid incurring sunk costs for re-entry 
should future developments turn favourable. Therefore, he is willing to incur some 
current loss to preserve this option. The optimal exit strategy of the entrepreneur depends 
on entrepreneur-specific profit thresholds levels, flc. 
18 See Appendix 7.7 for descriptive statistics for variables. 
136 Table 7.1: Explaining initial commitment in set up costs 
Log of Set I Jp Costs k 
Estimate Se 
Explanatory Variables 
Income (log) 0.294 [0.118]* 
Control Variables 
Debt capital {log) 0.127 [0.014]** 
Equity capital (lug) 0.105 [0.018]** 
Education (base = MBO) 
Ed = primary school -0.034 [0.451] 
Ed = LBO -0.213 [0.226] 
Ed = MAVO/ MAVO -0.208 [0.223] 
Ed = VWO -0.2'J 3 [0.400] 
Ed = HBO -0376 [0.191]* 
Ed = University -0.003 [0,274] 
Labour experience (months) 0.002 [0.001]* 
Unemployment experience (months) -0.005 [0.003] 
Married at time of entry -0.293 [0.193] 
Sel f-employed parents 0.17) [0J 43 J 
Self-employed parents-in-law 0.173 [0.167] 
Female -0.317 [0.212] 
Only owner -0.225 [0.175] 
Social Network Size 0.012 [0.028] 
Age 0.006 [0.010] 
Industry Sector (base = business services) 
personal service ind. health and culture 0.339 [0.232] 
manufacturing incl. utility -0.114 [0.301] 
hotels & restaurant sector 1.338 [0.577]* 
construction sector 0.144 [0-224] 
wholesale & retail sector 0.168 [0.206] 
Constant 5,383 [1-245]** 
Observations 334 
Model Specification Tests 
R-squared adjusted 0.30 
F(23,310) 7.31** 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
137 Dixit (1989) in general and Pfann in particular
39 (2001; 2006) show that these individual 
specific thresholds depend on the sunk fraction of set up costs qk, entrepreneurs specific 
profit uncertainty a0, and expected growth of idiosyncratic profits 6. Where q is the 
fraction of set up costs that is sunk, with 0 < q < 1
40. 
Entrepreneurs with low exit profit thresholds will be more reluctant to exit self-
employment and will have lower probabilities of exit and thus larger self-employment 
spells
41. We will investigate these predictions in detail below and will discuss their 
empirical proxies in the next section
42. 
Prediction 1. dUjdqk < 0 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 shows that sunk set up costs vary among entrepreneurs. 
An entrepreneur with high sunk set up costs is most reluctant to exit self-employment. 
This result compares to those of Dixit (1989) and Gimeno et al. (1997). Idiosyncratic 
sunk set up costs are path dependent. Income levels from previous jobs cause increased 
capital investments. Idiosyncratic set up costs are thus important for exit decisions. This 
is not the result of the sunk cost fallacy, but the consequences of rational decisions under 
uncertainty when fractions of the set up costs are sunk. 
Prediction 2. dTlJdO < 0 
The expected growth of idiosyncratic profits, 9, may vary across workers, and the 
entrepreneurs with the steepest profits growth will be most reluctant to exit self-
employment. Note that we relate the expected growth of idiosyncratic profits to idiosyn-
cratic entrepreneurial ability. This is a well-known result from Jovanovic (1982) learning 
model and Lucas (1978) general equilibrium model and is related to the fact that more 
able entrepreneurs with steeper growth rates are more likely to survive. 
Prediction 3. dH Jda0 < 0 
The idiosyncratic uncertainty of idiosyncratic profits, cr#, may vary across 
workers. The entrepreneur with the highest uncertainty will be the least likely to exit self-
employment because the chance of higher profits increases the firm's expected future 
returns. The most risky entrepreneur is thus also the most reluctant to exit self-
employment. This is an important result, because losses can be substantial before the 
entrepreneur is convinced to exit. 
In summary, the theory of entrepreneurial exit with heterogeneous set up costs and 
uncertainty extends the earlier entrepreneurial choice models that did not account for the 
sunk nature of set up costs. The idiosyncratic firm abandonment option value results from 
the irreversible character of the set up costs and the future uncertainty of each entrepre-
neur's profit. A new insight is that entrepreneurs with high firm abandonment option 
values are less likely to exit self-employment when business conditions turn unfavour-
" Dixifs work focuses on industry wide thresholds and macro uncertainty, like price volatility, whereas 
Pfann's contribution stems from identifying idiosyncratic thresholds from idiosyncratic uncertainty related 
to e.g. productivity. 
411 Asplund estimates that for the manufacturing industry, q may be as high as 0.8. 
41 Note that our model gives a rational explanation why underperforming firms remain (temporary) in 
business. If it rational for underperforming businesses to remain temporary in business, then the available 
capital to remain in business in worse times becomes important too. This argument is related to the liability 
of adolescence.  11 
We do not formally derive these thresholds but refer the interested reader to Pfann (2006). 
138 able. An entrepreneurial enterprise with a high option value will be more reluctant to exit 
self-employment. In the empirical application, we tiy to identify the existence of the firm 
abandonment option value by observing the timing of the exit decision of entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs with high option value are hypothesized to remain longer in business. 
7A The econometric model and the data 
Pfann (2006) shows that the non-linearity of the thresholds in qk, 6, and af} makes it 
cumbersome to analyze every worker's option values n , . He suggests using linearized 
decision rules instead, and express ritI in linear form as follows 
(3) n^^A^a.+ZJ + obrlor 
cqk a 6 da0 
(-) (") W 
nt, =//f.M + o(<) 
with o(wf) being a zero mean error term with standardized unit variance. Equation (3) 
implies that given that the self-employment spell has lasted until a particular time /, the 
probability that someone leaves self-employment in a short interval of time is a function 
of characteristics qkt <9, and a0 that may vary through time but are fixed over a short 
interval. We assumed that the process of thinking about the uncertainty of future income 
streams is a continuous time diffusion process. But the outcomes of it, as observed in the 
data are events. The useful parametric function to characterize this aspect of the distribu-
tion of observed spells out of self-employment is that of the hazard rate A(t), with the 
duration t being the time of an entrepreneur being self-employed, and accordingly the 
econometric analysis will be based on duration models. 
The theory's hypotheses are tested on a dataset consisting of 421 individuals. This 
sample is part of the South Limburg dataset which contains information about 1223 
individuals that either registered a business in South Limburg in 1998 or 1999 or regis-
tered at the "Starterscentrum South Limburg" in 1998 or 1999 . This database is 
matched with a database obtained from the Chamber of Commerce to obtain the current 
status of the business in May 2004. 987 individuals registered as starter. 805 subscribed 
in 1998 or 1999, the time frame of our study. The total population of subscriptions in 
1998 or 1999 is 5822. Our sample-consists of 13.8 % of the total population of entrants 
that did subscribe at the Chamber of Commerce. From the sample of 803, we excluded 
184 individuals that had been self-employed before; 61 individuals that had zero set up 
costs and 8 missing set up costs; 129 individuals that were not pioneering founders but 
took over a business; and 22 individuals that did not provide information about equity or 
debt capital. We end up with a net sample of 421 individuals. 
I •> 
The Starterscentrum is a foundation sponsored by the chamber of commerce and other local authorities to 
encourage successful self-em ploy ment by providing training and advice. 
139 Figure 7.2a-7.2c sketches the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier exit hazard for the 
different samples and the population. Figure 7.2a sketches the exit hazards for our net 
sample of 421 entrepreneurs and Figure 7.2b the exit hazards for all 803 entrepreneurs in 
the sample. The non-parametric hazards for both samples are almost identical. The 
overall picture in Figure 7.2a & 7.2b shows a hump-shaped course of the exit hazard, 
indicating that the chance of leaving self-employment is age dependent (duration depend-
ence). This shape of the exit hazard is consistent with Jovanovic (1982) and Frank (1988) 
learning approach and has been empirically validated by numerous empirical studies (e.g. 
Mata and Portugal 1994) and is also consistent within our framework. The probability of 
exit is initially low, peaks after four years, and then decreases. 
Figure 7.2c sketches the non-parametric hazard for the whole population. The exit 
hazard for the whole population is highest in the first two years, as is consistent with the 
findings of Mata and Portugal (1994). The difference in Figure 7.2a and 7.2c point 
toward a non-response bias for the more exit prone entrepreneurs, Our final sample is 
thus biased towards more (successful) long-living businesses. Predicted mean and median 
survival times are therefore not representative for the entire population. 
Figure 7.2(a): Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier exit hazard (N=421) 
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140 Figure 7.2(b):Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier exit hazard (N=803) 
in days 
Figure 7.2(c): Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier exit hazard (N=5822) 
days 
Furthermore, the dataset provides some information on the reasons for exiting in 
the population and in the sample. Table 7.2 provides the distribution of deregistration 
reasons in the population and in our net sample as provided by the Chamber of Com-
merce. The most common reason is the general deregistration (73.51% for the population 
and 81.03% in the sample). The second most common reason is due to deregistration by 
virtue of the Chamber of Commerce. If the Chamber suspects that the business is inactive 
it has the authority to deregister the business. Deregistration due to bankruptcy is not so 
common (4.67% in population and 5.17% in sample). The low probability of forced exits 
141 substantiate our belief that exit can be modelled as a choice. The non-parametric hazard 
differences between the population and the sample result in significant different discon-
tinuance rates. The discontinuance rate in the population is 25% points higher than in the 
sample (39% versus 15% respectively). For our empirical analysis, we assume that all 
reasons for exiting are due to shifting values between the two different states (self-
employment and employment). The only possible problematic cases like bankruptcy and 
economic transfer account only for 8.5% of the exits in the sample. Excluding these two 
exit options did not significantly alter our results. 
Table 7.2: Deregistration reasons for exit 
Reason  Code  # of individuals 
Population 
(N-5822) 
%  Net Sample 
(N-421) 
% 
Deregistration due to rectification  21  10  0.45 
Deregistration by virtue of the Chamber of 
Commerce 
24  260  11.58  5  8.62 
Deregistration due to change in legal form or 
economic activity 
25  3  0.13 
Deregistration due to discontinuance 
(general) 
27  1651  73.51  47  81.03 
Deregistration due to discontinuance by 
bankruptcy 
28  105  4.67  j  5.17 
Delayed deregistration (activity discontinued 
more than one year) 
29  128  5.70  1  1.72 
Unknown  31  7  0.31 
Deregistration due to economic transfer  32  74  3.29  2  3.45 
Unknown  91  8  0.36 
Total  2246  58 
Discontinuance rate by May 2004  38.58%  13.78% 
In our analysis we estimate the time it takes before exiting self-employment. Thus 
a respondent comes at risk at the time of entry into self-employment. Figure 7.2a shows 
that the self-employment hazard rate is hump-shaped. This can be modelled with the 
flexible parametric log-logistic distribution
44. The hazard rate based on the log-logistic 
distribution of duration with covariates yields 










with y > 0, and y/ = exp(- //, M) 
44 The choice for this specification was confirmed by testing several other distributions, like Generalized 
Gamma, Weibull, Exponential, and Lognormal. Inspection of AIC values left the Log-Logistic model as the 
optimal choice. 
142 If the shape parameter y < 1 then the hazard rate function is hump-shaped. If y > 1, the 
hazard rate is monotonically decreasing with /. We also test for unobserved heterogeneity 
adding to equation (7.4) some unobserved individual-specific effect a • 
(7.5) A(f | y/.aj)-afX(t \ y/) 
where a, follows the Gamma distribution with mean one and variance 0 (Cleves et al 
i/ 
2004: 279) 
/ X ay-'expiajff) 
™ ' rd/X»' 
7.4.1 Testing the predictions: Sunk set up costs, uncertainty, and 
productivity 
The theoretical model predicts a relationship between on the one hand the reluc-
tance or waiting time to leave self-employment, and on the other hand theoretical con-
structs such as human capital that may raise self-employment productivity, predetermined 
at the time of entering self-employment through formal education, or developed through 
labour market experience or learned from (self-employed) parents or social contacts; the 
(sunk) set-up costs, and the role of uncertainty on the expected evolvement of self-
employment income stream. In the section following the theoretical model we provide 
empirical concepts to actually measure these constructs. 
Set up (sunk) costs (k) : The sum of the investments in computers and software, office 
furniture and equipment, representation goods, education and training, machines, trans-
port equipment and buildings. Several authors have proposed that high capital investment 
is associated with more capital at risk of becoming sunk and capital investment has been 
used as a proxy for sunk costs (Campa 1993; Episcopos 1995; Lambson and Jensen 1998; 
O'Brien et al. 2003) This is further substantiated by the finding that a substantial fraction 
of investments in machinery is sunk (Asplund, 2000). 
Uncertainty (<r0): we use the ordering of entry times conditional on observed and unob-
served heterogeneity as a proxy of the underlying distribution of idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty. Under steady state assumptions, two seemingly identical (in terms of unobserved 
and observed characteristics
46) individuals may only enter at different dates if their 
idiosyncratic uncertainty differs. Later entry times are associated with higher levels of 
expected idiosyncratic uncertainty. We acknowledge that utilizing the ordering of entry 
times as a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty is rather unconventional; however, the 
45 We assume q>0 and equal among individuals. 
4fi We have very rich and detailed information about the entrepreneurs in terms of human capital, labour 
market history, social background, sex, social status, marital status, children, and social network size and 
composition to account for entrepreneur heterogeneity. Including these control variables did not change the 
cffect of our uncertainty proxy. 
143 proxy is derived from the theory. Furthermore, other researchers have empirically related 




48: Measurements of human capital are considered good proxies for the 
expected idiosyncratic growth of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial income. We follow Mar-
shall (1890), Penrose (1959), and Lazear (2005) that entrepreneurs should be jack-of-all-
srades. The steepest entrepreneurial income streams are expected from individuals that 
followed vocational schooling. In the Netherlands MBO and HBO offers the broadest 
curriculum and therefore we assume that this curriculum is most inline with the jack-of-
all-trades hypothesis
49. We expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between the level of 
schooling and idiosyncratic productivity and income growth. 
We include the following relevant control variables. (1) Debt capital: The amount 
of debt capital at the start of company. (2) Equity capital: The amount of equity capital at 
start of company. (3) Foreign: A dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur has the 
Dutch nationality or some other nationality. (4) Age over 50: A dummy indicating 
whether the entrepreneur was older than 50 at the time he or she entered self-
employment. Individuals in the Netherlands can legally retire around 55. 
Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variable  N  Mean 
. ".-jm -
 1 ——^——' 
Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Age  421  39.501  8.411  23  62 
Set Up Cost k  421  9.729  1.547  4.394  14.635 
Ed = primary school  421  .031  .173  0  1 
Ed = LBO  421  .164  ,371  0  1 
Ed = MAVO/ HAVO  421  .162  .368  0  1 
Ed - VWO  421  .031  .173  0  1 
Ed = MBO  421  .249  .433  0  1 
Ed = HBO  421  .276  .447  0  1 
Ed = University  421  .088  .283  0  1 
Equity Capital  421  37921  93376  0  1000000 
Debt Capital  421  29969  95067  0  1000000 
Foreign  421  .057  «332!  0  1 
Age > 50  421  .109  .312  0  1 
47 Admittedly, these researchers have used direct proxies of uncertainty to predict the timing of the 
investment decision. 
48 We also experimented with other sources of human capital, especially with size and composition of the 
entrepreneur's social network. These constructs turned out to be insignificant in our analysis and are 
therefore excluded. 
4y We acknowledge that Lazear's measurement for jack-of-all-trades is more specific but we justify our 
assumption on the broadness of the curriculum of vocational schooling. 
144 Table 7.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean age, at which 
entrepreneurs start a new business for the first time in their life, is between 39 and 40 and 
10.9% of the starting entrepreneurs are over 50. Most entrepreneurs had vocational 
schooling (MBO and HBO in the Netherlands). Mean set up costs of the business are 
Euro 16798. Mean equity capital at entry is Euro 37921 and debt capital Euro 29969. 
5.7% of the starting entrepreneurs have a foreign nationality. 
7.5 Estimation results 
Table 7.4 shows the results of the duration analysis. Model (1) and model (2) refer to the 
log-logistic duration model without unobserved heterogeneity and with unobserved 
heterogeneity. The likelihood ratio test indicates the presence of unobserved heterogene-
ity. For the discussion of the hypotheses we will refer to model (2). 
The uncertainty proxy, sunk costs, and the productivity proxy increase the spell 
length of self-employment in both models. These findings support our thesis that the sunk 
nature of the self-employment decision creates option values. More specific, entrepre-
neurs, who expect more uncertain income distributions, and therefore wait one more year 
before they enter self-employment, have subsequent 1.7 percent (exp(.017)=1.017) longer 
self-employment spells. This finding implies that the idiosyncratic uncertainty of self-
employment income streams increases the option value to abandon the firm and to exit 
self-employment. Note that this finding asserts that the timing of the entry and exit 
decisions is related. Individuals that have to overcome sunk set up costs and expect 
uncertain self-employment income streams wait longer to collect more information 
before they enter self-employment. At the same time, this uncertainty makes entrepre-
neurs more reluctant to exit self-employment once they have entered. This result is 
consistent with Dixit (1989) finding that uncertainty increases both entry and exit thresh-
olds. 
Since we use the logarithmic transformation of set-up costs, the associated coeffi-
cient of set up costs k can be interpreted as a constant elasticity, and, accordingly, a one 
percent change in the set-up costs implies, approximately, a 0.142 percent increase in the 
spell length of self-employment. The time ratio for set up costs k is exp(0.142)=1.152, 
which implies that waiting time is 1.152 times higher for an individual with 1 percent 
more set-up costs. The sunk cost component of set up costs creates an incentive for the 
entrepreneur to wait to exit and see if business conditions turn favorable again. Finally, 
our productivity proxy shows that vocational schooling (MBO & HBO) increases self-
employment spell length. Our finding indicates that individuals with vocational schooling 
have steeper income growth in entrepreneurship. Steeper income growth increases the 
option value to abandon their firm and reduces the probability of exit and increases self-
employment spell length. 
145 Table 7.4: Estimates of log-logistic duration model of waiting time out of self-
employment 
Model(l)  Model(2) 
Waiting Time  Waiting Time 
Model Parameters  Estimate  Se  Estimate  Se 
Uncertainty a  0.021  [0.009]*  0.017  [0.009]* 
Set up costs k  0.108  [0.041]**  0.142  [0.045]** 
Productivity 0 (MBO = base) 
Ed ~ primary school  5.260  [569.968]  4.919  [2,692.902] 
Ed - LBO  -0.360  [0.200]+  -0.389  [0.209]+ 
Ed = MAVO/ HAVO  -0.521  [0.192]**  -0.412  [0.187]* 
Ed = VWO  5.433  [518.145]  5.127  [2,445.376] 
Ed - HBO  -0.264  [0.182]  -0.229  [0.167] 
Ed = University  -0.615  [0.217]**  -0.692  [0.211]** 
Control Variables 










Foreign  -0.730  [0.185]**  -0.777  [0.202]** 
Age > 50 at entry  -0.513  [0.236]*  -0.384  [0.237] 
Constant  6.921  [0.503]**  6.392  [0.550]** 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
In {e)  1.239  [.726]+ 
Likelihood-Ratio test 9 = 0  4.68* 
Shape Parameter: 
y  0.370  [0.044]  0.271  [.055] 
Model specification Test: 
Likelihood-Ratio test 
Chi2(12)  48.66**  47.19** 
Observations  421  421 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
146 The results of the control variables show that the financing of the firm, either through 
debt or equity capital, may have an effect on the spell of self-employment. An increase in 
debt capital or equity capital reduces the spell of self-employment; however these results 
are only marginally significant for equity capital and not significant for debt capital
50. 
These results substantiate our finding that it is not the amount of capital available that 
influences small business longevity, but the sunkness of the set-up costs. The results in 
Table 7.4 also indicate that foreign entrepreneurs have lower survival chances than native 
entrepreneurs. 
The estimated y shows that the baseline hazard of exiting self-employment is 
hump-shaped. This shape is consistent with the passive learning model (Jovanovic, 
1982). It takes time for individuals to learn about their true entrepreneurial ability and to 
learn about the true stochastic process driving the uncertainty in their business environ-
ment. Figure 7.3 plots the predicted baseline exit hazard for the sample. During the first 
two years the exit hazard is very low, after that period it shows a long period of rising exit 
hazard. Several reasons might explain this exceptionally long period of rising exit haz-
ards. First, the rising hazards might reflect the rather unexpected long economic down-
turn starting late 2001 in the European Union. Second, the long learning period might be 
the result of the non-response bias in our sample. Our sample might be disproportionately 
supplied by high commitment entrepreneurs as is reflected in the relatively low overall 
exit rate in our sample. And Frank (1988) shows that it takes more time to alter the initial 
beliefs of highly committed entrepreneurs. 
Figure 7.3: Baseline exit hazard in months (N=421) 
Log-logistic regression 
50 A logarithmic transformation of these variables reduced the likelihood of the models. 
147 7.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we designed a theoretical model to explain the reluctance of entrepreneurs to 
exit self-employment in the presence of sunk costs and an uncertain evolution of self-
employment income. The model includes three important characteristics of that decision. 
First, initial commitments in partially sunk set up costs are important and irreversible. 
Second, the stochastic development of future self-employment earnings must be dealt 
with in the evaluation of value streams from different income streams. The expected 
growth of idiosyncratic self-employment earnings makes entrepreneurs more reluctant to 
exit self-employment even when their income is below labour market pay. Third, idio-
syncratic uncertainty of idiosyncratic earnings acts as a disciplinary devise for the deci-
sion making process. The option values of postponing entry and exit decisions can 
account for the reluctance of individuals to become self-employed and the reluctance of 
entrepreneurs to leave self-employment. The empirical contents of the model have been 
tested and confirmed with a parametric duration analysis of small business longevity for a 
group of 421 individuals over the critical first six years of the life of their first and newly 
established enterprise. 
We have shown that the theoretical model allows for more flexibility regarding 
the interpretation of empirical results than the traditional static decision framework that is 
based on net present value comparison of different types of employment choices. Our 
dynamic framework shows that entry and exit decisions are related and that the timing of 
the entry decision might reveal important information about small business longevity. 
Static models assume costless switching. We have shown not only that switching em-
ployment options is costly and that sunk switching costs make entrepreneurs reluctant to 
exit, but we also show that initial commitments in sunk set up cost are endogenous to 
previous income levels. High income individuals that become self-employed must 
commit more set up costs to make entry profitable. This initial commitment in sunk set 
up costs makes entrepreneurs reluctant to exit. Ignoring sunk switching costs, like set up 
costs, in empirical applications might seriously bias estimates correlated with earnings. 
Although we do not formally investigate the option value associated with the 
entry decision, its implications are obvious and provide some evidence for the hitherto 
unexplained result in the self-employment literature that high income individuals are less 
likely to become self-employed. High income individuals have to invest more sunk 
capital to raise entrepreneurial earnings above entry thresholds. However, since future 
earnings are uncertain, they have an option value to wait. Therefore, high income indi-
viduals will be more reluctant to enter self-employment than low income individuals. 
Further research should develop on this theme. 
148 7,7 Appendix 
Table 7.5: Summary statistics 
Mean 
Explanatory Variables 
Capita] Investment (log) 9.838 
Debt capital {log) 3.265 
Equity capital (log) 8.110 
Income (log - yearly) 10.833 
Ed = primary school .027 
Ed = LBO .156 
Ed = MAVG/ HAVO .150 
Ed = VWO ,033 
Ed = MBO .257 
Ed = HBO .287 
Ed = University .090 
Labour experience (months) 121.635 
Unemployment experience 4.563 
(months) 
Married at time of entry ,808 
Self-employed parents .359 
Self-employed parents-in-law .228 
Female .192 
Only owner .793 
Business Services .467 
personal service incl. health and .141 
culture 
manufacturing inch utility .060 
hotels & restaurant sector .015 
construction sector .141 
wholesale & retail sector .159 
Social Network Size 4.596 
Age 40.117 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
1.471 4.394 14.635 
5.014 0 13.816 
3.854 0 13.816 
.735 6.100 12.612 
.162 0 1 
.363 0 I 
.357 0 I 
.179 0 1 
.438 0 1 
.453 0 1 
.286 0 I 
109.564 0 479 
20.091 0 231 
.394 0 1 
.481 0 1 
.420 0 1 
.394 0 I 
.405 0 1 
.500 0 I 
.348 0 1 
.238 0 I 
.122 0 1 
.348 0 1 
.366 0 1 
2.449 0 10 
8.483 23 62 
149 Table 7.6: Co relation Mitm: 
1  A4  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  Capital Invesbtieiit (log) 
2  Debt capital (kg)  .41 
3  Equity capital (leg)  .23  -.17 
4  Income (log - ysarly)  .18  -.04  .08 
5  Ed=pdntaiy sclool  .04  .06  -.05  -.05 
6  Ed = LEO  -.03  .03  -.09  -.12  -.07 
7  Ed - MAVCtf HAVO  -.04  -.03  -.05  -.12  -.07  -.IS 
8  Ed « VVvD  .02  .05  JQ4  -.02  -.03  -.08  -.08 
9  Ed = MBO  .06  .02  .00  -.08  -.10  -.25  -.25  -.11 
10  Ed=HBO  -.07  -.07  .08  .19  -.11  -.27  -.27  -.11  -.37 
11  Ed = Unirersity  .07  .01  .01  .16  -.05  -.13  -.13  -.06  -.19  -.20 
12  Labour experience  .13  -.03  .01  .19  .19  .12  .02  -.03  -.09  -.11 
13  LTnemployment experience  -.10  -.10  .02  -.10  -.04  .07  .05  -.02  04  -.07 
14  IVfeniedattime of entry  -.05  -.01  -.05  .18  .03  .08  -.03  .05  -.01  -.03 
15  Self-emjlcyed parents  .09  .08  -.02  -.06  -.01  .02  .04  .00  -.04  .03 
16  Self-en\jic5?ed parents-in-law  .05  -.04  .10  .03  .09  .00  .07  .06  -.04  -.06 
17  Female  -.14  .01  -.02  -.44  .01  .02  .12  -.00  -.04  -.04 
18  Gnlyowxter  -.15  -.16  -.04  -.04  .04  .02  .01  -.03  03  -.02 
19  Business Services  -.09  -.09  -.08  .23  -.08  -.34  -.09  .03  -.03  .16 
3D  personal service  -.07  -.08  .01  -.27  -.07  -.01  .14  -.07  -.00  .03 
21  manufacturing mcl utility  .03  .07  .07  .01  -.04  .07  -.04  -.05  J02  .01 
22  hotels & restaurant sector  .17  .16  .01  .00  -.02  .02  .02  -.02  -.02  .03 
23  construction sector  .04  -.01  .04  .00  .04  .28  -.00  -.03  04  -.20 
V/itolesale & letail sector  .08  .13  .04  -.CP  .13  .02  .00  .10  01  -.08 
25  Social Net work Size  .06  .04  .07  .04  -.04  -.02  -.03  -.05  .12 
26  Age  .05  -.13  .03  .35  -.02  -.04  -.00  .03  -.06  .03 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  IS  19  X  21 
.04 
-JQ6  -fli 
-06  .20  -W 
-06  16  -.05  -.03 
-02  .06  m  .16  .07 
-JOS  -OS  -.01  .12  .03  .04 
-J05  .05  -.00  .05  -.02  .01  .04 
.23  .05  .01  -.02  -.09  .02  -.17  .02 
-.13  -.15  .01  -.07  .02  -.01  .39  .12  -.38 
-04  .01  -.05  .03  .07  -.02  -.06  -.06  -.24  -.10 
-04  -.10  -.03  -.07  .06  -.07  .00  -.06  -.12  -.05  -03 
-.10  .09  -.03  .09  .06  .05  -.13  .06  -.33  -.16  -.10 
-05  .04  .06  .00  -.02  -.02  .04  -.14  -.41  -.13  -.11 
.07  -09  -.02  -.02  .05  .04  .06  -.15  00  -.01  .05 
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151 Chapter 8 
A discrete choice model for produc-
tive social relations 




This paper investigates investment behavior in productive social relations of starting 
entrepreneurs. Social relations may turn into productive social capital. Social relations 
may add to profitability by economizing on transaction costs, minimizing search costs, 
enforcing contracts, stimulating trade, and providing timely access to valuable and 
reliable information. Entrepreneurs who face higher returns on investments in social 
relations may therefore be more successful entrepreneurs. The accomplishment of social 
relations is a rational choice. In this paper, we analyze the choice of the number of 
productive relations in a profit maximizing framework under uncertainty. The main 
objective of this paper is to show that profitability of productive social relations depends 
on the productivity of social relations within an industry and idiosyncratic accomplish-
ment costs. 
Theory predicts that relation-specific investments influence productivity. Informa-
tion conveyed in social relations reduces the uncertainty about competitor and supplier 
prices in imperfect markets (Stigler 1961). Investments which are specific to a certain 
relationship may create trust and economize on transaction costs and may lead to a 
concentration of trade between identified partners (Ben-Porath 1980). And social rela-
tions provide information that reduces search costs when markets show frictions (Kranton 
1996). 
Recently, empirical studies started to investigate the connection between social re-
lations and firm performance including social networks into the production function of 
firms. Barr (2000) predicts that social networks affect firm productivity indirectly 
through knowledge flows between firms. Fafchamp and Minten (2002) argue that social 
networks may help overcome or exploit market imperfections and therefore raise profit-
ability. Profitability is increased either directly through price discrimination or indirectly 
through an increase in the productivity of factor inputs. Both studies find strong evidence 
for a positive relationship between social networks and firm productivity. Empirically, 
these studies test for the determinants of social networks. However, their interest is in 
finding instruments for social capital and not in the formation per se. 
Although theoretical and empirical research validates the incentive to invest in 
productive social relations, they do not explain the differences in the total amount in-
vested by different persons. Figure 8.1 gives the frequency distribution of the number of 
productive social relations maintained by recently started entrepreneurs in a province of 
the Netherlands. The observed distribution of productive social relations among entrepre-
neurs raises the following questions: why do investments in productive social relations 
differ between persons and what accounts for these differences? 
51 This chapter is based on the paper "A discrete choice model for productive social relations" by Kok and 
Pfann (2006) and published in IAMB Conference Proceedings 2006 and submitted. 
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The model presented in this paper explicitly accounts for the accomplishment of produc-
tive social relations. Glaeser (2001) and Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) analyze 
the formation of social capital, as measured by club membership, using a model of 
optimal individual investment decisions. These studies show that the formation of social 
capital is based on rational individual investment decisions. The results are consistent 
with the predictions of a standard model for investment decisions under uncertainty. 
We model the demand for productive social relations as an outcome of profit 
maximizing behavior under uncertainty. Social relations are considered productive inputs 
in the production process of firms. The productivity of a relation may vary across indus-
tries because of differences in the production processes between industries. Relations 
may also be more productive when markets are not perfectly competitive. Such markets 
are often characterized by search and transaction costs. The optimization of complex 
production processes may demand more information than simpler ones, and trust and 
information may reduce transaction and search costs in heterogeneous inputs and outputs 
markets more than in their homogenous counterparts. For example, a car manufacturer's 
trust in his custom-made car parts supplier may reduce contract complexity and transac-
tion costs beyond the level a baker's corn supplier can. Therefore, seemingly identical 
social relations may differ in productivity to the extent that they are able to overcome 
market imperfections and optimize the production process of firms within an industry. In 
our model the costs of accomplishing social relations are heterogeneous. Equilibrium 
demand is identified in the market for productive relations where marginal returns of 
accomplishing relations equal marginal costs. 
The model's predictions are tested using a dataset of potential entrepreneurs in the 
South of Limburg, a part of a province in the Netherlands. The econometric analysis 
shows that young, native, highly educated entrepreneurs in large cities, with self-
employed parents, have lower cost of forming productive social relations. The ordering of 
profits shows decreasing returns to scale for social relations. On average, entrepreneurs 
obtain full information at 4 to 5 social relations. We conclude that the equilibrium de-
154 mand for productive social relations can be derived from the demand conditions emerg-
ing from industry structure and the supply conditions emanating from entrepreneurs' 
heterogeneity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2 sets out the basic theory of optimal 
investments in productive social relations. We apply a simple investment model to show 
differences between returns and costs of investments in social relations. The model 
determines how the extent of productive social relations depends on the market structure 
and idiosyncratic cost curves. Section 8.3 introduces the econometric demand model. 
Section 8.4 summarizes the information available in the data and section 8.5 presents the 
results of the econometric analysis. Section 8.6 concludes. 
8.2 Investing In productive social relations 
The model views investments in productive social relations as a cost-benefit decision that 
takes into account the expected returns of the investments and the cost of the investments 
(Becker 1964). Investing in social capital is like investing in human capital. Individuals 
increase their productivity by learning from others and cooperating with others. And 
some may benefit more from their social network than others. Presumably, productivity 
can be improved only at a cost, for otherwise there would be an unlimited demand for 
productive social contacts. Included in the cost are the time and effort for accomplishing 
social relations. These costs may differ for individuals. In our model, differences in 
incentives and costs drive the process of investing in other people. 
Figure 8.2: Within industry equilibrium levels of investments in productive social 
contacts 
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155 Figure 8.2 shows the supply and demand curves for investments in productive so-
cial relations. Along the horizontal axis, the amount invested in social relations is meas-
ured by its (implicit) accomplishment costs. The curve D shows the marginal benefit (MR 
in Figure 8.2), for simplicity measured by the rate of return, to an entrepreneur in a 
particular industry on each additional Euro of investment. D represents the demand curve 
for productive social relations. The curve S shows the marginal cost of accomplishing a 
relation ~ (MC in Figure 8.2). Marginal cost curves differences are reflected in SL and 
SH in Figure 8.2, representing low and high marginal cost respectively. If D exceeds S, 
the marginal rate of return would exceed the marginal cost, and the entrepreneur's profits 
would be increased by additional investment, and vice versa. Consequently, equilibrium 
is achieved in the point where D = 5, and is given by p , 
8.2.1 Demand curves 
Economists stress that the incentive to expand physical and human resources depends on 
the rate of expected return. Only recently, economic logic expanded to social resources 
(Burt 1992; Glaeser 2001; Glaeser et al. 2002). In our model, the decision to invest in 
social resources is a systematic response to the rate of return expected. The demand curve 
D in Figure 8.2 represents the incentive to invest. However, the incentive to invest is not 
similar among persons. We ignore "standard" investment incentives like the number of 
periods and the discount rate, but focus on the influence of the market structure on the 
c ^ 
incentive to invest in other people *. Investments in social relations would be discouraged 
if the market would be nearly perfect; thus the incentive to cooperate and to invest time 
and effort in other people increases as the level of market imperfection increases. In 
short, the more concentrated the market, the more productive social relations may be 
(Fafchamps and Minten 2002), 
Although market imperfections are a necessary condition for the productivity of 
social relations, they are not sufficient. The incentive to invest, the rate of expected 
return, depends on the market structure, the quality of the relationship, and the ability and 
skills of the investor to benefit from the relation. In perfectly competitive markets, all 
goods are traded in a market at publicly known prices and agents act as price takers (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). This assumption requires that the characteristics of all goods be 
observable to all participants in the market. Asymmetric information about heterogeneous 
in and outputs and their transformation process lead to market failure. Market imperfec-
tions lead to transaction costs to reduce uncertainty and moral hazard and they lead to 
search costs to find information about the production process and optimal prices. More 
condensed markets provide more opportunities for social relations to become productive. 
Social relations become productive if they provide information or trust that reduce 
transaction and search costs in imperfect markets (Fafchamps and Minten 2002). Entre-
preneurs benefit more from high quality relationships that provide better and more trusted 
52 We observe discreteness in social relations, but we assume an underlying continuous process of invest-
ments. 
53 In Glaeser et al/s (2002) investment model the incentive to invest depends on the structure of the 
occupation. More sociable occupations have higher expected returns. 
156 information. Ultimately, the (social) skills and ability of the entrepreneur determine the 
extent to which the value of the relationship is extracted
54, 
ft 
The demand curve in Figure 8.2 depends only on the structure of the market . 
The incentive to invest may differ across industries to the extent that social relations can 
capitalize on market failures. The probability that social contacts provide overlapping 
information increases as a business owner's social network grows (Burt 1992). Because 
overlapping information causes information redundancy, we expect negatively inclined 
demand curves. 
8.2.2 Supply curves 
The supply curves in Figure 8.2 show the accomplishment costs. The marginal cost of 
accomplishing (trading) partners is of central importance in understanding investments in 
productive social relations. With equal opportunity of finding equally valuable partners, 
the market for social relations would be perfect, and marginal cost of finding partners 
would be the same for entrepreneurs across all industries. In the real world, the market for 
productive social relations is segmented: spatial distance, status, centrality, club member-
ship, private resources, talents, abilities and family ties create unequal opportunities as 
well as different marginal cost of accomplishing productive social relations. All factors 
may affect the probability of accomplishing productive social relations. The cheapest 
sources for finding productive social relations are a business owner's family, friends and 
relatives. However, when this source is exhausted, more expensive sources, like clubs 
and trade organizations must be drawn on. This process is even more complicated, 
because rational actors will only invest in relations that are Pareto optimal in the sense 
that the relation must benefit both. Idiosyncratic characteristics create substantial differ-
ences in idiosyncratic marginal cost curves. These idiosyncratic curves contribute to 
differences in the equilibrium price for productive social relations. 
8.2.3 Equilibrium 
If we assume rationality of the decision-makers and a sufficiently large discount rate on 
investments in social relations (Burt 2002)
56, then an entrepreneur's optimal decision is to 
maximize profits by setting the marginal cost of investments in social relations equal to 
54 Gleaser et al. (2002: 438) stress this aspect when they define "individual social capital as a person's 
social characteristics - including his social skills, charisma, and the size of his Rolodex - which enables 
him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with others". 
55 For example, assume an imperfect market with transaction costs because suppliers are uncertain if 
contracts will be enforced. If a supplier trusts an entrepreneur, he can save on transaction costs and provide 
the goods at a lower price to the business owner. The maximum amount that can be saved is the total 
amount of transaction costs, which is determined by the market. If the market would change from imperfect 
to perfect where contracts are always enforced, then transaction costs would go to zero and the trust 
provided by the social relation would stop adding to productivity. 
56 If social relations do not have a large discount rate, then the optimal decision is to select an accumulation 
pattern that maximizes the net present value of profits. However, Burt (2002) finds extremely high decay 
rates of relations within a year. 
157 the marginal (rate of) return of these investments. In this simple investment model, 
differences in either demand or supply conditions lead to differences in social relations 
equilibrium demand. Entrepreneurs with either higher demand curves or lower supply 
curves will invest more than their colleagues with unfavorable conditions. 
Within an industry, investments and returns may differ only because of idiosyn-
cratic differences. These properties make investments in social relations comparable to 
the "egalitarian approach" to investment in human capital, This approach assumes that 
the demand conditions are the same for everyone. All individuals have the same capacity 
to benefit from investments in social capital. Investments and returns differ only because 
of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the entrepreneur. These differences change the costs 
of accomplishing relations and give some the opportunity to invest more than others. It is 
not unlikely that differences in investment opportunities related to social relations exist. 
High status individuals have access to more influential individuals and clubs and wealthy 
children benefit from the social relations of their parents (Becker and Murphy 2000). 
Eliminating these idiosyncratic differences would eliminate differences in opportunities, 
and thereby eliminate the important differences in investments and returns. In the follow-
ing section, we will present our modeling framework for the demand for productive 
social relations. 
8.2.4 Productive social relations 
Consider an entrepreneur / in industry j that uses only one type of productive inputs, stf, 
which is the knowledge embodied in social relationships. To produce output Ytn the 
nominal price per input Slf yields P*. The price for output is pj. The entrepreneur wants 
to choose the level of output so as to maximize 
(8.1) n(sJ=p/K,-p*s# 
and given the actions of all other firms in the market the equilibrium condition is that 
marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Choosing Sg then is 
BY.. ÔY.. P
s 
(8.2) pj —— - p* = o or —— = —-^r 
' as, dS9 pj 
d
2Y-
with necessary condition -^-<0 for a maximum. 
d"S,j 
The indirect profit function represents the equilibrium demand for social relationships, 
Sjr Relationships are only observed in discrete quantities ,sv, and these are determined 
upon evaluation of the breakeven condition 
(8.3) Sg=n if n(s. =/?)>0 and n^ =n + l)<0 
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s 
The real price ~r is not observable. To accommodate this unobservability, let X,y be a  p<, 
P
s 
vector of determinants of . We assume that industry returns to social capital are equal 
pn 
within industries, but may differ among industries. The equilibrium demand function can 
then be rewritten as 
(8.4) S]^arvXliP + sl] 
where a} captures the differences in productivity of social relations among industries j\ 
BY-
—~, and p captures the effect of the real price proxy Xu on the equilibrium demand . 
dS f 
Let n^ <tt2j <...<xNj be unknown profit threshold parameters for industry j\ and 
Nj be the maximum amount of social relationships in industry j. Then it holds that 
(8.5a) if S*j<7ru; 
(8.5b) sy = 1 if 7Tly < s*j < n2j; 
(8.5c) s^Nj if 
For our estimation procedure we assume that £.. has a logistic distribution. The resulting 
ordered logit model is a member of the GEV-family (Small 1987; Wen & Koppelman 
2001). GEV-models are consistent with profit maximization under uncertainty when 
choices are discrete (McFadden 1984). The response probabilities are 
(8.6a) Pr(s jj = 01 Xy) - Pr(.S * < | a,, Xif)= Pr(ay + X9P + < xXj | aJtX,)= k{tcxj -a,-Xltp) 
(8.6b) Prfo = l|a,,JTj=-aj-X9p)-\[xxs-aj-Xvp) 
(8.6c) Pr(s, ~ X p)-k[n Nh] -a^X.p) 
(8.6d) Pr [$, = Nj \ahxti )= 1 - A[*n - a, - X{jp) 
8.3 Data 
In order to estimate our model of entrepreneurs' demand for productive social relations, 
we use a survey among potential entrepreneurs in South Limburg in 1998 and 1999. The 
sample population is extracted from two databases: (1) The registration database of the 
local chamber of commerce contains all new firms, who registered a business in South 
159 Limburg in 1998 or 1999. (2) The address database of the "Starterscentrum South Lim-
burg" contains addresses of persons, who explicitly stated they seriously planned to start 
a company' . Together, both databases contain 4339 unique and complete addresses. 
After an initial telephone screening, 1223 people were willing to participate in the study 
and were interviewed for on average one hour. Thus, the response rate is 28%. The 
interviews were conducted from November 2000 till June 2001. 
Table 8.1 provides summary information about potential entrepreneurs in the South of 
Limburg during 1998 and 1999. 1223 potential entrepreneurs are interviewed. 
Table 8.1: Population & sampling details 
Sample  Population 
Total  1223 
Non-starters  236 
Starters  987 
Start before 1998 or after 1999  184 
Starters 1998/1999  803  3752 
Agriculture  12 
Missing SBI code 
No information network  14 
Sample size  775 
• • • • • "  — — tt— 
Based on the interviews, 987 respondents are labelled as starter. From this group, we 
have deleted 184 entrepreneurs that started before 1998 or after 1999. We also exclude 10 
respondents that do not provide any information concerning their social networks and 2 
r Q 
respondents that did not provide information on the sector they operated in . Finally, we 
exclude 14 observations that operate in the agricultural sector. This results in a net sample 
of 775 observations. 
The Starterscentrum is a foundation sponsored by the chamber of commerce and other local authorities to 
encourage successful self-employment by providing training and advice. 
58 For the zero-network observations, we do not know whether respondents are not willing to give informa-
tion or whether they make no use of any relation. 
160 For our empirical analysis, we define entrepreneurs' choices of the type of rela-
tions, Productive relations may emerge from different sources, like family, friends, 
colleagues, acquaintances, or business contacts. The network data were generated through 
"name-generator" type questions. Interviewees were asked to list the names of persons 
(1) with whom they discussed important matters during the self-employment decision 
process; (2) with whom they discussed important matters during the last six months; (3) 
with whom they were involved in informal social activities (4) whom they considered 
essential contacts (5) whom they considered difficult contacts (6) and whom they consid-
ered an important contact as well, but that was not listed before. A maximum of four 
answers per question were allowed, leading to a maximum social network of 24. Identical 
answers at multiple questions were allowed. However, we accounted for identical an-
swers, so we end up with the respondents' net number of social relationships. Our data 
reveals ten different levels (see Figure 8.1). 
The econometric model from equation (8.4) is specified as follows: 
The individual profits of an entrepreneur is made up of two components: a sector constant 
profit from sector specific marginal returns and a variable profit from cost differences 
that stem from the differences in the real price of accomplishing relations. The industry 
constant profit is proxied by industry sector dummies. We have classified six sectors with 
the use of SBI codes: business services (SBI 1000-4500), construction (SBI 4500-5000), 
trade (wholesale & retail) (SBI 5000-5500), catering (hotels & restaurants) (SBI 5500 -
6000), manufacturing (including utility) (SBI 6000-8500), and personal services (includ-
ing health and culture) (SBI 8500-9900). Theory predicts higher expected profits for 
sectors with higher marginal returns. 
The vector of characteristics Xtj include
59: self-employed parent(s), age, education, City, 
and native. Theory predicts that entrepreneurs with higher educated parents have better 
access to social resources (Lin 1990; Lin 1999). Self-employed parents may provide 
access to relevant contacts from their own network. Therefore, we expect that self-
employed parents reduce the price of obtaining contacts and increase the number of social 
relations (/?, >0). The effect of age on price and profits is ambiguous (p2 >0 or p2< 0). 
Young individuals may be more socially active, but older individuals may know more 
people. Previous research established a positive relation between education and access to 
social resources (Boxman et al. 1991; Glaeser et al. 2002; Lin 1990; Lin 1999). Entrepre-
neurs who invest in education face lower real prices for accomplishing contacts and 
therefore increase the number of social relations (/?3>0). We expect that individuals 
living in the largest city in the area will have more opportunities to meet people and 
therefore lower cost (pA >0). The people in our sample are from Limburg, a province in 
the South of the Netherlands. This area is known for its associational activity, but also for 
its closed culture. Cultural differences may pose barriers to enter these associations. 
Natives will have lower cost of forming relations and therefore being native is expected 
to increase network size (p$ > 0). 
59 We also used education parents, marital status, self-employed before, gender, a dummy demarcating 
whether the individual started in 1998 or 1999, and age squared. However, none of these covariates were 
significant at conventional levels, and are die re fore subsequently excluded from the analyses. 
161 Table 8.2(a): Descriptive statistics: Mean and standard deviations by industry 
Total  Business 
Services 
Construction  Trade  Manufacturing  Catering  Personal 
Services 
Variable 
# of social  4.82  5,19  4.11  4.74  4.77  4.70  4.58 
relations  (2.51)  (2.53)  (2.29)  (2.42)  (2.63)  (2.45)  (2.61) 
Parents self- .36  .40  .38  .52  .30  .37 
employed  (-48)  (47)  (.49)  (.49)  (.51)  (.46)  (.48) 
Age  38.44  39.82  38.51  38.77  40.27  34.85  35.77 
(9.14)  (9.25)  (8.78)  (8.60)  (10.04)  (8.43)  (8.90) 
Education  4.57  5.25  3.50  4.16  4.64  3.94  4.48 
(1-74)  (1.56)  (1.72)  (1.65)  ( 1 -74)  (1.76)  (1.57) 
City  .19  .18  .09  .24  .18  .25  .16 
(.39)  (.38)  (.28)  (.43)  (.39)  (-43)  (.37) 
Native  .94  .96  .94  .92  .95  .92  .90 
(.24)  (.19)  (.24)  (.27)  (.21)  (.28)  (.30) 
N  775  301  82  164  44  73  in 
Table 8.2(a) shows the descriptive statistics of these variables by industry. Table 8.2(a) 
provides interesting information about the characteristics of the entrepreneur in each 
industry. Entrepreneurs in business services have the largest social networks. Entrepre-
neurs in construction have the smallest social networks. More than half of the starting 
entrepreneurs in manufacturing have self-employed parents. In catering, less than one 
third have self-employed parents. Entrepreneurs in business services had the highest level 
of education, while in construction entrepreneurs had the lowest level of education. The 
entrepreneur operating in construction also lives more frequently outside a city. The 
entrepreneur in catering lives most frequently in a city. Finally, almost 10% of the 
entrepreneurs operating in personal services are foreigner. Only 4% of the entrepreneurs 
in business services are foreigner. 
162 Table 8.2(b): Descriptive statistics: Mean and standard deviations by number of social 
relations 
# of social relations 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Parents self- .38  .30  .29  .33  .42  .39  .42  .42  .35 
employed  (.49)  (.46)  (.46)  (.47)  (.50)  (.49)  (.50)  (.50)  (.50)  (-48) 
Age  41.05  41.23  38.01  38.18  37.43  36,43  37.14  39.42  38.00  38.89 
(11.20)  (9.40)  (8.56)  (8.39)  (9.04)  (8.20)  (9.07)  (8.82)  (9.15)  (10.05) 
Education  4.1i  4.61  4.03  4.29  4.88  4.62  4.80  5.19  5.19  4.93 
(1.72)  (1.74)  (1.78)  (1.78)  (1.65)  (1.60)  (1.73)  (1.64)  (1.58)  (1.61) 
City  .05  .06  .15  .21  .20  .22  .26  .26  .35  .22 
(.23)  (.25)  (.36)  (.41 )  (.40)  (.42)  (.44)  (.44)  (.48)  (.42) 
Native  .91  .92  .93  .93  .90  .97  .96  .97  .98  1.00 
(.29)  (.27)  (.26)  (-26)  (.30)  (.16)  (.20)  (.18)  (.14)  (0.00) 
N  56  93  120  126  109  76  70  31  48  46 
Table 8.2(b) shows the descriptive statistics for each number of social relations. The 
statistics show a pattern of increasing social relations at higher levels of education, for 
entrepreneurs living in a city, and for entrepreneurs that are native. The distribution of 
age and self-employed parents shows a less clear pattern at successive numbers of social 
relations. 
8.4 Estimation results 
Table 8.3 provides the results of our ordered discrete choice model. To calculate expected 
profit levels, we use the formula: 
(8.7) fl =af+Xj 
Table 8.4 presents the industry specific choice probabilities implied by the ordered logit. 
To calculate the choice probabilities, we used the formulas in equation (8.6a) - (8.6d). To 
determine the effect of prices on the choice probabilities, we calculate both the choice 
163 Table 8,3: Ordered choice probabilities for number of social relations (N=775) 
Variables  Estimates  Standard Errors 




























Cutpoints  Estimates  Predicted profits  N 
Mean 
(s.d) 
y ( from 1 to 2 social relations) 
^ (from 2 to 3 social relations) 
y (from 3 to 4 social relations) 
^ (from 4 to 5 social relations) 
^ (from 5 to 6 social relations) 
p (from 6 to 7 social relations) 
^ (from 7 to 8 social relations) 
p (from 8 to 9 social relations) 
^ (from 9 to 10 social relations) 
Notes. Business services is base category. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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164 probabilities including prices (indicated by T in Table 8.4), as well as setting prices at 
zero (indicated by I in Table 8.4). The choice probabilities correspond to the full model 
and the constant only model respectively. Based on the estimated choice probabilities, we 
calculate the corresponding expected equilibrium demand for productive social relations 
with the formula: 
i \ ^ 
(8.8) 
ti — ] 
where S denotes the number of social relations in industry j. To determine whether price 
differences exist between industries, we also calculate the average real price level for 
each industry utilizing the inverse effect of the parameter estimates on the real price 
proxy. Finally, we calculate the average profit level per industry. 
A positive parameter in Table 8.3 implies that the probability of observing an in-
creasing number of social relations increases if a covariate X increases. Rewriting equa-





Given fixed n and Y, from equation (8.9) follows that if S increases, the real price — 
P 
decreases. A positive parameter in Table 8.3 not only implies an increase in the probabil-
ity of increasing social relations, but also a decrease in the real price of accomplishing 
social relations. 
Self-employed parents increase the probability of more social relations. Living in 
a city increases the probability of more social relations. Being native increases the 
probability of more social relations. The positive parameter estimates for education 
implies that an increase in the level of education increases the probability of more social 
relations. Note that the positive parameter estimate in Table 8.3 also implies that being 
native, living in a city, having a high education, and having self-employed parents 
reduces the cost of accomplishing social relations. Only age has a negative effect. Young 
entrepreneurs have more social relations than older entrepreneurs. Age increases the cost 
of accomplishing social relations. 
Besides the effect of the real price proxy on social relations, the results in Table 
8.3 indicate that there are significant differences in the demand for productive social 
relations between industries. The negative signs for the a's imply that the demand for 
productive social relations is always lower in these industries compared to the business 
services. However, the negative signs are only significant for the constaiction and the 
personal services. Economic logic suggests that higher returns to social relations will 
induce higher investment rates. Combining this logic with our results would suggest that 
social relations are most productive in business services and least productive in construc-
tion and personal services. 
Differences in the amount of social relations among industries may also be the re-
sult of a selection effect. There might be some unobserved heterogeneity, like the social 
ability and skills of the entrepreneur that are not captured by our covariates. Entrepre-
neurs with high social ability should endogenously select industries with high returns on 
165 social relations. Self-selection does not undermine our argument that social relations are 
more productive among certain industries; it just provides another mechanism why 
observed investment levels may differ among industries. 
The lower right part of Table 8.3 provides the predicted profits at successive level 
of social relations. The ordering of the profits follows the expected structure of increasing 
profit levels at successive number of social relations up to seven relations. From seven 
social relations onwards, profits remain relatively stable. Figure 8.3 sketches the ordering 
of predicted profits graphically. The figure shows that predicted profits increase at a 
decreasing rate. This result of negatively inclined demand curves reflects our proposition 
that overlapping information between social relations causes information redundancy. 
Figure 8.3: Predicted expected profit levels by number of social relations 
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The results in Table 8.4 provide the choice probabilities disaggregated by indus-
try. Setting prices at zero, the (1) column presents the baseline demand for productive 
social relations for each industry. The results show an inverse U-shape between the 
number of social relations and its likelihood, with a peak at three social relations. Cor-
recting for prices, the inverse U-shape remains intact, but peaks at four social relations, 
except for trade which peaks at three. For all industries, prices increase the probability of 
more social relations. We use the choice probabilities to calculate the expected equilib-
rium demand for productive social relations for each industry. The results indicate that in 
these imperfect markets, entrepreneurs obtain full information at 4 to 5 social relations. 
More imperfect markets need more information to clear. With 5.2 social relations, 
business services have highest demand, and with 4.1, construction has lowest. Within the 
business services sector, products are more heterogeneous than in the construction sector. 
These heterogeneous products create uncertainty which increases potential transaction 
costs. Transaction costs may be overcome by the trust in its trading partners, providing a 
larger incentive to invest, explaining the higher demand for productive social relations in 
business services. Although in absolute terms a difference of one social relation seems 
trivial, this number indicates almost 27% more demand for social relations in business 
166 services than in trade. Given our low estimated network size, it is not unlikely that we 
only captured each entrepreneur's core social network. If each core network contact 
provides 5 more indirect contacts, then the total retrievable network would already 
increase to 26 for business services and 21 for trade, ignoring the possibility that core 
network contacts may lead to identical indirect contacts. 
In Table 8.4, we also tested whether estimated price and profit level differences 
differed among industries. The ANOVA tests the null hypothesis of no differences in 
price levels among industries. We significantly reject the null hypothesis of no differ-
ences. The results show that real price levels are lowest in business services and highest 
in construction. The descriptive statistics in Table 8.2 provides some hints about the 
drivers of these price differences. In business services, entrepreneurs have a higher level 
of education and higher proportion of them live in cities. Table 8.3 shows that education 
and city significantly reduces the real price of accomplishing relations. 
Table 8.4: Industry choice probabilities, equilibrium demand, prices, and profits 
Probabilities  Business  Construc- Trade  Manufactur- Catering  Personal 
(in %)  Services  tion  ing  Services 
I  T  I  T  I  T  I  T  1  T  I  T 
1 social relation  8.6  5.0  13.8  10.4  10.7  6.8  11.5  7.1  11.5  7.0  12.5  7.7 
2 social relations  14.4  9.3  19.8  16.4  16.8  11.9  17.7  12.3  17.6  12.2  18.6  13.2 
3 social relations  18.1  13.8  20.6  19.3  19.5  16.2  19.9  16.6  19.8  16.5  20.2  17.2 
4 social relations  17.8  16.4  16.6  17.6  17.6  17.5  17.3  17.6  17.4  17.6  17.1  17.7 
5 social relations  13.9  15.4  11.1  1 4M* # ^^  12.7  14.9  12.3  14.7  12.3  14.7  11.7  14.4 
6 social relations  8.7  11.2  6.3  7.8  7.6  9.9  7.2  9.7  7.2  9.8  6.8  9.3 
7 social relations  7.3  10.4  4.9  6.3  6.1  8.7  5.7  8.4  5.7  8.5  5.3  7.9 
8 social relations  3.0  4.6  1.9  2.5  2.5  3.7  2.3  3.5  2.3  3.6  2.1  J.J 
9 social relations  4.4  7.1  2.7  3.6  3.5  5.5  j.j  C  j.j  j.j  5.3  3.0  4.8 
10 social relations  3.9  6.7  2.3  3.2  3.1  5.0  2.8  4.8  2.9  4.8  2.6  4.4 
Expccted equiiib- 4.4 5.2 3.7 4. i 4.1 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.7 3.9 4.5 
rium demand 
Anova 
Average  Price  -.578  -.324  -.502  -.540  -.546  -.534  F(5,769) 
level  (.474)  (.437)  (.480)  (.509)  (491)  (.461)  3.82** 
Average  Profit  .578  -.202  .266  .218  .231  .121  F(5,769) 
level  (.474)  (-437)  (480)  (5.9)  (.491)  (.461)  43,06** 
N  301  82  164  44  73  111 
Notes. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
167 We used the profit function of equation (8.7) to test whether profit differences 
exist between industries, The ANOVA tests the null hypothesis of no differences in profit 
levels among industries. Also, this null hypothesis is significantly rejected. In line with 
equilibrium demand for productive social relations, profits levels are lowest in construc-
tion and highest in business services. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we designed a model to explain the accomplishment of entrepreneurs
1 
productive social networks in concentrated markets. The accomplishment of productive 
social networks in a business context follows economic logic. Individual incentives drive 
the formation of productive social networks. Differences in expected returns and costs 
trigger the equilibrium demand for productive social relations. 
A discrete choice formulation is used to draw inferences about the unobserved 
profitability of entrepreneur's social network. The analysis shows that expected profit-
ability increases at successive levels of social relations. Moreover, social contacts differ 
in productivity across markets. When markets deviate from their perfect form, frictions 
and uncertainty emerge and transaction and search costs arise. Social relations may 
dampen uncertainty and overcome or capitalize on frictions and thereby reduce these 
costs. Whereas the demand for productive social contacts emerges from the peculiarities 
of the industry the entrepreneur operates in, the price of establishing social contacts 
follows from entrepreneur heterogeneity. The price of social contacts is not only a 
function of individual characteristics, like education, social background, age, and nation-
ality, but also a matter of location. Living in a city is a cheap source of social resources. 
Understanding why investment in social capital, like social networks, differs be-
tween individuals is important for government policies. We echo Gleaser et al. (2002: 
456) that "individuals accumulate social capital when the private incentives for such 
accumulation are high". However, we add that providing incentives to invest is only one 
side of the medal. Opportunities for investment in social capital are still structurally 
segmented, by race, education, and social class. As investments in human capital may be 
inhibit by financing constraints, investments in social capital may be constrained by 
social structure. 
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9.1 Summary 
At the end of this dissertation, we take some time to reflect on what we have learned and, 
also, in what directions future research can be undertaken. In this dissertation, we utilized 
two datasets to answer several research questions related to entrepreneurship and self-
employment. In chapter 3 and 4 we investigated individuals' entry decisions with the aid 
of the North Brabant dataset. In chapter 6 we studied non-response related to business 
idea continuance in the newly created Limburg dataset. Chapter 7 investigated entrepre-
neurs exit decision when a fraction of the set up costs is sunk. Chapter 8 scrutinized the 
social network accumulation decisions of entrepreneurs. We have studied these entrepre-
neurial decisions as an individual's choice being sensitive to the entrepreneur social 
context. 
In this dissertation, we started from the premise that the entrepreneur is so 
strongly embedded in his social context, both horizontally through space by the social 
and economic structure and vertically through time by his past actions and choices and 
future aspirations, that entrepreneurial decisions can not be researched from a static 
atomized perspective, but should be studied as a dynamic phenomenon mutually reinforc-
ing social and economic context. 
In chapter 3, our analysis confirms the superiority of the dynamic duration models 
to model the transition to self-employment to their static counterparts applied to multipe-
riod data. We have shown theoretically that the static model is merely an aggregated 
version of a duration model and therefore always inefficient. If the process that generates 
the data is the continuous Poisson process and the data is grouped into intervals, then the 
natural candidate for an empirical dynamic model is a grouped duration model with a 
type I extreme value error distribution (cloglog). We have studied the consequences of 
time aggregation in a study on self-employment selection in the Netherlands between 
1953 and 1993. The results showed the clear superiority of the dynamic models in terms 
of parameter estimate precision and prediction accuracy. Time aggregation can seriously 
bias parameter estimates. For example, we have shown that the self-employed father 
increases the probability to become self-employed in the dynamic model with 40 up to 
200% points as compared with the static estimator. The dynamic model with duration 
dependence classifies 95% more individuals in the highest probability decile than the 
static model. Estimation precision is important for policy makers that aim to predict who 
becomes an entrepreneur. Furthermore, our dynamic approach explicitly models the 
timing of the entry decision providing information for policy makers when individuals 
are most at risk of self-employment. 
In chapter 4, we extended the knowledge on the timing of the entry decisions by 
differentiating two routes into self-employment: taking over control in a family business 
or founding a new business. We have developed an economic theory of the self-
employment process, where an individual's human, financial, and social capital deter-
mine the waiting time into self-employment. Our analysis reveals clear differences 
between people who took over an existing family business and people who founded a 
170 new firm. The results from the analysis show that the hazard of entering self-employment 
is age dependent and the shape of the duration dependence is self-employment type 
dependent. Because learning may take place in the family business and less sunk costs 
have to be financed, the hazard of taking over a family business is highest in the earliest 
stages of ones professional career. In contrast, starting up a business from scratch takes 
more time. First the would-be self-employed has to accumulate enough skills, capabili-
ties, and capital to overcome set up costs and to become self-employed. The real foun-
der's probability of entering self-employment is initially low and increases only gradually 
over his life. Therefore, taking over a family business cannot be compared by starting up 
a business from scratch. Continuation of a family business is like entering self-
employment with a valuable set of assets already existent, while real founders enter self-
employment with the burden of financing the sunkness of the start up expenses. Further-
more, the uncertainty of the expected profitability is much lower for a firm that has 
learned about its true productivity, than for the de novo firm whose expected profitability 
is still more a reflection of the subjective beliefs of the business owner. 
Furthermore, chapter 4 investigated the determinants of self-employment selec-
tion. Next to an individual's human capital, our results indicate that an individual's social 
context is an important predictor of self-employment selection. The entrepreneur's social 
context both promotes and inhibits the self-employment decision. Our analyses reveal 
that self-employed parents transfer not only entrepreneurial skills, but also the opportu-
nity to take over the family business. Parents with a high education that are probably also 
wealthier are especially important for real founders who face higher liquidity constraints. 
A spouse increases self-employment because he or she provides emotional and financial 
support as well as cheap labor. On the other hand, children sometimes constrain the 
choice for self-employment. And coming from large entrepreneurial family constraints 
the possibility to take over the family business. 
The results from our analyses in chapter 3 and chapter 4 have important implica-
tions for the field of entrepreneurship and self-employment. Results of previous (empiri-
cal) research that can not differentiate between family self-employment and de novo self-
employment must be reconsidered in the light of our study (e.g. Evans & Leighton 1989; 
Dunn & Holtz-Eakin 2000). First and foremost, the time dimension must be brought back 
in theorizing and econometric modeling of self-employment selection. Furthermore, the 
results of chapter 4 have shown that aggregating family self-employment and de novo 
self-employment might off set the dynamic nature of self-employment. Aggregating 
taking over a family business and starting from scratch resulted in a constant hazard for a 
considerable period of our researched time period. Moreover, disentangling the different 
routes into self-employment alters the causal nature of some of the determinants of self-
employment selection. 
Starting entrepreneurs were the focus in chapter 3 and chapter 4. However, 
answering the question who becomes self-employed and who not requires also that 
persons who are not self-employed are part of the research population. After all, without 
such a control group of non-self-employed it is not possible to show what differentiates 
self-employed from non-self-employed. The Limburg dataset was created to investigate 
the choice for entrepreneurship. For making inferences from the collected data, it is of 
utmost importance that as many possible individuals are willing to cooperate in the 
research. However, a part of the approached individuals were for one or the other reason 
171 no willing to collaborate. In chapter 6, we investigated the sources of non-response in 
general and the link between the outcome of the self-employment decision and non-
response in particular. The results from our models suggest several sources of non-
response. One of the reasons of non-response is attrition, e.g. because of death, from the 
sample. Furthermore, some individuals are more likely to non-respond than others. 
However, the most important finding from our analyses is that there is a structural 
relationship between the probability that an individual decides to abandon his business 
idea and his subsequent probability of non-response. Individuals that continued their 
business idea were more likely to partake in the personal interview, while individuals that 
abandoned their business idea were less likely to partake in the personal interview. As a 
result, researchers and policy makers that use surveys to investigate the self-employment 
decision must be aware of this causal bias. Abandoning business ideas in the population 
is probably more common than the survey results will show, leading to possible underes-
timation of possible constraints. 
In chapter 7 we shifted our attention from the entry decision to the exit decision. 
In this chapter we designed a theoretical model to explain the reluctance of entrepreneurs 
to exit self-employment in the presence of sunk costs and an uncertain evolution of self-
employment income. The results indicate that the sunk fraction of the set up costs make 
entrepreneurs reluctant to exit self-employment. The fact that sunk costs lead to reluc-
tance provides evidence for the existence of option values associated with the self-
employment decision. A business owner may accept a temporary loss and decide to 
remain self-employed and wait if business conditions turn favorable again to recoup 
partly sunk investment costs. 
Furthermore, this chapter investigated why entrepreneurs invest different amounts 
of sunk costs in their firm. Our results show that the level of wage earned in the last job 
prior entry is an important determinant of the initial commitment in sunk set up costs. 
This confirms our prediction from an entrepreneurial choice model extended with sunk 
set up costs. The entrepreneurial choice model applied in this chapter shows that indi-
viduals have to raise their capital investments to overcome individual entry thresholds. 
The entry threshold is the income one can earn as a wage worker. Therefore, the entre-
preneurial choice model dictates that individuals with high previous income levels have 
to invest more capital to raise their entrepreneurial income above the entry threshold level 
to make it profitable to become an entrepreneur and enter self-employment. We find that 
the elasticity of previous income level to initial commitment in sunk capital investments 
is .294. Thus a one percent increase in the level of income prior to entry implies a .294 
percent increase in initial capital investments. 
Although we do not formally investigate the option value associated with the en-
try decision, its implications are obvious and provide some evidence for the hitherto 
unexplained result in the self-employment literature that high income individuals are less 
likely to become self-employed. High income individuals have to invest more sunk 
capital to raise entrepreneurial earnings above entry thresholds. However, since future 
earnings are uncertain, they have an option value to wait. Therefore, high income indi-
viduals will be more reluctant to enter self-employment than low income individuals. 
This results from chapter 7 complement the results from chapter 4 and 5.We believe that 
the timing of the self-employment decisions is important to understand who becomes 
self-employed and what the founding characteristics of the firm are. The decision to defer 
172 self-employment might increase the opportunity costs of becoming self-employed, e.g. 
the wage earned in the labor market. 
In chapter 8, we investigated one possible factor of successful self-employment, 
namely an entrepreneur's social network. In this chapter, we modeled the demand for 
productive social relations as an outcome of profit maximizing behavior under uncer-
tainty. Social relations are considered productive inputs in the production process of 
firms. The productivity of a relation can vary across industries because of differences in 
the production processes between industries. Relations can also be more productive when 
markets are not perfectly competitive. Such markets are often characterized by search and 
transaction costs. Therefore, seemingly identical social relations may differ in productiv-
ity to the extent that they are able to overcome market imperfections and optimize the 
production process of firms within an industry. In our model the costs of accomplishing 
social relations were heterogeneous. Equilibrium demand is identified in the market for 
productive relations where marginal returns of accomplishing relations equal marginal 
costs. 
The model's predictions are tested using the Limburg dataset. The econometric 
analysis shows that young, native, highly educated entrepreneurs in large cities, with self-
employed parents, have lower cost of forming productive social relations. The ordering of 
profits shows decreasing returns to scale for social relations. On average, entrepreneurs 
obtain full information at 4 to 5 social relations. We conclude that the equilibrium de-
mand for productive social relations can be derived from the demand conditions emerg-
ing from industry structure and the supply conditions emanating from entrepreneurs' 
heterogeneity. 
Understanding why investment in social capital, like social networks, differs 
between individuals is important for government policies. Individuals accumulate social 
capital when the incentives for such accumulation are high and the costs for accomplish-
ing social capital are low. However, our study shows that the opportunities for investment 
in social capital are still structurally segmented, by race, education, and social class. As 
investments in human capital may be inhibit by financing constraints, investments in 
social capital may be constrained by social structure. 
Reflecting on these results, what have we learned of the influence of the social 
context on entrepreneurial decisions? Most importantly, we have shown the strong social 
embeddedness of the entrepreneur. First of all, the social background of an individual is 
important to understand the chance that he will become an entrepreneur. Individuals with 
self-employed parents have a higher chance of becoming self-employed and enter self-
employment faster than individuals without self-employed parents. This dissertation 
found several reasons for this finding. We agree with other researchers that self-employed 
parents can transfer skills and capital to their offspring. Furthermore, we add to this 
understanding that a significant part of the effect of self-employed parents on self-
employment selection rest in the fact that self-employed parents can provide their off-
spring the opportunity to take over the control in a family business. However, the effect 
of self-employed parents diminishes over time as the individual increases his entrepre-
neurial abilities through education and work experience and increases his own wealth 
through saving. But also after the individual enters self-employment, the self-employed 
parent can be important. Our study shows that self-employed parents are an important 
source for the accomplishment of productive social relations. Entrepreneurs from self-
173 employed parents have larger productive social networks and entrepreneurs with large 
social networks are more successful entrepreneurs. Highly educated and probably wealth-
ier parents are especially important for real founders who do not take over a business and 
who have to overcome sunk set up costs and who face more uncertain success chances. 
However, the social background is not always productive for the prospective entrepre-
neur. The more siblings an individual has, the fewer are his chances to take over the 
family business. 
But the context of the entrepreneur transcends his social background. The past ac-
tions of the entrepreneur bear a considerable influence on his future behavior. His past 
accumulation decisions influence the timing of the entry decision. Investments in educa-
tion relax both human capital and liquidity constraints through the learning of entrepre-
neurial capabilities and the accumulation of capital through higher earnings. How-
ever, the accumulation of labor market job specific skills and capabilities can make 
individuals reluctant to exit their labor market job and enter self-employment. The 
influence of path dependence becomes especially important if one investigates the effect 
of labor market experience on the founding characteristics of the firm. Next to the accu-
mulation of labor market job specific human capital, experience and high income from 
labor market jobs create idiosyncratic entry thresholds. The individual only enters self-
employment if his income from self-employment exceeds labor market income. In order 
to raise entrepreneurial earnings the individual has to invest partially sunk capital in the 
form of set up costs. Individuals from high labor market income cohorts must therefore 
overcome more set up costs. Although high income individuals are less liquidity con-
straints, our study has shown that sunk costs make individuals reluctant to enter or exit 
self-employment when faced with uncertain future entrepreneurial earnings. If sunk costs 
do not only make individuals reluctant to exit self-employment but also to enter self-
employment, then individuals from high income cohorts will be both less likely to enter 
as exit self-employment, a process called hysteresis. 
For these reasons, we provide ample evidence for the embeddedness of the entre-
preneur in its social context, and the influence of being embedded in a social context on 
the decisions of the entrepreneur. 
9.2 Suggestions for future research 
Thanks to the dynamic nature of our datasets, we could show many interesting aspects of 
the self-employment decisions not available in static studies. The rejection of the static 
nature of the self-employment decision opens new paths of inquiry. Studying the waiting 
time into self-employment bears close resemblance with studying the real options nature 
of investments. The real options nature of investments dictates that in the presence of 
irreversible costs, the uncertainty of self-employment success can make individuals 
reluctant to become self-employed and reluctant to exit self-employment. This may be 
especially true for real founders whose success chances are more uncertain and who face 
higher partially irreversible set up costs. 
Our research provided empirical evidence of the real options nature of the self-
employment decision. Further research is needed to assess the empirical validity of the 
real options nature of the entry decision. Furthermore, our data allowed us only to use 
174 proxies for the key parameters in the real options model. Future research should try to 
obtain direct measures or better proxies of sunk costs, idiosyncratic uncertainty, and 
idiosyncratic profit growth. Especially measuring idiosyncratic uncertainty is the "holy 
grail for the empirical analysis of dynamic irreversible adjustment models" (Pfann 2006: 
166). 
From an empirical perspective, more research is needed that investigate the dy-
namics of the self-employment decision. Our study has shown the time dependent shape 
of the entry hazard both for real founders and for individuals that take over control in a 
family business. Other samples from different countries must be consulted to generalize 
the time dependence of self-employment. Furthermore, our analyses have shown that 
variables can have different effects over time. Future research on the dynamics of self-
employment selection can make use of parametric spline models that can account for 
these differences. 
Furthermore, our analyses of different types of self-employment seemed fruitful. 
Further research can investigate the dynamics of other types of self-employment like the 
Schumpeterian innovator to assess its dynamics and determinants. Multiple risk models 
are the preferred techniques to estimate these models. These multiple risk models can 
also be extended to the analysis of exit behavior of different types of self-employment. 
An obvious candidate would be a study investigating the exit dynamics of de novo 
businesses and taken over family business. 
Our study has shown that self-employment is strongly embedded within a social 
context. Future research should follow this endeavor providing a more complete picture 
of the entrepreneur and its origins. For example, there is a promising literature studying 
discrete choices with social interactions (Brock and Durlauf 2001). Unfortunately, their 
findings have not been incorporated in this study, but studying self-employment choices 
within their framework can provide interesting information on determinants of self-
employment selection. Furthermore, this dissertation provided only a limited view of the 
social context. We have limited ourselves to the micro social context and have not 
addressed the macro social context. Studies that incorporate both the micro and macro 
social context can be more conclusive in assessing the relevant worth of both approaches. 
More studies are needed that explain why and how social relations make individuals more 
productive. We have investigated how differences between industries and difference in 
accomplishment costs influence the use of social networks. However, our study touches 
the benefits of social relations only superficially by observing differences among indus-
tries. More studies are needed that investigate smaller sectors and explicitly model the 
industry characteristics related to transaction and search costs. Our discrete choice model 
for productive social relations can be easily extended to allow industry characteristics as 
determinants to the use of social networks. Moreover, our analysis of social network size 
can be extended with models that focus not only on network size but also on the type and 
strength of the relation and the structure of the social network. 
With these suggestions for future research we have reached the end of this disser-
tation, in which we have tried to do justice to the dynamic nature of entiy and exit to the 
market for self-employed entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we have showed the importance of 
the social context to these processes. We have shown that the entrepreneur is not just an 
isolated phenomenon outside its social context, but that he is strongly embedded in its 
social structure that at the same time can promote and hinder his development. 
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182 Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Zelfstandig ondernemerschap is een belangrijke motor voor de Nederlandse economie. 
Zelfstandige ondernemers vullen de gaten in de markt die niet attractief genoeg zijn voor 
grote multinationals en zij vormen een belangrijke werkgever. Binnen deze grote groep 
zelfstandige ondernemers bevindt zich ook de zogenaamde "entrepreneur". Het is voor-
namelijk deze entrepreneur die verantwoordelijk is voor innovatie en verandering in het 
economische systeem. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat zelfstandig ondernemers een 
belangrijke onderzoekspopulatie vormt in wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 
Wij mogen echter de zelfstandige ondernemer niet opvatten ais een autonoom 
opererend individu buiten een brede sociale context. De zelfstandige ondernemer beïn-
vloedt niet alleen de economische en sociale context door het opstalten en opzeggen van 
bedrijven, het creëren en vernietigen van banen en het brengen van innovaties, hij is op 
zijn beurt afhankelijk en wordt gevormd door zijn sociale en economische context. De 
zelfstandige ondernemer komt vaak uit een familie van ondernemers, die hem belangrijke 
vaardigheden mee kan geven en die hem zelfs de mogelijkheid kan bieden om een 
familiebedrijf over te nemen. Echter ook een individu's geschiedenis kan een belangrijke 
rol spelen bij het worden van ondernemer. Zijn investeringen in educatie, zijn sparen op 
ontvangen loon, zijn huwelijk, en tevens ouderlijke erfenissen kunnen allemaal bijdragen 
om de droom van zelfstandig ondernemerschap te realiseren. Maar tegelijkertijd kan de 
accumulatie van arbeidsmarktspecifiek kapitaal, de zorg en verantwoordelijkheid voor 
vrouw en kinderen hem angstig en onwillig maken 0111 te worden wie hij werkelijk is. 
Wij geloven dat de zelfstandige ondernemer zo sterk ingebed is in zijn sociale 
context, zowel horizontaal door de ruimte van economische en sociale structuren als 
verticaal over de tijd door zijn gemaakte keuzes en toekomstige aspiraties, dat de beslis-
singen van ondernemers niet kunnen worden onderzocht vanuit een statisch atomistisch 
perspectief, maar moet worden bestudeerd als een dynamisch fenomeen die in onderlinge 
spanning en betrekking staat met een brede sociale context. 
De centrale onderzoeksvragen in dit proefschrift proberen recht te doen aan deze 
visie. Niet alleen stellen wij de geaccepteerde onderzoeksvragen binnen de zelfstandig 
ondernemerschap literatuur naar wie er zelfstandig ondernemer wordt en wie hier op een 
later tijdstip weer vanaf ziet, maar wij vullen deze vragen aan met de onderzoeksvragen 
naar wanneer iemand zelfstandig ondernemer wordt en wanneer hij er mee ophoudt. 
Verder kijken wij hoe deze toe en uittredingsprocessen tot de markt van zelfstandige 
ondernemers zich gedragen in een brede sociale context. 
In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 wordt de dynamiek van de beslissing om tot de markt van 
zelfstandige ondernemers toe te treden onderzocht. Naast de vraag wie er zelfstandig 
ondernemer wordt behandelen wij de vraag wanneer hij voor het eerst in zijn beroepsle-
ven ondernemer wordt. Het verkrijgen van kennis betreffende de timing van zelfstandig 
ondernemerschap is belangrijk omdat zij inzicht kan geven in de snelheid waarmee een 
persoon kan toetreden tot de markt van zelfstandige ondernemers zodat hij zijn carrière 
als zelfstandig ondernemer kan maximaliseren. Ondernemerschap ervaring is namelijk 
een belangrijke indicator voor toekomstige ondememerschapbedrijvigheid en toekomstig 
ondernemerschap succes in termen van overlevingskansen en bedrijfswinsten. 
184 De onderzoeksvraag naar het tijdstip wanneer iemand ondernemer wordt en toe-
treedt tot de markt van zelfstandige ondernemers kan worden geschat met behulp van 
duurmodellen. Mede door het ontbreken van longitudinale data is dit op individueel 
niveau nog niet of nauwelijks gedaan in het wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar zelfstandi-
ge ondernemers en daarom wordt in hoofdstuk 3 uitgebreid ingegaan op de toepasbaar-
heid, bruikbaarheid en het voorspellende vermogen van duurmodellen op de onderzoeks-
vraag naar wanneer iemand voor het eerst tot de markt van zelfstandige ondernemers 
toetreedt. Hiervoor gebruiken wij de Noord Brabant dataset. Deze dataset bestaat uit een 
cohort individuen die drie keer geïnterviewd zijn over de periode 1953 tot 1993. In dit 
hoofdstuk laten wij de voordelen zien van dynamische modellen t.o.v. statische modellen 
aan de hand van een replicatie van een studie die deze data benaderde met een statische 
schatter. Eerst laten wij zien dat de statische schatter een geaggregeerde versie is van de 
dynamische schatter. De resultaten van de statistische analyse laten zien dat de dynami-
sche schatters superieur zijn in termen van parameter precisie en voorspellend vermogen. 
Verder laat de data zien dat zelfstandig ondernemerschap leeftijdsafhankeüjk is. Op jonge 
leeftijd is de kans om zelfstandig te worden klein waarna de kans langzaam toeneemt en 
op latere leeftijd weer afneemt. 
In hoofdstuk 4 breiden we de kennis betreffende de timing van de toetredingsbe-
slissing uit door twee verschillende routes naar zelfstandig ondernemerschap te onder-
scheiden, namelijk, het overnemen van een familiebedrijf of het oprichten van een nieuw 
bedrijf. Hoewel vele onderzoekers het belang hiervan benadrukken is dit de eerste studie 
die zowel een economische theorie ontwikkeld die deze twee verschillende routes ver-
klaart en die deze theorie ook empirisch kan testen. In deze theorie verklaart een indivi-
du's humaan, financieel, en sociaal kapitaal de tijd voordat een individu toetreedt tot de 
markt van zelfstandig ondernemers. Onze analyse brengt duidelijke verschillen aan het 
licht tussen mensen die een bestaand familie bedrijf overnemen en die een nieuw bedrijf 
oprichten. De resultaten van de analyse laten zien dat de kans op zelfstandig onderne-
merschap leeftijdsafhankeüjk is en dat de vorm van de tijdsafhankelijkheid per route naar 
zelfstandig ondernemerschap verschilt. Omdat het vak geleerd kan worden binnen een 
bestaand bedrijf en minder verzonken kosten gefinancierd hoeven te worden is de kans 
om een familiebedrijf over te nemen het grootst in de vroegste stadia van iemands profes-
sionele carrière. Daar tegenover vergt het opstarten van een nieuw bedrijf meer tijd. Eerst 
moet de potentiële zelfstandig ondernemer genoeg vaardigheden, capaciteiten, en kapitaal 
opbouwen om opstartkosten te overkomen en zelfstandig ondernemer te worden. De kans 
van een oprichter van een nieuw bedrijf om zelfstandig ondernemer te worden is dus 
initieel laag en neemt slechts gestaag toe over zijn leven wanneer meer kapitaal verza-
meld is. 
Daarnaast hebben wij in hoofdstuk 4 ook de determinanten van de keuze voor 
zelfstandig ondernemerschap onderzocht. Onze resultaten laten zien dat naast een indivi-
du's humaan kapitaal, zijn sociale context een belangrijke indicator voor onderne-
merschap is. De resultaten laten zien dat zijn sociale omgeving zowel de kans op onder-
nemerschap kan stimuleren als beperken. De statistische analyse van deze studie laat zien 
dat ouders die zelf ondernemer zijn niet alleen ondememerschapspecifieke vaardigheden 
overgeven aan hun kinderen, maar vaak ook de mogelijkheid om het bedrijf over te 
nemen. Hoog opgeleidde ouders, die ook welvarender zijn, spelen echter juist een belang-
rijke rol voor de oprichters van nieuwe bedrijven die meer liquiditeit nodig hebben om de 
185 verzonken kosten van hun onderneming te financieren. Een echtgenote vergroot de kans 
op ondernemerschap omdat zij zowel emotionele als financiële ondersteuning kan geven 
en een goedkope arbeidskracht is. Aan de andere kant verkleinen kinderen de kans op 
ondernemerschap doordat zij tijd en energie opeisen. Tot slot laten de analyses zien dat 
de grootte van het gezin waarin men opgroeit de kans op het overnemen van een familie-
bedrijf significant verkleint. 
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 hebben belangrijke implicaties voor het weten-
schappelijk onderzoek naar zelfstandig ondernemerschap. Resultaten van voorgaande 
studies die het onderscheid niet kunnen maken tussen het oprichten van een nieuw bedrijf 
en het overnemen van een familie bedrijf dienen heroverwogen te worden in het licht van 
onze studie. Verder stellen wij voor dat de tijdsdimensie teruggebracht wordt in zowel 
theorievorming als mede in de econometrische schattingstechnieken naar de keuze voor 
zelfstandig ondernemerschap. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 laten namelijk zien dat het 
samenvoegen van zelfstandig ondernemen binnen het familie bedrijf en het opstarten van 
een nieuw bedrijf de dynamiek van ondernemerschap kan doen opheffen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 introduceren wij de zogenaamde Limburg dataset. Deze dataset 
bestaat uit 1223 personen die serieus over zelfstandig ondernemen hebben nagedacht in 
1998 en 1999. Deze dataset is in 2004 aangevuld met data van de Kamer van Koophandel 
waarin o.a. de gegevens zijn opgenomen over de status van het opgerichte bedrijf tot en 
met mei 2004. Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft het verloop van het onderzoek die tot de Limburg 
dataset heeft geleid en presenteert een aantal beschrijvende statistieken. Veel aandacht in 
dit onderzoek is gericht op de non-response. Non-response is ook het thema in hoofdstuk 
6. Daarnaast gebruiken wij deze data in hoofdstuk 7 en 8 om diverse theoretische voor-
spellingen empirisch te testen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we de oorzaken van non-response en specifiek de 
link tussen non-response en de beslissing om zelfstandig ondernemer te worden. Hiervoor 
bouwen wij een structureel model om de onderliggende populatie karakteristieken te 
benaderen. Verder bouwen wij een sequentieel beslissingsmodel om de link tussen non-
response en de zelfstandigheidbeslissing te onderzoeken. De resultaten van deze model-
len suggereren de volgende oorzaken voor non-response. Eén van de oorzaken van non-
response is verloop binnen de onderzoekspopulatie door bijvoorbeeld ziekte of sterven. 
Verder zijn er individuele verschillen die de non-response kans beïnvloeden. Mensen met 
een lagere opleiding zijn bijvoorbeeld meer geneigd mee te werken aan het onderzoek. 
Echter de belangrijkste bevinding van deze analyses is dat er een structurele relatie 
bestaat tussen de kans dat iemand besluit om van zijn idee om een bedrijf te starten afziet 
en de kans dat hij weigert aan het onderzoek deel te nemen. Individuen die besluiten om 
hun bedrijfsidee voort te zetten zijn veel vaker geneigd om aan het onderzoek deel te 
nemen dan zij die van hun bedrijfsidee afzien. Hierdoor dienen onderzoekers en beleids-
makers opmerkzaam te zijn voor een zogenaamde causale bias. Deze zorgt er namelijk 
voor dat het afzien van een bedrijfsidee in werkelijkheid vaker voorkomt dan de onder-
zoeksresultaten laten zien. Dit kan weer leiden tot onderschatting van de structurele 
beperkingen voor het toetreden tot de markt van zelfstandige ondernemers, zoals het 
onderschatten van liquiditeitsbeperkingen, 
In hoofdstuk 7 verplaatsen wij onze aandacht naar de dynamiek van de beslissing 
om te stoppen met een bedrijf en zo eventueel de markt van zelfstandige ondernemers 
weer te verlaten. In dit hoofdstuk ontwerpen wij een theoretisch model om de weerstand 
186 van ondernemers om met hun bedrijf te stoppen te meten wanneer er verzonken kosten 
met het bedrijf gemoeid zijn en de evolutie van toekomstige bedrijfsinkomsten onzeker 
is. De resultaten laten zien dat de fractie van de opstartkosten die verzonken zijn er voor 
zorgen dat de ondernemer weerstand heeft om zijn bedrijf op te zeggen. Dit kan er op 
duiden dat er een optie waarde aan het opzeggen van een bedrijf kleeft. Een ondernemer 
kan hierdoor er voor kiezen een tijdelijk verlies te accepteren en besluiten om zelfstandig 
ondernemer te blijven en wachten of de bedrijfscondities verbeteren om zo de gedeelte-
lijk verzonken opstartkosten terug te verdienen. 
Verder gaat hoofdstuk 7 in op de vraag waarom startende ondernemers verschillen 
in de grootte van kapitaal investeringen waarmee zij de markt van zelfstandige onderne-
mers toetreden. Hier wordt wederom gekeken naar de invloed van de brede sociale 
context op deze beslissing en voornamelijk naar de invloed van eerdere keuzes m.b.t. de 
arbeidsmarkt op de grootte van de kapitaalinvestering van beginnende ondernemers. De 
resultaten laten zien dat in het bijzonder de hoogte van het laatst genoten loon een belang-
rijke determinant is voor de hoogte van de initiële kapitaalinvestering in gedeeltelijk 
verzonken opstartkosten. Dit resultaat is in lijn met de verwachtingen van een door ons 
met verzonken kosten uitgebreid keuzemodel voor ondernemerschap. Dit keuzemodel 
laat zien dat mensen hun initiële kapitaal investeringen moeten verhogen om individueel 
bepaalde toetredingsdrempels te overkomen. Dit model voorspelt dat individuen met een 
hoog laatst genoten loon meer gedeeltelijk verzonken kapitaal moeten investeren om hun 
persoonlijke drempel te overkomen en het voor hen winstgevend wordt om zelfstandig 
ondernemer te zijn. Specifiek vinden wij dat de elasticiteit van het voorafgaand genoten 
loon in verhouding tot initiële kapitaalinvesteringen in gedeeltelijke verzonken opstart-
kosten 0.294 is. Dit wil zeggen dat elke procent vermeerdering van het laatst genoten 
loon voor de toetredingsbeslissing een 0.294 procent toename in initiële kapitaalinveste-
ring betekent. 
In hoofdstuk 8 onderzoeken wij een mogelijke factor die kan bijdragen aan het 
succes van een onderneming, namelijk de grootte van het sociale netwerk van een onder-
nemer. In dit hoofdstuk modeleren wij de vraag naar productieve sociale relaties als een 
uitkomst van winstmaximaliserend gedrag onder onzekerheid. Wij veronderstellen dat 
sociale relaties productieve input zijn in het productieproces van een bedrijf. De produc-
tiviteit van een sociale relatie kan variëren tussen industrieën vanwege verschillende 
productieprocessen. Relaties kunnen ook productiever zijn wanneer markten niet perfect 
competitief zijn. Zulke markten worden vaak gekenmerkt door zoek en transactiekosten. 
Hierdoor kunnen op het oog gelijke sociale relaties verschillen in hun mate van producti-
viteit al naar gelang dat zij deze markt imperfecties kunnen overkomen en het productie-
proces kunnen optimaliseren. In ons model zijn de kosten om deze sociale relaties aan te 
gaan heterogeen. Evenwichtsvraag in de markt van sociale relaties wordt dan ook bereikt 
wanneer de marginale opbrengsten van een sociale relatie gelijk zijn aan de marginale 
kosten van het aangaan van deze relatie. 
De voorspellingen van dit model zijn getoets op de Limburg dataset. De econome-
trische analyse laat zien dat jonge, hoog opgeleide startende ondernemers in grote steden 
met ouders, die ook zelfstandig ondernemer zijn, lagere kosten hebben om sociale relaties 
aan te gaan. De ordering van de verwachte winsten laten verminderende opbrengsten van 
sociale relaties zien en de verwachte winsten verschillen per industrie. Gemiddeld bereikt 
een zelfstandige ondernemer een optimale hoeveelheid informatie door 4 a 5 sociale 
187 relaties aan te gaan. Hieruit kunnen wij concluderen dat de evenwichtsvraag naar produc-
tieve sociale relaties afgeleid kan worden uit de vraagcondities die ontstaan uit imperfec-
ties binnen de marktstructuur en de aanbodscondities die ontstaan uit individuele ver-
schillen tussen ondernemers. 
Hiermee zijn wij aan het einde gekomen van dit proefschrift waarin wij getracht 
hebben recht te doen aan het dynamische karakter van toe en uittreding tot de markt van 
zelfstandige ondernemers. Verder hebben wij het belang laten zien van de sociale omge-
ving op deze processen. We hebben laten zien dat de ondernemer niet slechts een los-
staand fenomeen buiten de sociale context is maar dat hij stevig ingebed zit in de sociale 
structuur die hem zowel mogelijkheden biedt om zichzelf te ontplooien maar die het hem 
tevens moeilijk maakt om een bedrijf te starten of om een bedrijf succesvol te maken. 
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